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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), numerous studies have focused 
on tax evasion which analyze the incentives to evade taxes. Tax evasion is illegal 
whereas tax avoidance is not necessarily and it is more difficult to determine 
whether the transaction is permissible or not. Tresch (2002, p. 512) defines tax 
avoidance and tax evasion: 
"Tax avoidance refers to taxpayers taking advantage of the 
provisions of the tax laws to reduce their tax liability. Avoidance of 
taxes is legal and its consequences certain. Tax evasion refers to 
hiding sources of taxable income from the tax authorities to reduce 
one's tax liability. Evading taxes is illegal and its consequences are 
uncertain depending on the probability of the taxpayer being 
caught. " 
Given this definition, tax evasion is illegal and may be punishable by substantial 
fines and, in extreme cases, imprisonment whereas tax avoidance is the use of 
legal loopholes and tax allowances to reduce legitimately the size of a tax bill. To 
reduce avoidance, tax authorities are likely to attempt to eliminate loopholes but 
this may lead to an overly complex system. As each loophole is closed, tax 
advisers will search for other loopholes and indeed the closing of a particular 
loophole may inadvertently lead to other loopholes being found. These activities 
are referred to as aggresive tax planning, which is an attempt to reduce tax liability 
and often requires an intelligent application of expert knowledge to avoid tax. 
Lymer and Oats (2006, p. 350) define tax planning as activity that "involves 
strategic use of available tax concessions in order to minimize tax liability. " As 
previously mentioned, the government effort to eliminate loopholes may, 
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however, lead to a more complex tax system. As the government realizes that tax 
advisers have discovered effective methods of avoiding tax, the government will 
make an effort to instigate tax reform. However, taxpayers always find other 
opportunities in response to these reactions. It could result in the government 
discovering that taxpayers take more advantage of the new tax law than of prior 
provision. 
Tax avoidance thrives where there is some structural defect or loophole in the tax 
legislation. An example of such a loophole enables the common practice of tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing, where profit or income is shifted between 
countries. Even though there is the transfer pricing arm's length principle, 
multinational companies might still be able to use developing countries with less 
sophisticated tax system, to reduce the overall tax burden. According to Buckley 
and Hughes (1998, p. 622) it is difficult to quantify transfer pricing owing to 
"insufficient documentation available to the taxing authorities to `prove' a lack of 
arm's length price and different methods of costing between companies. " With 
different tax rates or systems to avoid the total amount of tax payable, tax 
avoidance also includes income shifting, investing in loss companies, income 
splitting and gift schemes. 
At one time, the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion was relatively 
clear. Tax avoidance was legally permissible and tax evasion was not. In more 
recent times, there has been a blurring of these two concepts. Potas (1993) has 
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coined the term `avoision' to describe the grey area between avoidance and 
evasion. Even now the confusion is such that some tax officers prefer the terms 
`compliance' and `non-compliance', rather than seeking to distinguish between 
avoidance and evasion. In the past, the term tax avoidance was used to denote that 
the taxpayers had employed legal methods or schemes for reducing their tax 
liability. It did not imply any conscious wrongdoing, but merely planning which 
resulted in paying less tax than otherwise required. This process is sometimes 
referred to as tax minimization and is the end product or objective of tax planning. 
Potas (1993) has described tax planning as the exploitation of tax law. He 
comments that, in the last decade or so, tax avoidance has acquired a distinctive 
pejorative connotation. There is no longer a guarantee that avoidance 
arrangements entered into by the taxpayer are free from illegality. In other words, 
some forms of tax avoidance are illegal. There is much case law relating tax 
avoidance and two cases which are very well-known are the Peabody case in 
Australia and Furniss v. Dawson in the U. K.. Both are cases relate to individuals, 
not companies. The Australian case, Peabody v. The Commissioner for Taxation 
[1994] ATC 4140, ' is one case of many where the taxpayer had overstepped the 
mark between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
I Peabody's case involved a complicated series of transactions where the amount of $8.6 million 
value of shares was added to the Peabody family trust. The business, Pozzolanic Group, was 
owned by the Peabody family (62%) and Kleinschmidt (38%). Kleinschmidt sold his 38% stake 
($8.6m) to Peabody but, instead of buying the shares directly, the shares were transferred through a 
complicated series of transactions and gained a tax advantage without giving any legal profit to the 
tax authority. 
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Tax avoidance is legal but may be considered unacceptable behaviour, for 
example in the U. K case of Furniss v. Dawson [1984] A. C. 474,2 the courts found 
that there was no commercial purpose other than the avoidance of tax for a set of 
transactions and required the tax thus avoided to be paid. Even though Dawson 
argued that, the Ramsey Principle3 did not apply in their case, the court decided 
that they had generated such artificial transaction only for tax saving. 
Potas (1993) claims that during the 1970s the tax avoidance industry mushroomed. 
Taxation planning was actively promoted by professional lawyers and 
accountants. In the Australian case, for example, the Treasury's Draft White 
Paper cited in Grabosky and Braithwaite (1987) indicated that, in 1985, the 
activity of tax avoidance and tax evasion was estimated to have cost the Australian 
revenue authorities about $3 billion per year. This offence is generally regarded by 
criminologists as belonging to the category of white-collar crime. Grabosky and 
Braithwaite (1987) mention that traditionally, white-collar crime is taken to relate 
to persons of relatively high social status who commit crimes in the course of their 
occupation. However, that label does not sit comfortably with tax evaders. 
2 Furniss v. Dawson is an important example of tax avoidance case in the UK. Dawson, owned two 
successful companies called Fordham and Burton Ltd. and Kirkby Garments Ltd., and wished to 
sell his family company to Wood Bairstow Holdings Ltd. He did not sell the company directly (so 
as to avoid capital gain tax), and thus adopted a pre-arranged plan and formed Greenjacket 
Investments Ltd. Dawson sold his family share to Greenjacket and owned Greenjacket shares as an 
exchange in lieu of money. On the same day, the newly formed Greenjacket sold the family shares 
to Wood at a previously negotiated price. Dawson had a capital gain tax exemption from the 
disposal of family company shares to Greenjacket in respect of the company amalgamation. The 
court had made the decision that pre-arranged artificial transactions had taken place for no 
commercial purpose, but only to avoid tax. 
3 W. T. Ramsey Ltd v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1982) A. C. 300 was the earlier case. 
Ramsey entered into a complex and self-cancelling series of transactions which had created an 
artificial capital loss. It involved pre-arranged artificial transactions which have no commercial 
purpose other than to save tax. 
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Grabosky and Braithwaite (1987) stated that tax evasion and tax avoidance 
activities are generally associated with the rich and powerful and involve large 
companies and large amounts of money and yet the offence can also apply to 
ordinary people, to almost anyone in fact who derives an income and has an 
obligation to pay tax. Grabosky and Braithwaite (1987) continued that naturally, 
the greater the income or capital that a person or corporation derives, the greater is 
the potential for large scale tax avoidance and fraud. For example, The Canberra 
Times (10 May 1993) reported that, since 1988, the Australian Tax Office has 
been conducting a large scale audit programme which has targeted the top 100 
Australian companies. When only about half of these audits had been completed, 
records kept by the Corporate Tax Association revealed that tax adjustments 
arising from these audits had already exceeded $1 billion, although some 30 per 
cent of these adjustments were still in dispute. 
The China Daily (2004) reported that China's tax authorities have accused 
multinationals of widespread tax avoidance, causing the country to lose as much 
as 30 billion yuan each year. Asia Times (2007) claimed that foreign 
manufacturer use transfer pricing to shift revenue abroad and avoid paying tax in 
China. They reported that, from 1990 to 2004, revenue shifted by foreign-invested 
enterprise in China reached $250.6 billion. 
In the United States, a study organized by the Institute of Taxation and Economic 
Policy (ITEP, 2000), including the 250 largest and profitable corporations in the 
5 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
U. S for the 1996 to 1998 period, reports resurgence in corporate tax avoidance. 
The study found that although big corporations are supposed to pay 35 per cent of 
their profits in taxes, the 250 companies in ITEP's survey paid only 20.1 per cent 
in 1998, which was down from 22.9 per cent in 1996. This is far below the 26.5 
per cent that a similar group of large companies paid in 1988. If all 250 companies 
paid the full 35 per cent corporate tax rate on their $735 billion in pretax U. S 
profits from 1996 to 1998, their federal income tax would have totalled $257 
billion. However instead, tax breaks for the 250 companies lowered their taxes by 
$26.9 billion in 1996, $31.8 billion in 1997 and $39.3 billion in 1998, for a total of 
$98 billion in tax saving over the three years4. Almost half of those tax-break 
dollars went to just 25 companies, which each received more than a billion dollars 
in tax breaks. The study found that companies used a variety of means to lower 
their federal income taxes, including accelerated depreciation write-offs, tax 
credits for activities such as research and oil drilling, and tax breaks for doing 
business in Puerto Rico. The other significant tax break involved leasing activities 
and stock options. They found that 233 of the 250 companies lowered their taxes 
through stock options by a total of $25.8 billion over the three years. 
More recently, a study organized by the Citizens for Tax Justice (2005) 
concerning state corporate tax avoidance by 252 of American's largest and most 
profitable corporations from 2001 through to 2003, found that those companies on 
average failed to include two-thirds of their actual U. S. pretax profits on their state 
4 This study does not provide profit and tax breaks for individual years, and elaborates more on the 
industry approach. 
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tax returns. These 252 companies dramatically reduced their state income tax 
payments to an average of only 2.3 per cent of their U. S. profits. Since the average 
statutory state corporate tax rate is about 6.8 per cent (weighted by gross state 
product), that means that two-thirds of their profits escaped state taxes entirely. It 
is found that 71 of the 252 companies managed to pay no state income tax at all in 
at least one year from 2001 through to 2003, despite telling their shareholders they 
made $86 billion in pretax U. S. profits in those no-tax years. Twenty-five of these 
companies enjoyed multiple no tax years. In 2003 alone, 35 companies paid no 
state income tax. Another 138 of the companies paid less than half the statutory 
state corporate tax rate that particular year. The study stresses that, if these 252 
corporations had paid the 6.8 per cent average state corporate tax rate on the 
almost $1 trillion in U. S. profits that they reported to their shareholders, they 
would have paid $67.1 billion in state corporate income taxes over the 2001 to 
2003 period. Instead, they paid only $25.4 billion. Thus, these 252 companies 
avoided a total of $41.7 billion in state corporate income taxes over the three 
years. 
Even though some studies (for example, Fletcher, 2002; ITEP, 2000) contend that 
tax incentives are not effective, are costly, distort investment, facilitate corruption, 
make the tax system complicated and in certain cases promote tax avoidance, tax 
authorities have long viewed tax incentives as necessary and vital to promote 
investment, provide a more conducive business environment particularly to lower 
the cost of doing business and also to ensure a more efficient taxation system. In 
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Malaysia, tax incentives have been offered for several reasons. There is a need to 
implement those incentives to achieve the national plan. As for the Malaysian 
government, they have provided a list of tax breaks as well as tax incentives for 
several objectives. Most of the incentives offered are listed in the Promotion of 
Investment Act (PIA) of 1986 and the Income Tax Act of 1967. The different tax 
incentives have been formulated accordingly to its objective, and are discussed in 
Chapter 2. Generally, tax incentives have been designed to develop certain 
industrial bases for economic growth, attract foreign investments to gain access to 
new technology and to make the cost of doing business internationally 
competitive. Thus, in line with government aspirations, the tax incentives offered 
will assist the government in expediting technology transfer, lowering production 
costs, simulating exports and boosting economic development. 
In Malaysia, income tax revenue is a major contributor to Malaysian government 
revenues. The Bank Negara Annual Report (2003) reported that income tax 
represents approximately 50 per cent of the total revenue of the Federal 
Government of Malaysia. The Inland Revenue Annual Report (2000) reported that 
the largest contributors to the income tax collected were incorporated businesses 
which made up about 47.93 per cent of the total tax collected. From the data, more 
than MYR400 million were collected from back taxes which were from cases 
under investigation. This suggests that there may be tax evasion activities in 
Malaysia. However, very little research regarding tax evasion, and no research 
regarding tax avoidance, has been carried out in Malaysia to the author's 
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knowledge. A study by Kasipillai (1997) suggested that tax evasion accounts for 
an average of around 20 per cent for the period 1971 to 1994. In this study, 
Kasipillai (1997) estimated the size of the hidden economy as a proxy to evaluate 
the extent of tax evasion. He reported the estimated tax losses from 1971 to 1994 
as a low of MYR192 million (in 1971) and a peak of MYR1,350 million (in 1984). 
Even though Kasipillai's study only estimates hidden economy as it is difficult to 
accurately measure the hidden economy, however, the prevalence of tax evasion is 
a major concern for the Government. Deputy Minister of Finance Datuk Chan 
Kong Choy reported that although tax collection reached a record high (MYR45 
billion) in 2002, the number of defaulters are also believed to have increased. By 
July 2002, over 13,000 individuals owing some MYR1 billion in taxes were 
barred from leaving the country. This compares to under 4,000 in 2001 (Business 
Time, 2003). Therefore, from the above, it is believed that tax avoidance activity 
has been increasing over time. 
This thesis focuses on tax avoidance and not tax evasion. Unlike tax avoidance, 
tax evasion is always against the law. It is the activity of not paying taxes either by 
under-declaring income or over-declaring deductions or exemptions. Taxpayers 
who engage in tax evasion will face deterrent penalties, and in some cases, 
custodial sentences for tax evasion. On the other hand, tax avoidance is legal, but 
the consequence is same as with tax evasion, that is it will reduce the tax revenue. 
Thus, this is an interesting phenomenon that needs to be studied. 
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This study will help to explain, in part, the determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance strategies in Malaysian. 
1.2 Background to the Study 
Countries frequently change their tax laws and regulations, being prompted by 
budgetary needs, general economic conditions, and the political situation at that 
time. For example, according to Auerbach and Hines (1988), the United States 
introduced 17 separate corporate tax reforms over a 33 year period from 1953 to 
1985. Stiglitz (1988) provides a discussion of the changing composition of US 
taxation. Over the same period, in that country, the federal government had drawn 
relatively more from social security taxes, a similar amount from personal income 
tax, and less from corporation tax and from excises. Slemrod (2001) noted that, 
over the past half century, corporate tax collections have been in steady decline. 
They amounted to about 5 per cent of GDP in the 1950's, about 4 per cent in the 
1960s, about 3 per cent in the 1970s, and just over 2 per cent since then. 
A report by the Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ, 2004) focuses on the $210 billion 
provided in the new corporate tax breaks, mostly for corporations over the next 
decade. Many of the tax subsidies will further reward multinational corporate tax 
avoidance. In another CTJ report (2003), it was documented that corporate tax 
reductions in the past two years have been unwarranted as they have not had a 
positive effect on jobs. Instead, Congress should move in exactly the opposite 
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direction, by closing loopholes and restoring corporate tax payments to a 
reasonable level. This is because the most recent Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) data shows that U. S. corporate taxes as a 
share of the economy are now virtually the lowest in the industrialized world. 
Some of the corporate tax shortfalls reflect the weak economy, and the vast 
amount of offshore tax sheltering in which corporations now engage. Counting tax 
breaks that have been on the books for longer, corporations now pay considerably 
less than half of what they should. They also pay far less than they used to pay. 
These statements have been reported by Citizens for Tax Justice (2004) for large 
companies in the Fortune 500. 
In the U. K., similar trends have also been reported. For example Kay (1990) 
reported that the number of tax reforms or changes in the tax structure has resulted 
in the increased importance of social security taxes and of Value Added Tax 
(VAT). National insurance contributions have grown steadily. VAT, which was 
introduced in Britain in 1973, has increased greatly in significance and raises a far 
greater proportion of revenue than did purchase tax, the wholesale sales tax which 
it replaced. Personal income tax makes much the same contribution to revenue as 
in the 1960s. Most other taxes, such as excises on particular commodities, the 
corporate income tax and other taxes on capital are in relative decline. However, 
one recent study by Devereux et al. (2004) does not continuously support this 
finding. They found that, even though the statutory tax rate for the UK 
corporations has been reduced over the last two decades, tax revenues have 
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increased substantially over these years. However, they argue that this does not 
necessarily suggest an increase in tax compliance but may be partly explained by 
higher rates of profitability and the expansion of the financial sector. 
A tax system is one tool that a government can use to promote overall economic 
stability and growth. Since the tax system generates revenues to fund a country's 
expenditure, it is important to ensure that taxpayers pay their appropriate share of 
taxes. However, the tax system may itself create opportunities for unintended 
distortion behaviour. Distortion behaviour exists as a consequence of tax 
loopholes in the tax system. One of the unintended behaviours is aggressively 
minimizing tax liabilities, which is a device used in tax avoidance activity. The 
government may try to stimulate the economy by providing particular tax 
incentives for managers and companies to achieve in particular ways. Frequently 
the incentive gives rise to behavior unintended and unexpected by the authorities. 
Managers' reactions to tax legislation are not predictable. Managers might alter 
the financing, investing, or production activities of the firm in order to minimize 
tax in ways other than originally intended by the tax authorities when providing an 
incentive. This study examines managerial behavior in using accounting policy 
and tax legislation to avoid corporate tax. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Tax avoidance is the basic way of keeping taxes as low as possible by taking 
advantage of every possible technicality in the tax law. Sometimes the line 
between tax evasion and tax avoidance becomes blurred, which is why many 
taxpayers pay often quite substantial fees to lawyers and accountants to ensure that 
aggressive tax avoidance does not result in criminal charges for tax evasion. 
The principal objective of this thesis is to document the determinants of corporate 
tax avoidance behaviour in public listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 
2001 to 2005. Seven firm characteristics were chosen either on the basis of their 
economic implications for tax avoidance behaviour or because they proxy for the 
hypotheses developed in this thesis. 
Specifically, the research objectives are: 
a) To investigate the existence of tax avoidance in Malaysia. 
b) To examine whether the following potential determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance behaviour are relevant in the Malaysian corporate setting. 
i. Political Cost 
ii. Profitability 
iii. Leverage 
iv. Foreign Activity 
v. Capital Intensity 
13 
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vi. Dividend 
vii. Managerial Ownership 
c) To identify which characteristics distinguish firms that avoid corporate tax. 
d) To identify whether the extent of tax avoidance and its determinants 
differs depending on the industry. 
This thesis is the first attempt to study the factors affecting company tax avoidance 
behavior in Malaysia. In examining the company characteristics that affect the 
company's tax avoidance behavior, the thesis offers an opportunity to explore the 
industry effect towards tax planning based on tax incentives given for each 
industry. Unlike previous studies in the main stream effective tax rate (ETR) 
literature, this study extends the range of theoretical determinants to cover 
characteristics in the Malaysian business environment. The thesis provides new 
evidence of the importance of dividend policy and managerial ownership in tax 
avoidance strategies. 
While most of the existing studies employed ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, this thesis utilizes recent developments in the econometrics of panel 
data to estimate the parameters in the tax avoidance model. A distinct advantage 
of panel data is that it facilitates testing of economic relationships over time and 
across companies. The analyses in the thesis therefore are able to examine the 
effects of macro-economic factors, such as the tax system, on a company's tax 
avoidance behaviour. 
14 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Tax and financial advisers have become much more sophisticated about 
engineering transactions to avoid tax. The cost of such strategies has been 
declining because the supply of tax avoidance experts has increased which has 
produced competitive pressures to lower the costs of advice and has expanded the 
arrangement of shelter schemes. Some commentators explain the growth in 
corporate tax avoidance activity as a reflection of the more accepting attitudes of 
tax advisers and corporate executives towards engaging in aggressive tax 
planning. Furthermore, corporations might view the current tax system as unfair. 
In such an environment, some corporations may be more willing to take 
aggressive tax positions. 
Thus, the focus of this study is to provide at least a partial explanation as to why 
some companies (tax avoiders) systematically avoid income taxes while other 
companies (tax non-avoiders) pay their fair share of taxes. The results of this 
study may partly assist tax authorities in the development of an equitable and fair 
national tax policy in Malaysia. Since the tax system potentially generates such 
large amounts of revenue, it is important that policy makers create a consistent, 
logical and fair set of laws to ensure compliance. Care must be exercised in 
creating tax statutes to create a fair and equitable tax system for all taxpayers. 
However, to obtain this equitable system, it is important that tax authorities 
understand the economic consequences of their regulations on all tax paying 
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entities. This study does determine which characteristics of companies lead them 
increasingly to avoid taxes. The benefits of this study also include exploring the 
impact of national tax policy on financial reporting and could help explain 
managerial behavior. 
Maydew (2000) provides comments and critiques on empirical tax research in 
accounting and suggests that, in future research there is a need to clarify why some 
companies appear to be more aggressive tax avoiders than other companies; to 
identify whether companies engaging in foreign operations heavily utilize 
opportunities in tax planning and corporate tax shelters. 5 His discussion is 
designed, first and foremost, for PhD students interested in conducting tax 
research. 
Most research on corporate tax avoidance has been conducted in the U. S., the 
U. K. and Australia. This is the first study of its kind to the author's knowledge to 
be carried out in an emerging market. This study investigates corporate tax 
avoidance in Malaysia, thus adding to the corporate tax avoidance literature by 
examining an emerging market. 
Another factor of importance is the potential to pass to the tax authorities valuable 
information regarding tax avoiding activity which will be an essential factor in 
S Corporate decisions are potentially affected by tax provisions. For example, Rego (2003) claims 
that companies engaging in foreign operations are more able to avoid income taxes than domestic- 
only companies, and Philip (2003) indicates that managers' after-tax compensation leads to the 
companies' propensities to engage in tax planning. 
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assisting tax authorities to develop a fairer tax system. The Malaysian tax system 
is an old tax system which has not changed much since it was developed. The 
Income Tax Ordinance, 1947, was the first income tax legislation enacted for the 
Federation of Malaysia. The Act, which took effect from 1 January 1948, was 
subsequently repealed and replaced with the Income Tax Act (ITA), 1967. 
However, ITA 1967, which came into force on 1 January 1968, did not introduce a 
new taxation system. While the Malaysian economy has progressed and 
developed, the tax system has not changed much to cope with increasing 
complexities in business operations within the changing economy. The principles 
and rules of income taxation embodied in the tax law which was introduced in 
1948 and consolidated in 1968 still apply today. Now, modem businesses have 
become increasingly large and complex but the tax system has not kept pace. With 
more complex businesses, the loopholes in the tax system have become 
increasingly exploited. It is now the right time to close some of these loopholes 
and protect the tax base. It is hoped that this study would be able to assist partly 
the tax authorities in developing tax reforms to reduce the opportunities for 
unintended tax avoidance. The outcome from the reform and the closing of the 
loopholes may help to improve the integrity of the Malaysian tax system. 
1.5 The Thesis in Brief 
Most previous studies in this area have attempted to examine the determinants of 
tax avoidance in a univariate framework. This thesis provides new evidence on the 
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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the tax avoidance literature by researching the 
importance of various firm characteristics as possible determinants of corporate 
tax avoidance strategies. Corporate tax avoidance studies have been addressed for 
a number of years within the developed market context, whereas corporate tax 
avoidance research for companies in developing, countries is largely non-existent. 
The determinants of tax avoidance strategy used in previous research are carried 
over into the Malaysian context, with additional new factors identified as relevant 
in the Malaysian business environment. This thesis is the first to document the link 
between corporate tax avoidance and firm characteristics in an emerging market. 
Seven explanatory variables are hypothesized in associating firm characteristics 
with corporate tax avoidance activities. These variables, which are included in the 
tax avoidance model, are political cost, profitability, leverage, foreign activity, 
capital intensity, dividend and managerial ownership. Industry affiliations are also 
included as potential explanatory variables because tax avoidance activity may 
also depend on the sensitivity of certain industries. 
This thesis tests the corporate tax avoidance model by using a cross-sectional 
valuation, which is OLS estimation, and a cross-sectional-time series valuation 
using panel data analyses including three panel types, which are fixed-effects, 
random-effects and tobit estimations. The results reveal that all of the explanatory 
variables have a statistically significant coefficient with predicted sign except for 
the foreign activity dummy variable and the dividend which is significant with 
sign different from expected. The results also confirm the importance of industry 
differences in explaining corporate tax avoidance activity. 
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determinants of corporate tax avoidance in a multivariate framework, using micro- 
level longitudinal (panel) data. Specifically, the thesis examines the determinants 
of tax avoidance strategies by examining the association between the effective tax 
rate (ETR) and political cost, profitability, leverage, foreign activity, capital 
intensity, dividend and managerial ownership. The proxies used to measure the 
explanatory variables and their predicted influences on avoidance behaviour are 
discussed below. 
Firm size proxies the political cost characteristic of the company. This 
thesis hypothesizes that corporate ETR is positively associated with the 
political cost. This is consistent with several studies (for example, Rego, 
2003; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Omer et al., 1993) which argue that 
larger companies suffer from political cost that increases their ETR. 
Political cost hypothesis asserts that large companies face greater 
government scrutiny than smaller companies which in turn suffer from a 
higher corporate tax burden. 
Profitability is measured by income before income tax (IBIT) and is 
hypothesized to have negative association with ETR. Rego (2003) 
documents that corporations with greater pre-tax income have lower ETR, 
as companies with greater pre-tax income have greater resources to engage 
in tax planning. 
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0 Capital intensity is measured by the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total 
assets and it is hypothesized to have a negative influence on ETR. This is 
consistent with Gupta and Newberry (1997) who reported a negative 
significant association between capital intensity and ETR as investment in 
tangible assets would lead to greater tax savings due to increased tax 
deductions associated with investment in physical assets. 
" Leverage, measured by the ratio of debt to equity, is hypothesized to have 
a negative relation with ETR. Stickney and McGee (1982) observe that 
companies with low ETR tend to be highly leveraged. 
0 Foreign activity is measured by two proxies that are a foreign activity 
dummy variable (DFA) and foreign activity (FA). DFA value is 1 if the 
company reported foreign income or foreign assets and zero otherwise. FA 
is measured by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Foreign activity is 
hypothesized to have a negative relation with ETR. This is consistent with 
Rego's (2003) argument that companies engaging in foreign operation 
have greater opportunities to avoid income taxes due to cross-border 
investments and by exploiting differences between tax rules of different 
countries as well as shifting income from high-tax locations to low-tax 
locations. 
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" Dividend is measured by dividend payout ratio. It is hypothesized that 
companies will decrease dividend payments to avoid increase in tax 
liability due to restriction of dividend payment in Section 108 Franking 
Account. The increase in dividend payout ratio will increase the 
company's effective tax paid. Thus, dividend is presumably to have a 
positive relationship with ETR. Dividend is a new variable included in the 
tax avoidance model. 
0 Managerial ownership is measured by the per centage of equity shares 
owned by executive directors and it is hypothesized to have a negative 
relationship with ETR. Managerial ownership is also a new explanatory 
variable included in the tax avoidance model. With the theory of synergy 
and agency which simultaneously exist and interact, it is hypothesized that 
higher managerial ownership will lower the corporate effective tax rate. 
The natural logarithmic transformation is used in most of variables to reduce the 
skewness of the distribution and to minimize the standard error of the regression 
coefficient. In addition, the industry effects are controlled for because company 
characteristics might differ systematically by industry. 
In term of the research methodology perspective, this thesis differs from most 
prior studies by examining the determinants of tax avoidance with longitudinal 
(panel) data. Earlier studies have examined the relationship by using either cross- 
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sectional (for example, Porcano, 1986) or time-series data (for example, 
Zimmerman, 1983). Although Rego (2003) used panel data, he examined only 
firm size, income and multinational corporation effects. The thesis also includes 
cross-sectional estimation by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In 
addition, fixed-effects and random-effects regression models are estimated to 
exploit fully panel data properties. Fixed-effects regression models offer the 
advantage of controlling for unobserved or immeasurable variables if these 
variables do not vary much over time. 
The objective of the thesis is to determine corporate tax avoidance strategies in an 
emerging market in Southeast Asia, Malaysia. The thesis examines specifically the 
corporate tax avoidance determinants of 1,645 firm-years for public listed 
companies in Malaysia between 2001 and 2005, inclusively. 
The thesis addresses four research questions. First, does corporate tax avoidance 
exist in Malaysia and to what extent do corporations avoid tax? Second, what are 
the driving factors of corporate tax avoidance strategies? Third, what are the 
characteristics of companies that avoid tax? Finally, does the type of industry 
affect corporate tax avoidance activity? 
The empirical results confirm that corporate tax avoidance is associated with all 
the explanatory variables in this thesis which are political cost, profitability, 
leverage, foreign activity, capital intensity, dividend and managerial ownership. 
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Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that the industry effects have a 
significant impact on corporate tax avoidance activity. 
Even though tax administration in Malaysia is armed with anti-avoidance 
provisions which empower the Director-General of the Inland Revenue Board 
(IRB) to make adjustments to taxable income whenever there are reasons to 
believe that the company altered business transactions to lower tax, it is found that 
public listed companies in Malaysia do engage in tax avoidance activity. 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 highlights 
Malaysian corporate tax legislation. Chapter 3 presents theoretical arguments and 
develops the hypotheses based on analytical models from previous studies. 
Chapter 4 discusses research methods, including data gathering, sample selection 
procedures, research models and the measurement of the variables. The analysis 
and results are presented in Chapter 5. Lastly, Chapter 6 contains discussions, 
implications, concluding comments, indications of future research directions and 
potential limitations. 
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Malaysian Corporate Tax Legislation 
2.1 Introduction 
Taxation is an important economic tool for the Malaysian government to employ 
to regulate the economy. The principal aims of implementing tax policies are to 
develop economic growth and to provide funds for numerous development 
projects and provide funds for public goods, such as education, defence, etc. 
In its early years of development, the Malaysian tax system depended heavily on 
indirect taxes as sources of revenue, in part owing to the imposition of tax on 
rubber exports in 1907. The introduction of income tax in 1917, on a temporary 
basis in Malaya (Malaysia was known as Malaya until 1963), was clouded with 
uncertainty as it faced strong opposition from the general public. For example, the 
draft bill for imposing a tax on income, which was introduced by the Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council in 1910, was withdrawn the following year as it 
did not receive the support of the tax-paying public. Furthermore, early attempts to 
introduce income tax prior to 1948 were interrupted by the two World Wars. 
The new era of income tax in Malaysia was finally introduced in the Income Tax 
Ordinance 1947, which took effect from 1 January 1948. The provisions of this 
Ordinance were based substantially on the Model Colonial Territories Income Tax 
Ordinance 1922 (United Kingdom) which was designed for the British colonies at 
that time. The tax laws of a number of Commonwealth countries were initially 
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based on this model of legislation. Generally, the Malaysian tax structure is 
adapted from those of the United Kingdom and Australia. 
The Income Tax Ordinance 1947 was subsequently repealed and replaced by the 
Income Tax Act (ITA) 1967 which came into effect on 1 January 1968. The 
Income Tax Act 1967 is actually the combination of three income tax6 laws in 
Malaysia, namely: 
The Income Tax Ordinance 1947 for Peninsular Malaysia; 
ii. The Sabah Income Tax Ordinance 1956 for Sabah; and 
iii. The Sarawak Inland Revenue Ordinance 1960 for Sarawak 
The Malaysian income tax law is set forth in the Income Tax Act 1967 and 
supplementary legislation. Other principal tax laws are the Real Property Gain Tax 
Act 1976, Sales Tax Act 1972 and Service Tax Act 1975. Changes in tax laws can 
be introduced by the government at any time to regulate and control the economy. 
Any changes are normally proposed in the annual national budget, which is 
usually announced in October every year. The whole process of these changes 
usually commences with invitations to various organisations to submit their input 
for the national budget. Then, pre-budget dialogues are organised, one part being 
between the minister of finance and treasury officials and the other part between 
various organisations. Subsequently, various meetings are held by the treasury to 
6 The term income tax is generic for tax on company income and profits. 
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formulate recommendations and the budget strategy. Finally they are drafting the 
finance bill, presenting the budget and gazetting the act. 
The Ministry of Finance, in Malaysia, has two separate departments to manage the 
administration of taxes. Direct taxes are administered by the Inland Revenue 
Board while indirect taxes are managed by the Royal Customs and Excise 
Department. Income tax is currently the main source of revenue for the Malaysian 
government. From the Economic Report (2006), 52.3 per cent of the federal 
government revenue was from direct taxes and the remainder was from indirect 
taxes and non-tax revenues. Direct taxes contributed a large portion of federal tax 
revenue. This can be seen in Table 2.1 as follows: 
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Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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Table 2.2 shows direct tax and indirect tax for federal government revenue from 
2002 to 2006. Figures in the parentheses show an annual percentage change in 
revenue. 
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Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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Table 2.3 shows the breakdown of direct taxes (2006). Direct taxes comprise 
corporate tax, personal income tax, petroleum income tax and others. Table 2.3 
shows the importance of corporate tax for Malaysian government revenue as 
corporate tax contributes the major portion of direct taxes. 
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30 
Chapter 2 Malaysian Corporate Tax Legislation 
The computation of a company's income tax is based on its audited accounting 
profit, as adjusted for tax purposes. The principal adjustments to accounting 
profits in determining taxable income are in respect of expenses of a capital 
nature, expenses which have not been incurred for tax purposes such as general 
provisions for expected future liabilities, specifically prohibited expenses such as 
contributions to unapproved savings, provident or pension schemes and excess 
contributions to approved schemes, and expenses not incurred wholly and 
exclusively in the production of income. The computation of a company's income 
tax payable can be seen in Appendix A. 
2.2 Basis of Taxation 
Malaysia had a preceding year basis of assessment before the calendar year or 
financial year ending in 1999. The taxable income for a year of assessment was 
determined by reference to the income for the basis period (year immediately 
preceding that year of assessment). In the year 2000, Malaysia switched from the 
preceding year basis of assessment to the current year basis of assessment. As a 
result of the change, income tax on taxable income (other than dividend income) 
for the basis year or basis period ending in 1999 was waived from taxes. The first 
year of assessment under this basis was the year of assessment 2000 for the 
financial or calendar year ending in 2000. The basis year and year of assessment is 
the same year which is usually from 1 January to 31 December annually. 
However, the business organisations that may have accounting year ends which do 
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not end on 31 December and the Act (current year basis of assessment) allows the 
accounting year to be the basis period. 
2.3 Corporate Income Tax 
2.3.1 Resident Companies 
As indicated in Section 8, Income Tax Act, 1967, a company is deemed to be 
resident in Malaysia for the basis year if at any time during the basis year the 
management and control of its business or businesses is exercised in Malaysia. 
Management and control generally refer to the place where the board of directors 
meet to make a decision. 
Income tax is charged on a company's income that accrues in or is derived from 
Malaysia. Overseas income remitted by companies is tax exempt except for 
companies carrying on sea and air transport business, insurance and banking 
which are taxable. Resident companies carrying on sea and air transport business, 
insurance, and banking operations are taxed on a world income basis. No tax, 
however, is charged on offshore income derived by an offshore company. 
Offshore business activities are governed under the Labuan Offshore Business 
Activity Tax Act, 1990. 
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2.3.2 Tax Rates 
Malaysia, similar to other countries such as the UK and the US, has lowered its 
corporate tax rate gradually over the years, from 40 per cent in 1988 to the current 
rate of 28 per cent. In the 1998 Budget, the rate of income tax imposed on 
companies was reduced from 30 per cent to 28 per cent. The rationale given for 
this is to help ease the tax burden of the private sector. In the 2006 Budget, the 
corporate tax rate was announced as being reduced to 27 per cent in 2006 and 26 
per cent for 2007. The reduction of tax rates is summarized in Table 2.4 as 
follows: 
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Table 2.4 
Changes in Malaysian Corporate Tax Rates 
Year Corporate 
of Assessment Tax Rate (%} 
Before 1988 40 
1989 -1992 35 
Ir 1993 34 
1994 12 
_ 1995-1997 0 
1998- 2005 28 
2006 27 
2007 26 
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Other objectives of the reduction in the Malaysian corporate tax rate are to attract 
foreign investors and provide an incentive for companies to expand their activities. 
The reduction in the tax rate not only resulted in lower income taxes being payable 
on an on-going basis but also created an opportunity for companies to utilize a 
short term benefit by managing revenues and expenses so as to defer the payment 
of income taxes. In the U. S., Guenther (1994) found empirical evidence that 
companies deferred revenues and accelerated expenses to increase tax saving 
when faced with lowering corporate tax rates. 
From the year of assessment 1998, all companies in Malaysia have been subject to 
a flat 28 per cent tax on their chargeable income, while the income of non-resident 
companies is taxed at varying rates depending on the nature of income (Table 2.5). 
There is no minimum income tax. 
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Table 2.5 
Malaysian Corporate Income Tax Rates 
Companies Corporate 
Tax Rate (%) 
Resident Companies 
- all income 
Non-resident Companies 
28 
- Royalties IO 
- Rental of Moveable Properties IO 
Technical or Management Service Fees 10 
- Interest 15 
Dividend 28 
Business and Other Income 28 
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Malaysian companies are required to make payments of tax in 12 equal monthly 
instalments, beginning from the second month of the company's basis period 
(financial year). An estimate of tax payable for the year of assessment must be 
provided to the Director General one month before the beginning of the basis 
period. The balance of the tax payable by a company is due to be paid on the last 
day by which the return must be submitted. Tax on royalties, rental of moveable 
properties, technical or management service fees and interest received by non- 
resident companies are collected by means of a withholding tax. The withholding 
tax is payable within one month of crediting or paying the non-resident company. 
Table 2.6 shows the corporate tax rates for Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries. Malaysian corporate tax rate (28 per cent) is the second 
lowest in the ASEAN region. This is statutory rate and not the effective tax rate. 
There is a set of various incentives available for the manufacturing, hotel, tourism- 
related and certain other strategic industries, like IT companies. With all these 
incentives in place, the effective tax rate is much lower than the statutory rate of 
28 per cent. 
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Table 2.6 
Corporate Tax Rates of ASEAN Countries 
ASEAN Countries 2005 2006 
(%) (%) 
Sini more 20 2() 
Malaysia 28 27 
Vietnam 28 28 
Brunei Darussalam 30 30 
Indonesia 30 30 
Thailand 30 30 
Philippines 32 35 
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In addition, from the year of assessment 2003, companies with a paid-up capital of 
MYR2.5 million and below (small and medium sized companies) are assessed at a 
lower rate of 20 per cent on the first MYR100,000 of taxable income, while any 
excess is subject to tax at the statutory rate of 28 per cent. The threshold of 
MYR100,000 was increased to MYR500,000 from the year of assessment 2004. 
The reduction in tax rates for these small and medium sized companies was 
brought in by the government due to promoting investment in small and medium 
enterprise (SME). 
2.3.3 Self Assessment System 
Malaysia has in place a self assessment system (SAS) in the computation, 
disclosure and payment of taxes. Self assessment for companies came into effect 
from 2001. Under the self assessment system, taxpayers assess their own tax 
liability and pay taxes based on their disclosed figures. Taxes are paid in the 
financial period in which profits are earned. The responsibility of correctly 
assessing tax liabilities has been transferred from the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) 
to companies. The main objective of SAS is to inspire a practice of voluntary 
compliance by taxpayers and at the same time, reduce the workload of the IRB to 
enable them to focus on tax audits and potentially increase revenue collection. 
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2.3.4 Collection of Tax 
Before the year of assessment 2001, tax was payable within 30 days of the issue of 
the notice of assessment by the tax authorities. This was under the preceding year 
basis. 
From the year of assessment 2001, when the self assessment system came into 
effect, tax payable by a company is due to be paid on the last day by which the 
return must be submitted. The due date is eight months from the accounting period 
end, in line with the extension of time for submitting the return. An estimate of tax 
payable for the year of assessment must be furnished to the Director General one 
month before the beginning of the basis period. 
This thesis uses data collected from 2001 onwards (2001 being the year the self 
assessment system started in Malaysia). 
2.3.5 Profit Distribution (Dividend) 
Malaysia adopts a dividend imputation system of taxation. Malaysia's dividend 
imputation system applies to dividends paid by Malaysian resident companies to 
resident individual shareholders. Malaysian corporate taxes paid by companies are 
allocated to shareholders by way of imputation credits. These credits are included 
in the shareholder's taxable income, which are then eligible for a tax rebate equal 
40 
Chapter 2 Malaysian Corporate Tax Legislation 
to a tax credit included in their income. Under this system, tax paid by companies 
on profits is imputed to shareholders when dividends are paid. 
Under the dividend imputation system, the income tax paid by a resident company 
is credited into a tax credit account, which can be utilised to frank dividend 
payments to shareholders. Any unutilised tax credits can be carried forward for 
franking future dividend payments. Where the tax franking for a dividend payment 
exceeds the available tax credits, the shortfall becomes a debt due to the tax 
authorities. This payment cannot be utilised against future tax liabilities of the 
company. Therefore, companies pay dividends based on the franking credit 
available which arises from income tax paid less amounts used to frank dividend 
previously distributed. As the tax authority does not refund excess imputation 
credits, companies are subject to pay dividend only from franking credit available. 
An example of a dividend franking account can be seen in the next Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.6. In contrast with the UK dividend imputation system, any access 
imputation credit can be carried forward to use against taxable income in future 
years. 
Foreign shareholders are treated differently and are taxed outside the imputation 
system. 
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2.3.6 Losses 
Business losses can be set off against income from all sources in the current year. 
Any unutilised losses can be carried forward indefinitely to be utilised against 
income from business sources only. 
2.4 Capital Allowances 
Depreciation and amortisation of fixed assets for accounting purposes are not 
allowable for tax purposes. In their place capital allowances are given. A capital 
allowance can only be set off against the income of the business which incurs the 
capital expenditure. It follows that where capital allowances cannot be fully 
absorbed because of an insufficiency of adjusted income, the unabsorbed capital 
allowances can be carried forward indefinitely to offset against future taxable 
income from the same business until they have been fully claimed. This set off 
takes priority before setting off any unabsorbed business losses brought forward 
from previous years. The available capital allowances are discussed in the 
following sections. 
42 
Chapter 2 Malaysian Corporate Tax Legislation 
2.4.1 Industrial Building Allowance (IBA) 
The Industrial Building Allowance (IBA) is permitted by the Income Tax Act 
1967, and is granted to a person? who incurs qualifying capital expenditure on the 
construction or purchase of an industrial building or structure for use in a 
qualifying trade. There are two types of allowance given - is the initial allowance 
and the annual allowance. The rate of the initial allowance is 10 per cent given 
once when the qualifying capital expenditure (QCE) is incurred (first year). The 
QCE is the cost of construction of a building or structures which are used as 
industrial buildings. (Where the industrial building is acquired second hand 
(purchased), special rules apply in quantifying the amount of IBA available). An 
annual allowance at a rate of 2 per cent is given each year commencing from the 
year of assessment relating to the basis period in which the qualifying capital 
expenditure is incurred. An office building will qualify for allowances where it 
physically forms part of an industrial building and its cost does not exceed 10 per 
cent of the total building cost. 
With effect from year of assessment 2000, the QCE building definition has been 
extended to include buildings constructed under an agreement with the 
government on a "build-lease-transfer" basis which was approved by the Minister 
of Finance. The QCE was also extended to include airports and motor racing 
circuits approved by the Ministry of Finance with effect from the year of 
' According to Section 2, Income Tax Act 1967 (Act 53), the interpretation of `person' includes a 
company, a body of persons and a sole corporation. 
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assessment 2001. This is due to the government's objective of promoting the 
tourism industry in Malaysia. 
With effect from the year of assessment 2002, the initial allowance of 10 per cent 
is extended to purchased industrial buildings and the period for claiming industrial 
building allowance has been shortened from 45 to 30 years. Subsequently, the rate 
of annual allowance has been increased from 2 per cent to 3 per cent. In addition, 
industrial building status is extended to include hotel buildings. In order to qualify, 
the hotel must be registered with the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Tourism. 
2.4.2 Plant and Machinery 
Under Schedule 3 of the Income Tax Act 1967, the initial allowance for plant and 
machinery is 20 per cent and annual allowance rates for plant and machinery 
varied depending on the type of assets used in the business. The annual allowance 
rate varied from 6 per cent to 20 per cent according to the Income Tax (Qualifying 
Plant Annual Allowances) Rules 1968. 
However, with effect from the year of assessment 2000, the annual allowance 
rates have been re-categorised with three rates only applicable, is 10 per cent, 14 
per cent and 20 per cent. The changes in the annual allowance rate can be seen in 
Table 2.7 below. With this new rule, the annual allowance rates, ranging from 6 
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per cent to 20 per cent set out in the Income Tax (Qualifying Plant Annual 
Allowances) Rules, 1968 were revoked. 
45 
Chapter 2 Malaysian Corporate Tax Legislation 
Table 2.7 
Changes in the Annual Allowance Rate 
Type of Asset Before Year of From Year of 
Assessment 2000 Assessment 2000 
Rate (%) Rate (%) 
leavy Machinery and 20 20 
Motor Vehicles 
General Plant and 8-20 14 
Machinery 
Office Equipment, 6- 12 1O 
Furniture and Fittings 
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With effect from 28 October 2000, the QCE for a motor vehicle which is not 
licensed or permitted to be used for the commercial transportation of goods or 
passengers is restricted to MYR100,000 if the motor vehicle has not been used 
prior to purchase and the total on-the-road cost does not exceed MYR150,000. 
Otherwise, the eligible cost is restricted to MYR50,000 (as per year of assessment 
1999). 
2.5 Tax Incentives 
The Pioneer Industries Ordinance was introduced in 1958 to encourage the 
development of manufacturing industries. As a result, foreign investors were 
largely involved in developing import-substitution industries in areas such as food, 
beverages and tobacco. In 1968, the Investment Incentives Act replaced the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance and this move encouraged the development of not 
only import-substitution industries but labour intensive industries that produced 
goods for export. The Promotion of Investment Act 1986 replaced the Investment 
Incentive Act and has provided numerous incentives that fully or partially exempt 
income from tax. Special provisions in the Income Tax Act 1967 also wholly 
exempt the income of venture capital companies and reduce the taxable income of 
approved operational headquarters companies. 
Tax incentives are found mainly in the Promotion of Investment Act 1986 (PIA) 
and the Income Tax Act, 1967. The PIA is the more important legislation as it 
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covers the major incentives available. A number of tax incentives has been 
introduced by the Malaysian government to promote foreign investments and 
priority industries, particularly projects which are capital intensive, with high 
value added content and involving new and emerging technologies. Malaysia 
offers tax incentives for investments in promoted products and activities (see 
below) in manufacturing, agriculture, tourism including hotels, research and 
development (R&D) and training. 
2.5.1 Pioneer Status 
The incentive of pioneer status is provided in the Promotion of Investment Act 
1986 to encourage certain activities or products in Malaysia. Companies 
participating in `promoted activities' or engaging in the manufacture of `promoted 
products' are eligible to apply for pioneer status. Companies which are granted 
pioneer status enjoy an exemption from tax on the profits generated by the pioneer 
business for five years. Only 70 per cent of the statutory income (that is, adjusted 
income less capital allowances) from the pioneer business for each of the five 
years will be exempted from tax. The balance of the statutory income will be taxed 
at the statutory corporate tax rate. Any unutilised losses or capital allowances 
cannot be carried forward to the post-pioneer period. 
Projects which are considered to be of national and strategic importance, as 
determined by the Minister of Finance, may enjoy full (100 per cent) exemption 
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from tax. Such projects typically involve heavy capital investment and advanced 
technology, which can generate extensive `links' to Malaysian industries (see 
below) and transfer or develop technological processes in Malaysia. The same 
treatment is available to a contract research and development company. 
Furthermore, a company engaged in promoted activity or the manufacture of a 
promoted product in the areas of new and emerging technologies, such as 
automation, bio-technology, electronics, building material sciences, information 
technology, and renewable energy technology qualifies for 100 per cent exemption 
on statutory income for a period of five years. 
It was announced in the 1997 Budget that companies approved by the Multimedia 
Development Corporation (MDC) would be able to enjoy pioneer status for 10 
years. Such companies would be treated as carrying on projects of national and 
strategic importance. 
The types of activities or products deemed to be promoted activities or products in 
an industrial linkage programme are listed by the Promotion of Investments 
(Promoted Activities and Promoted Products) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 1999 
and over the years, the list of promoted activities or products has been extended to 
encourage various types of activities. An example of promoted activities and 
promoted products is companies which manufacture transports equipment. 
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2.5.2 Investment Tax Allowance (ITA) 
Investment Tax Allowance (ITA) is an alternative that companies can opt for 
instead of the pioneer status. ITA is designed to cater for projects which have large 
capital investment over long gestation periods. 
A company which applies for and is granted ITA on or after 1 November 1991 
may be granted ITA of 60 per cent of the QCE incurred within a period of five 
years. The maximum amount that can be utilised is restricted to a maximum of 70 
per cent of the statutory income (profits after deduction of capital allowances) for 
each year of assessment. The balance of 30 per cent of the statutory income is 
subject to tax at the statutory corporate tax rate. Any ITA that cannot be utilised 
against taxable income may be carried forward indefinitely for set-off against 
future taxable income derived from the same project. 
A national project and strategic importance8 is eligible to enjoy an allowance of 
100 per cent of the capital expenditure, which is fully deductible against statutory 
income. A contract research and development company may enjoy an allowance 
of 100 per cent of QCE for a period of 10 years, which is restricted to 70 per cent 
of the statutory income. A research and development company undertaking 
research and development projects for group companies can also enjoy the same 
$ As stated by the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), products or activities of 
national and strategic importance are generally defined as projects or activities which are "involved 
in heavy capital investments with long gestation periods, have high levels of technology, and are 
integrated, generate extensive linkages, and have a significant impact on the economy. " 
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incentive. However, companies undertaking in-house research and development 
projects can only enjoy an allowance of 50 per cent. 
2.5.3 Industrial Adjustment Allowance (IAA) 
The tax incentive for Industrial Adjustment Allowance (IAA) is provided for in 
the Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) 1986. The IAA is available to companies 
in selected manufacturing sectors which are participating in certain industrial 
adjustment activities, such as reorganisation, reconstruction or amalgamation 
within the sector. Companies engaged in wood-based, textile, machinery and 
engineering industries are eligible to apply to the Minister of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) for approval to participate in the approved industrial 
adjustment programmes. `Industrial adjustment' is defined (by MITI) as any 
activity proposed to be undertaken by a particular sector in the manufacturing 
industry to restructure by way of reorganisation, reconstruction or amalgamation 
within that particular sector, with a view to strengthening the basis for industrial 
self-sufficiency, improving industrial technology, increasing productivity, 
enhancing the efficient use of natural resources and the efficient management of 
manpower. These companies will be granted an allowance of 60 per cent to 100 
per cent based on the industrial adjustment activities undertaken. The allowance 
will be given in respect of QCE incurred, and can be utilised to set off against 100 
per cent of adjusted income. The incentive can be enjoyed by the manufacturing 
company for five years. 
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2.5.4 Infrastructure Allowance (IA) 
Under the Promotion of Investment Act 1986, infrastructure allowance (IA) is 
available to any company resident in Malaysia engaged in manufacturing, 
agriculture, hotel, tourist or other industrial or commercial activity in Sabah, 
Sarawak and the designated eastern corridor of peninsular Malaysia. 
A company which has incurred capital expenditure on infrastructural facilities 
such as construction, reconstruction, extension or improvement of any permanent 
structure, including a bridge, jetty, port or road for a business located in a 
promoted area, will be given an allowance equal to 100 per cent of the capital 
expenditure. The capital expenditure must exclude capital expenditure that 
qualifies and claims other tax incentives (such as ITA, normal capital allowance 
under Schedule 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1967) and plant and machinery for 
storage, treatment or disposal of scheduled wastes. The infrastructure allowance 
should not exceed 85 per cent of the statutory income and any unutilised 
allowance can be carried forward to set off against future taxable income. 
2.5.5 Double Deduction on Expenses for the Promotion of Export 
This incentive is available to any company resident in Malaysia seeking 
opportunities to export manufactured products and agricultural produce. The 
Income Tax (Promotion of Exports) Rules 1986 provide for a double deduction for 
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expenses incurred in the promotion of exports. Certain expenses incurred for the 
purpose of seeking opportunities to export manufactured products and agricultural 
produce are eligible for double deductions. The expenses that qualify for the 
deduction include overseas advertising, supply of free samples abroad, export 
market research and the cost of maintaining a sales office overseas for the 
promotion of exports. Local companies are entitled to a double deduction for 
expenses incurred in participating in an approved international trade fair. The 
incentive is given to promote export activities by local companies. 
With effect from 1 January 2001, professional fees incurred in packaging design 
are eligible for double deduction, provided that the goods are of export quality and 
the company employs local professional services. 
2.5.6 Companies with Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) Status 
The 1997 Budget allocated tax incentives to companies with Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) status, which is approved by the Multimedia Development 
Corporation (MDC). In December 1997, the guidelines for MSC status were 
issued. The MSC is set to become the centre for state-of-the-art products and 
services where eight special areas are promoted, including telemedicine, research 
and development and electronic government. Companies with MSC status will 
enjoy special incentives, including tax holidays for a period of up to 10 years or 
ITA of 100 per cent and no duties on the import of multimedia equipment. These 
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incentives were to encourage the development of the MSC and to ensure that there 
are sufficient knowledge-workers for the multimedia and information technology 
sector of the economy. In order to accomplish the Vision 2020 to be a fully 
developed and industrialized country by the year 2020, the development of 
technology sectors plays a crucial role, as it is important and under government 
supervision. The Malaysian government has provided clear specific objectives in 
accelerating Malaysia's shift to high-technology industries, including accelerated 
industrial restructuring, technological upgrading and industrial linking. 
From the year of assessment 1998, the tax incentives accorded to MSC status 
companies have been extended to multimedia faculties in the institutions of higher 
learning. A multimedia faculty is referred to as a centre of learning, which 
provides courses in multimedia, information technology, engineering, computer 
science, media arts and science, library science and other related fields. The 
incentives would, however, only be relevant to private universities which are 
taxable entities. 
2.5.7 Industrial Building Allowance (IBA) for Hotels 
Under the 2002 Budget, the IBA has been extended to include companies which 
have incurred capital expenditure on an approved hotel building or in extending or 
modernising an existing hotel to the approved standard. The IBA consists of an 
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initial allowance of 10 per cent and an annual allowance of 3 per cent. The 
incentive has been given to encourage the tourism sector in Malaysia. 
All the tax incentives discussed from point 2.5.1 to 2.5.8 are summarized in Table 
2.8 as follows: 
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Table 2.8 
The Summary of Tax Incentives 
Tax Descriptions 
Incentives 
Pioneer Status A pionccr status company, which is involved 
in a promoted activity or is producing 
promoted product will be granted tax 
exemption for five years. Could be extended 
by another five years if certain criteria are 
met. 
The objective is to encourage certain types 
of activities or products. 
Investment Tax IT A is given to a company, which is 
Allowance involved in a promoted activity or is 
(ITA) producing a promoted product, and is 
eligible fier an allowance not exceeding 60 
per cent of qualifying capital expenditure 
(Q('I? ). 'I'Ihe amount of allowance to he 
utilized is restricted to a maximum of'7() per 
cent of statutory income (SI). The balance of 
30 per cent cif the SI is subject to tax. 
'Flie objective is to encourage certain types 
of activities or products. 
Industrial IAA is given to a manufacturing company, 
Adjustment which is involved in reorganization, 
Allowance reconstruction or amalgamation which is 
(IAA) eligible tier an allowance up to 100 her cent 
from Q('1, against adjusted income. 
Infrastructure Infrastructure allowance is given to certain 
Allowance industries in promoted area,, which are 
involved in construction, reconstruction, 
extension or improvement o any permanent 
structure. The allowance given is 100 per 
cent from capital expenditure, but not 
exceeding 85 per cent fromm SI. 
Law 
Promotion of 
Invcstmcnl Act 
(PIA) 1986 
Promotion Of- 
lnvestnment Act 
(PIA) 1986 
I'runu)tioll of' 
Investment Act 
(PIA) 1986 
Income I IX Act 
1967 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
The Summary of Tax Incentives 
Tax Descriptions Law 
Incentives 
1)iuhlc Local companies are entitled to a double I he Income , fax 
Deduction on deduction for expenses incurred on the (Promotion of' 
Expenses for promotion of'exports. Exports) Rules 
the Promotion 1986 
of Export The incentive is given to local companies to 
promote export activity. 
Effective from the year of assessment 2003, Budget 2003 
a locally owned manufacturing company will 
be given the following incentives: 
I. Tax exemption on statutory income 
equivalent to 30 per cent of increased export 
value, provided that the company achieves a 
significant increase in exports, 
2. Tax exemption on statutory income 
equivalent to 50 per cent of increased export 
value, provided that the company succeeds 
in penetrating new markets, and 
3. Dull exemption on increased export value, 
provided that the company achieves the 
highest increase in exports. 
Companies Companies approved by Multimedia Budget 1997 
approved by Dc% clopment Corporation would be able to 1": l'lcctivc from 
Multimedia enjoy pioneer status or investment tax year of 
Development allowance fier 10 years. assessment 
Corporation 1997 
The objective encourages the development 
of the multimedia super corridor (MS('), and 
to ensure that there are Sufficient knowledge- 
workers for the multimedia and inn rnlation 
technology 
Industrial 113A has been expanded to include hotels Budget 2002 
Building which are granted a 10 per cent initial 1.1 tfhcive from 
Allowance allowance and 3 per cent annual allowance. year of' 
(l13A) für assessment 
1lotels The ohjective is to reduce the cost ofdoing 2002 
business and increase competitiveness. 
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2.6 Tax Avoidance Provision 
In Malaysia, there is general anti-avoidance legislation. There is general law to 
combat the artificial devices used for tax avoidance schemes. However, there are 
not many specific anti-avoidance provisions which directly handle tax avoidance 
schemes in particular circumstances. Price Waterhouse (1990, p. 116), refers to the 
provision which "empowers the Director-General of IRB to make adjustment to 
taxable income and assets valuation whenever there are reasons to believe that a 
business transaction has altered the incidence of tax". 
2.7 Summary 
The need for the development of the country's infrastructure, such as road, rail and 
port facilities, led to the introduction of the earliest form of taxation in Malaysia in 
1910. At that time, tax was mainly in the form of direct taxes on the main 
economic units. This was followed by a tax on income in 1917 which was then 
repealed in 1922. During World War II, a tax on profit and income was solely 
used for the purpose of imperial defence. In 1946, a taxation system was 
recommended for introduction. The principal objective of the introduced taxation 
system was to achieve a more equitable distribution of the tax burden in addition 
to generating revenue for the government. This marked the beginning of a new era 
in taxation on a permanent basis in Malaysia. 
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Malaysia is a former British colony and its tax system has its roots in the British 
tax system. Before the mid-sixties, no clear objective has been cited any where for 
tax collection other than to raise revenue. In the mid-seventies, however, 
according to Bardai (1991) the tax structure was increasingly been rationalized to 
achieve certain objectives. Taxes were therefore used: 
9 to promote investment and stimulate industrial development; 
" to promote national saving and improve the free flow of goods leaving the 
country through harmonization of tax rates between Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sabah and Sarawak; 
to promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth through a 
more progressive income tax structure and Real Property Gains tax; and 
0 to alleviate the burden of inflation, especially on the lower income groups. 
These measures have brought some sophistication into the tax system, which has 
resulted in the use of taxation as an important policy instrument with uses other 
than merely collecting government revenue. 
The tax structure in the 1960s and early 1970s was dominated by taxes on foreign 
trade. The importance of indirect taxes in the total tax structure gradually 
diminished. In contrast, the importance of direct taxes continued to rise. In 1988, 
corporate taxes, payroll taxes and import taxes had been the most productive taxes 
in the economy which, when grouped together, produced nearly 60 per cent of the 
total tax revenue. Corporate and payroll taxes contributed more than 49 per cent of 
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the total tax revenue which reflected the significant importance of direct taxes in 
the economy. In 1986, the Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) was introduced 
which implemented major tax incentives in Malaysia. Since the introduction of the 
Promotion of Investment Act 1986, it seems that there has been a need to attract 
foreign investors, so many changes have been implemented offering tax 
incentives. These incentives are designed to grant partial or, to an extent, total 
relief from the payment of income tax. Incentives were granted to promote 
products and activities in certain local industries. The tax incentives offered were, 
in the main, to motivate foreign investment. 
Although the Malaysian tax structure was designed based on British tax law, 
Malaysian tax law is set forth to meet government objectives. Malaysia considers 
offers competitively low tax rates (Table 2.6 showing corporate tax rate in 2005 
for ASEAN countries with Table 2.9 showing corporate tax rate in the broader 
region, Asia Pacific). Currently, Malaysia's corporate tax rate is the fourth lowest 
in the Asia Pacific region after Hong Kong (17.5 per cent), Singapore (20 per 
cent) and Taiwan (25 per cent). There are no annual wealth taxes, estate duties, 
gift taxes, accumulated earnings tax, federal income tax, controlled foreign 
company legislation, thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing rules. Although 
there is no transfer pricing legislation, transfer pricing transactions can be caught 
under Section 140, anti-avoidance provision. 9 
9 The Director General of the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) may disregard or vary any transaction 
and make any necessary adjustments as he thinks fit if he has reason to believe that the transfer 
price is not reflective of the arms' length price and if profits are transferred between companies 
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"' 
within a group through artificial inter-company arrangements in order to minimize the group's 
income tax liability. 
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The anti-avoidance legislation in Malaysia is provided in Section 140 of the 
Income Tax Act 1967. In order to apply the provisions in Section 140, the Director 
General of Inland Revenue Board must first have reason to believe that a 
transaction has the effect of altering the incidence of tax. Apart from general anti- 
avoidance provisions in Section 140, the Income Tax Act 1967 contains other 
specific anti-avoidance provisions relating to the transfer or sale of stocks on 
discontinuance of business, settlements and controlled companies. 
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Literature Review 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
This thesis presents a principal-agent model in incorporating the possibility that 
the manager (agent) involved in tax avoiding activity may have two motivations 
for tax avoiding activity, namely synergy and agency, but which also allows for 
the possibility of hubris occurring. Prior studies of tax avoidance have stressed 
more individuals' behavior rather than corporations'. Slemrod (2004) has 
emphasized the differences between individual and corporate tax compliance, 
arguing that the latter should be analyzed in a principal-agent model. The basic 
premise of the model is that decisions about corporate tax avoidance are made by 
companies' managers. 
In synergy-motivated tax planning, the managers act in the interests of their 
shareholders to increase firm value. If tax planning activity is driven by the 
synergy motive, then such activity should intend to create wealth for shareholders. 
Agency theory suggests that the interests of principals and agents will not 
necessarily coincide and rests on the assumption that managers have an incentive 
to maximize their personal utility and may do so even to the detriment of 
shareholders. Managers may avoid tax because they derive a private benefit, for 
example, an increase in their prestige or career prospects by making them appear 
more valuable to the firm, owing to their ability to reduce taxes. In other words, 
the main characteristics of managers that are addressed in the agency literature are 
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opportunism and self-interest. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen 
and Meckling, (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989), in the absence of either appropriate 
incentives or sufficient monitoring, agents will be able to exercise their discretion 
to the detriment of principals. The argument is that owners wish to maximize 
profits, but that their designated agents may have neither the interest nor the 
incentive to do so. 
Hubris results from mistakes by managers in estimating the value of tax planning. 
Hubris emphasizes the role of managers and their personality traits. Under the 
hubris theory, tax planning may be initially viewed as deriving from the 
motivation to raise firm value and maximize shareholders' wealth. The study of 
hubris which is widely used in the takeover literature has attracted scholars 
interested in understanding the role of the neurotic and psychological disorders of 
top executives. The concept of hubris from the personality theory (for example, 
see Kets de Vries 1990 and 1991), provides a description of hubristic leaders as 
narcissistic personalities who long for the reassurance and the applause of others. 
Kets de Vries (1991) notes that, with previous successes and from consistent 
public acclaim for successful achievements, hubristics leaders end up believing 
that their achievements exceed those of their counterparts. Kroll, Toombs and 
Wright (2000) emphasized that hubristic leaders tend to listen only to people 
whose opinions are compatible with their own. Consequently, being too 
independent, hubristic leaders tend to make mistakes. 
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This thesis proposes that in any tax avoidance activity, elements of synergy, 
agency and hubris simultaneously exist and interact to determine the output of the 
activity. These theories aim to identify the economic motives that influence 
managers to make certain choices. These theories could hence be used by 
accounting regulatory bodies and tax policymakers to predict how corporations 
would react to proposed changes in accounting rules and to predict the economic 
effect of these changes. 
This thesis will try to adapt and provide additional evidence on the principal-agent 
model of tax avoidance behaviour. This model, which has been well established in 
developed countries (for example, see Phillips, 2003; Rego, 2003; Janssen and 
Buijink, 2000; Holland, 1998; Gupta and Newberry, 1997), may have different 
consequences and implications in the Malaysian setting, thus new factors may be 
identified in the Malaysian business environment. 
3.2 Development of Hypotheses 
This thesis identifies seven hypotheses to measure firm characteristics to explain 
why managers decide to avoid or not avoid corporate income tax. Those 
hypotheses are: 
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3.2.1 Political Cost 
Political costs refer to the costs imposed on firms by politicians resulting from 
taxes and regulations. Alchian and Kessel (1962) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
conceptualized the political cost hypothesis, while Watts and Zimmerman's 1978 
study was one of the first studies to test it empirically. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) developed a framework to explain managerial decisions concerning 
accounting policy choice. One factor they identify which influences accounting 
policy choice is firm size. This is because firm size may serve as a proxy for a 
company's success and political costs. Effective tax rates studies have attempted 
to investigate whether firm size is systematically related to the ETR. Several 
studies provided evidence that there is an association between firm size and 
effective tax rates, but the results have been mixed: where some studies found a 
positive relationship (for example, Rego, 2003; Omer et al., 1993; Zimmerman, 
1983), others have found a negative relationship (for example, Janssen and 
Buinjink, 1998; Holland, 1998; Porcano, 1986; Siegfried, 1972) and still others, 
no association (for example, Mills et al., 1998; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Jacob, 
1996). 
Zimmerman (1983) reveals that there is a positive relation between firm size and 
effective tax rates and contends that large firms pay more taxes because they 
experience greater government and public scrutiny. He indicates that larger firms 
suffer from political costs. Omer et al. (1993) obtained empirical evidence that 
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supports Zimmerman's findings and political cost hypothesis. Omer et al. (1993) 
support the political cost hypothesis that firms, because larger and successful are 
victims of greater regulatory actions. In general, the political cost hypothesis 
argues that large firms are facing greater government scrutiny and wealth transfer, 
and in turn would have a higher corporate ETR. Rego (2003) investigates the 
effect of ETR in a multivariate framework using a large sample of U. S. 
corporations for a time period between 1990 and 1997. He reveals that after 
controlling for pre-tax income, foreign operations, industry membership, year and 
geographic location, larger firms have a higher ETR. His results conclude that 
larger firms face political costs which increase their ETR. 
In contrast, Siegfried (1972) found a negative association between firm size and 
ETR. He argued that larger firms would have a lower ETR because their greater 
resources would increase their ability to develop expertise in tax planning and to 
organize their activities in a tax efficient manner. Salamon and Siegfried (1977) 
argue that larger firms possess superior economic and political power relative to 
smaller firms and are therefore able to avoid tax burdens. Porcano (1986) supports 
this notion by finding a negative relationship between firm size and ETR. In 
Europe, Janssen and Buinjink (1998), using data from the Netherlands, reported a 
negative association between size and ETR. Holland (1998) was been the first to 
investigate the relationship between company size and corporate tax burdens using 
UK data. He estimates the relationship from UK non-financial firms for a twenty- 
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six year period. He finds some evidence of a negative relationship between firm 
size and ETR. 
However, on the other hand, Jacob (1996), Gupta and Newberry (1997), and Mills 
et al. (1998) did not find any relationship between firm size and ETR. Thus 
evidence concerning a relationship between firm size and ETR is mixed and 
therefore controversial. The controversial evidence for the impact of firm size on 
corporate tax liability suggests the need for a further examination of the issue. The 
differences in results may be because of the difference in sample selection by 
reference to countries or industries, the time frame under observation, the database 
employed and the proxy used for firm size. In addition, most of the ETR and firm 
size studies are in a univariate framework, which might create variation problems. 
Thus, the relationship between firm size and ETR is, therefore, a matter for 
empirical investigation. This thesis predicts the direction and strength of the 
relationship to be positive, which is consistent with the prediction of Omer et al. 
(1993) that larger companies are likely to pay more income tax than smaller 
companies, as a result of increased visibility and government scrutiny. 
Despite this on-going debate, previous literature has focused more on U. S. and 
U. K. firms and with little emphasis on emerging economies. However, a 
univariate study by Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) focused on Hong Kong, Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand and reports a positive relationship between firm 
size and ETR for Hong Kong, a negative relationship for Korea and Thailand and 
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no significant relationship for Malaysia and Thailand. Derashid's and Zhang's 
2003 study is the only study of ETR and firm size which has been carried out in 
Malaysia and this study covers the period of 1990-1999 inclusively. They, 
however, find a negative relation between firm size and ETR and suggest that 
large firms in Malaysia do not suffer from political costs. These two studies 
reported conflicting results in the relationship between firm size and ETR. The 
important fundamental limitation may be because both studies do not control for 
other variables which may influence ETRs. 
Based on the political cost hypothesis, it is expected that large companies are less 
likely to engage in aggressive tax avoidance. In the alternate form, the hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hl: Tax avoiding corporations are smaller in size than non-avoiding 
corporations. 
Most ETR researchers (for example, Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Rego, 2003) use 
firm size as a proxy for political cost. Other studies, not examining ETR, also refer 
to company size as a proxy for political cost (for example, Inoue, 1996). Inoue 
(1996) investigated factors which potentially influence Japanese managers' choice 
of accounting policies. He used 
firm size as a proxy for political costs and found 
that size is significant for all accounting policy choices tested. Thus, firm size has 
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been identified in the literature as the most important accounting variable that 
represents political cost. 
This thesis also uses firm size to measure political cost. Measurement of firm size 
in previous studies has used sales or total assets as a proxy for political cost. To 
facilitate comparison with previous studies, this thesis measures firm size by the 
total assets. 
3.2.2 Profitability 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) suggest that profitable firms can make more efficient 
use of tax deductions, credits, and exemptions, resulting in greater book-tax 
differences1°. Spooner (1986) contends that investment patterns and profitability 
affect ETR. Siegfried (1972) is one of many from the ETR literature who argues 
that ETR can be used to measure effective tax planning, and has hypothesized that 
firms which have greater resources would develop expertise in tax planning. 
Rego (2003) investigates whether economies of scale exist for tax planning, that is 
whether larger, more profitable, multinational corporations avoid more taxes than 
other firms. He found that after controlling for firm size, corporations with greater 
pre-tax income have lower ETRs. The negative relation between firm size and 
ETR suggests that firms with greater pre-tax income avoid more income taxes 
than other firms. 
10 Book-tax difference is the difference between income reported to shareholders (annual report) 
and tax authorities (taxable income). 
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In contrast, even though Wilkie (1988) argues that pre-tax income is an important 
determinant of variation in the corporate tax burden, Wilkie (1988) and Wilkie and 
Limberg (1993) report a positive relationship between pre-tax income and ETR, 
that is, greater pre-tax income is associated with a higher ETR. However, their 
findings were based on univariate results which did not control for firm size, 
hence it is possible that their results were due more to the political cost argument 
as discussed earlier. 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) identify possible control variables for ETR. They 
examine four determinants of ETR which are size, profitability, capital structure 
and asset mix, and explore whether the relation between these variables and ETR 
changed before and after the enactment of the U. S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. They 
find that the relationship between profitability and ETR for both time periods was 
significantly positive. 
This relationship between profitability and ETR has been tested in developed 
markets, but to the author's knowledge has not been tested in emerging markets, 
such as Malaysia. Previous findings might be supported or contradicted as they 
will be influenced in part by characteristics of enforcement, professionalism, 
flexibility and cultural factors of the companies in emerging countries, hence, the 
need for further evidence on the relationship in developing countries. 
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Companies with high profits are likely to employ extensive tax planning to gain 
tax benefits. Thus a negative relationship between income before income tax and 
ETR is hypothesized. It is predicted that an increase in the income of the company 
will decrease company's effective tax rate whilst controlling for size effects. In the 
alternate form, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Tax avoiding corporations are more profitable than non-avoiding 
corporations. 
Profit is defined as income before income taxes. The tax shield theory would be 
validated in emerging countries if a negative relation is found between profit and 
ETRs. 
In another study which is not an ETR study, Graham and Tucker (2006) identified 
a sample of 44 tax shelter companies that have been alleged or proven by the 
government to be involved in tax shelters 
for the period 1975 to 2000. They 
compared and matched the average data before and after the shelter activity across 
companies, regardless of the length of the sheltering activity, to investigate the 
characteristics and magnitude of the tax shelter employed. They indicated that tax 
shelter activity increases with 
firm size, profitability, research and development 
expenditure, foreign operations and the market to 
book ratio of debt. Thus their 
study supported the idea of a positive relationship 
between profitability and tax 
shelters. 
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3.2.3 Leverage 
Companies requiring new finance can fulfill their needs either by borrowing (debt) 
or by raising equity (shares). It seems likely that when companies make their 
financial decisions, they consider the costs and benefits associated with each 
financing method. The optimal level of debt decisions are based on several 
theories, which are the trade-off theory" (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978), the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), the agency cost 
theory (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and the tax shield theory 
(Lasfer, 1995; Chatterjee and Scott, 1989; Ross, 1985; DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980). Several authors report that taxation and agency cost are regarded as the 
main determinants of capital structure (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Harris and 
Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990). In addition, Graham (2000) indicates that tax benefits 
are one of the factors that affect financial decisions. This thesis employs the debt 
tax shield theory in explaining the company's leverage decisions. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) first hypothesized the tax benefit of debt, which is the tax shield 
theory. The theory predicts that profitable companies would borrow more so as to 
reduce taxes since interest on debt is tax deductible. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that, in the U. S., companies can take 
advantage of various tax deductions, allowances and forms of tax relief that are 
11 Trade-off theory is balancing the costs and benefits of debt relative to equity. It is to determine 
the optimal target capital structure by balancing between tax shield on debt and expected cost of 
financial distress. 
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non-debt tax shields 12, which are available for corporations. Only companies with 
lower income or lower corporate tax rates could fully utilize these deductions and 
allowances to lower taxable income. They suggest that companies subject to lower 
corporate tax rates will employ less debt in their capital structure. Ross (1985) 
indicates that with substantial non-debt tax shields, the expected value of interest 
tax savings declines and the incentive to finance by debt is diminished. He also 
assumes that firms subject to low tax rates are expected to employ less debt in 
their capital structure relative to firms with higher tax rates. 
Corporations engaging heavily in debt financing may be considered to be 
engaging in one form of tax planning. The standard assumption, dating back to 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), is that as interest payments are tax-deductible and 
dividend payments are not, debt financing is associated with a high tax advantage. 
One would then expect firms as fully debt-financed as possible. However, the 
results are, in general, not confirmed by empirical evidence (for example, see 
Graham, 2000; Barclay and Smith, 1995). Modigliani and Miller (1963), pursuing 
the tax shield theory, justify that companies borrow more to save taxes since 
interest costs are deductible. Miller (1977) suggests that firms issue debt only 
when they expect to use the interest deduction to offset taxes. Stickney and 
McGee (1982) provide evidence of a significant negative relationship between 
leverage and ETR, which indicates that firms with low ETR tend to be highly 
leveraged. 
12 Non-debt tax shield is a tax deduction and allowance, other than interest on debt deduction. 
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Porcano (1986) indicates that, when a firm has more debt, it would pay less tax. 
Managers might not favour more debt as it will reduce cash flow for companies to 
serve debt payments. However, as there are tax benefits, managers will increase 
debt if the benefit is sufficient. The increase in the amount of debt in a company's 
capital structure lowers the expected tax liability and so increases the company's 
after tax cash flow. The benefits of debt on tax are often modelled as the primary 
benefit of using debt, but the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
corporate taxes and capital structure choice is conflicting and inconclusive (for 
example, Gordon and Lee, 2001; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; and Titman and 
Wessels, 1988 in the U. S., Lasfer, 1995 in the U. K.; and Pattenden, 2006; Twite, 
2001 and Gatward and Sharpe, 1996 in Australia). Graham (1996) suggests that 
some conflicting results may be because of the proxies used to measure a 
company's tax status. The tax status of companies has never been explicitly 
calculated owing to tax return data being confidential. According to Graham 
(1996), although the proxies used to gauge a company's tax status are the best 
available, they can still be misleading. As a consequence, most research fails to 
find that tax considerations are an important factor in corporate financial 
decisions. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995) fail to provide support for the 
proposition that taxes have an important impact on corporate leverage decisions. 
However, they added that this does not prove that tax considerations do not affect 
financing decisions and suggest that it may be possible to design more effective 
tests of the tax effects of debt financing. 
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In Australia, studies by Twite (2001) and Gatward and Sharpe (1996) find 
conflicting evidence on the association between taxes and capital structure. 
Gatward and Sharpe (1996) find no support, while Twite (2001) finds strong 
support, for the use of taxes in explaining financial choices. 
In the United Kingdom, Lasfer (1995) examines the impact of corporation tax and 
agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Lasfer (1995, p. 265) finds that, 
"in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation". 
However, "in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted (firms' not paying 
tax) exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms". He suggests 
that, in the short term, firms do not alter their financing to accommodate changes 
to ETR as they may return to being a tax-paying firm in the long term and changes 
in debt financing will incur costs. They conclude that, in the short term, the 
motivation for debt finance is driven by the resolution of the agency conflicts13 
and, in the long term, by tax savings. 
In a recent study, Pattenden (2006) investigates the tax incentive to use debt in two 
different tax regimes in Australian firms. He determines factors that affect 
corporate capital structure in both of the tax regimes, which are the dividend 
imputation regime and the classical regime. He reveals a strong relationship 
13 Corporations, typically, are controlled by management teams over business activity without 
sufficient monitoring by the owner of the corporation. The separation of ownership and control 
might raise agency conflict due to the manager's conflict of interest. Agency conflict is the conflict 
between managers and shareholders in evaluating and making financial decisions. The conflicts 
occur because managers and shareholders 
have different incentives. The resolutions arise after 
taking into account the conflict between them. 
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between marginal tax rates and debt changes under the classical regime, and little 
or no relationship under the dividend imputation regime. 
In the U. S., Gordon and Lee (2001) estimate the effects of changes in corporate 
tax rates on the debt policies of U. S. firms. The advantage of their study is that the 
data set used covers a long time series from 1954 to 1995, which includes different 
tax regimes. Their results suggest that taxes have had a strong and statistically 
significant effect on debt levels. For example, they report that increasing the 
corporate tax rate by 5 per cent (from 35 per cent to 40 per cent), resulted in an 
additional 1.8 per cent of corporate debt financing, whereas cutting the corporate 
tax rate by 10 per cent (from 46 per cent to 36 per cent), reduced the leverage by 
around 3.5%. Thus they conclude that corporate tax rates have a significant effect 
on corporate use of debt. 
MacKie-Mason (1990) also provides clear evidence of tax effects on financing 
decisions, and reports a relationship between tax shields and debt policy. He 
suggests that tax shields should matter only to the extent that interest deduction 
would affect the marginal tax rate. He clarified the relationship between tax 
shields and the incentive to use debt. Furthermore, he suggests that firms with low 
marginal tax rates are less likely to finance new investments with debt14. His 
results provide strong and robust evidence that the relationship between tax shields 
and the marginal tax rate is important and that taxes do affect financing decisions. 
14 He found that firms with high tax loss carry forwards and investment tax credit are much less 
likely to use debt. This is because they are unlikely to be able to use interest deductions. 
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Graham (1996) supports the finding by Mackie-Mason (1990) that firms with high 
marginal tax rates are more likely to issue debt than firms with low marginal tax 
rates. 
Different tax codes accord differential treatments to the capital structure and are 
likely to impact on companies' financing decisions. There is evidence that 
corporate debt may have great tax benefits that maximize after tax returns. More 
recently, Graham (2000, p. 1901) indicates that the "typical firm could double tax 
benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline". He 
predicts how aggressively a firm will use debt by observing its tax benefit 
function. He added that firms tend to use debt more aggressively now than they 
did in the 1980s. 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) noted that there are competing arguments about the 
direction of the relationship between leverage and ETR in the U. S. They use a 
multivariate approach and longitudinal data to measure the effect of the U. S. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) on the determinants of ETR. They found that the 
coefficient of leverage was significant and negative both before and after TRA86, 
with the ETR based on book-income (accounting income). This result is consistent 
with the argument that larger 
interest tax shields lead to lower ETR. However, 
they also found a positive significant relationship between leverage and ETR 
before TRA86, with the ETR based on cash-flow. This finding could be explained 
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by an alternate argument that companies with high marginal tax rates" are more 
likely to use debt financing. Hence, they document support for both significant 
positive and negative association between leverage and ETR. Their finding 
indicates that, in the U. S., the differences in marginal tax rates may be factors 
driving companies' financing decisions, resulting in a positive relationship. 
Malaysia, however, has a flat corporate tax rate, and thus large differences in 
marginal tax rates are unlikely. 
Interest deductions reduce a company's taxable income, which in turn decreases 
the company's tax liability. The tax benefit of debt is the tax saving that results 
from deducting interest from a company's revenue. Given that the advantage of 
debt financing (resulting from the interest tax-deductibility) could reduce the 
company's tax liability, it is predicted that a negative relationship will exist 
between leverage and a company's effective tax rate. The negative association 
between leverage and ETR is expected because highly leveraged companies have 
a higher interest tax shield which in turn reduces the ETR. Therefore, it is 
expected that tax avoiders will have higher levels of leverage, whilst controlling 
for company profit. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative 
form: 
H3: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher level of leverage in the capital structure 
than non-tax avoiders. 
IS One of the most significant changes in the U. S. Tax Reform Act 1986 was a reduction in the 
marginal tax rates (MTR), which was 
from a high bracket of 46 per cent of MTR in 1986 to 34 per 
cent in 1988. 
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In addition to the tax shield theory, recent literature also relates debt to agency 
costs, that is, companies are expected to set their capital structure in a way to 
minimize the potential conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. 
The agency theory posits that there is natural conflict in the interest of managers 
and shareholders. According to several comprehensive surveys of the literature 
(for example, Moh'd et al., 1998; Harris and Raviv, 1991), debt can reduce agency 
conflicts. According to Moh'd et al. (1998), there are several methods that could 
mitigate the agency problem. These methods fall into two categories, namely 
motivational mechanism and external control. In the latter (external control), one 
way to align the interest of managers and shareholders is to increase manager 
ownership. The motivational mechanism is to use an increase in debt. The increase 
in debt would also increase the probability of bankruptcy and job losses, and this 
would add risk and might further motivate managers to increase their efficiency. 
Thus managers' fear of bankruptcy or financial distress tends to reduce agency 
costs. The increase in debt, to reduce agency conflict, would in turn lower the 
corporate effective tax rate. 
On the other hand, debt reduces the amount of free cash flow as a company is 
committed to pay out cash owed to debt. Thus the company will have lower 
amount of free cash and manager self-interest activities will be limited. Hence 
according to Wruck (1994) and Maloney et al. (1993), debt finance creates an 
incentive for managers to work harder and make better investment decisions. 
Thus, the company issuing debt is committed to distributing free cash flows as 
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interest payments rather than retaining them as a buffer which may discipline 
management into working more efficiently. 
A large body of prior studies (Bathala et al., 1994; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; 
Friend and Hasbrouck, 1988; Friend and Lang, 1988) find evidence consistent 
with the proposition that debt is a substitute for managerial ownership in reducing 
agency costs. 
This implies that companies are expected to use debt finance not only to benefit 
from tax shields but also to mitigate agency costs. Thus the joint theoretical 
prediction between tax shield and agency costs will in turn lower the company's 
effective tax rate. However, this thesis primarily concentrates on tax shield theory 
in explaining the company's leverage decisions. 
3.2.4 Foreign Activity 
The Malaysian economy is dependent on foreign activity. As the operations of 
Malaysian companies become increasingly global in scope, an important issue is 
how their foreign activities impact on their effective tax rates. Companies 
engaging in foreign activity are fundamentally different from domestic-only 
companies as they operate in different cultural, political, economic environments 
and different tax legislations and jurisdictions. 
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There are several means by which companies engaging in foreign activity may 
lower their effective tax rates. Companies engaging in foreign operations have 
opportunities to avoid income taxation by: 
" locating operations in low-tax foreign jurisdiction; 
shifting income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions; 
exploiting differences between the tax rules of different countries; and 
taking advantage of tax benefits agreements with host countries. 
These activities may enable companies to lower their effective tax rates. 
According to Leblang (1998), corporations engaging in foreign operations may 
have significantly greater opportunities to escape tax with respect to cross-border 
investments than domestic only corporations. 
There is a number of foreign jurisdictions that offer corporate income tax rates 
which are lower than the Malaysian corporate tax rate of 28 per cent (see Table 
2.9), such as Singapore (20 per cent) and Hong Kong (17.5 per cent). The benefit 
of operating in a low tax foreign jurisdiction is that it will lower the corporate tax 
expense and in turn, the corporate ETR. In contrast, corporate income tax rates 
exceed the Malaysian corporate tax rate 
in a number of foreign jurisdictions, such 
as Indonesia (30 per cent), Thailand (30 per cent), Brunei (30 per cent) and 
Philippines (32 per cent) in the ASEAN region. It is common for Malaysian 
corporations to have operations in both high and 
low foreign tax jurisdictions, but 
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one would expect that the corporations would operate more in low tax foreign 
jurisdictions than high tax foreign jurisdictions. 
Despite the advantage offered by cross-border activity, the Malaysian tax code 
also provides tax benefits for Malaysian companies engage in foreign operation 
activities. The Promotion of Investment Act 1986 provides a tax incentive for 
foreign sales corporations: 
. for exporting Malaysian manufactured products and agricultural produce; 
by providing a double deduction for expenses incurred in the promotion of 
exports and expenses of seeking opportunities for the export of 
manufactured products and agriculture; 
by promoting export activity by local companies as they are eligible for a 
double deduction for expenses incurred in participating in an approved 
international trade fair; and 
by providing a double deduction to local companies for local professional 
fees incurred on packaging design on export quality goods. 
Studies, mainly in the U. S. and U. K., have documented that companies engaging 
in foreign activity report significantly lower taxable income compared with 
domestic only companies. One might expect that corporate taxes are controllable 
through planning, and Hines (1999) provides evidence that U. S. corporations with 
foreign operations employ a wide variety of international tax planning strategies. 
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According to Rego (2003, p. 813), companies with foreign 
operations "have opportunities to avoid income taxes by locating 
operations in low-tax countries, by shifting income from high-tax 
locations to low-tax locations, by exploiting differences in the 
tax rules of different countries, by engaging in complex property 
transactions and by taking advantage of tax subsidy agreement 
with host countries". 
Several studies have considered foreign operations as a determinant of tax burden. 
According to Craig and Todd (1993), companies that are involved in foreign 
operations have to re-evaluate the structure and location of foreign operations in 
order to reduce the tax burden. 
Another aspect of companies that engage in foreign operations is the foreign- 
controlled company itself. Collins et al. (1997) found that foreign-controlled 
domestic firms (FCDC) achieve around zero taxable income as a result of transfer 
pricing manipulation. They examined the U. S. tax returns of FCDC wholesale 
traders from 1981 - 1990, a sector where production function, they argue, is 
relatively simple and where companies can manipulate taxable income by 
managing the prices between the foreign manufacturer and the U. S. distributor. 
Leblang (1998) suggests that companies with foreign operations could avoid or 
reduce their tax burden, since they have greater opportunities to escape tax with 
respect to cross-border investments than with respect to strictly domestic 
investments. However, in contrast with Leblang's assertions, Collins and 
Shackelford (1999) contend that empirical findings are insufficient and ambiguous 
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and fail to provide conclusive evidence that companies engaging in foreign 
activity pay less income tax than domestic-only companies. 
Harris and Feeny (2003) investigate the variation of ETR in a multivariate 
framework of Australian large business and international companies. The data 
consists of four years for the period 1993/1994 to 1996/1997. The results of their 
OLS regressions, carried out on each separate year of data, indicate that the 
foreign income variable has a negative sign for all four years and is significantly 
negatively related to ETR for the latter two years. They argue that this provides 
evidence that companies may be using their foreign operations to lower their 
domestic ETR. 
Rego (2003) investigates whether economies of scale exist for tax planning, such 
that larger, more profitable, multinational corporations avoid more income taxes 
than other firms. He revealed that multinational U. S. companies, with more 
extensive foreign operations, reported lower effective tax rates than domestic-only 
companies. He also indicated that this was a result of several tax avoidance 
strategies, such as creation of 
book-tax differences and income shifting from high 
tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions. 
Hence, several studies provide evidence that companies engaging in foreign 
activity might be tempted to shift taxable 
income to low tax jurisdictions. As 
Malaysia is already a relatively low tax jurisdiction, the aggressiveness of tax 
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avoidance activity between companies engaging in foreign activity and domestic- 
only companies may be limited. However, it is expected that companies with 
extensive foreign activity will exploit tax minimization strategies more 
aggressively than their counterparts with less extensive foreign activity 
companies. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H4: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher level of foreign activity than non-tax 
avoiders. 
A further study, which focuses on the foreign controlled aspect, by Langli and 
Saudagaran (2004) investigates whether foreign controlled corporations have 
lower taxable income compared with domestic controlled corporations. Their 
sample consists of small and medium size corporations registered in Norway in 
the manufacturing and retail and wholesale industries. They find that foreign 
controlled corporations in these two industries report consistently lower taxable 
income than comparable domestic controlled corporations. However, the finding is 
with the exception of small size corporations in the manufacturing industry where 
the taxable income differential is negative but not significant overall. 
3.2.5 Capital Intensity 
The Malaysian government has been introduced a number of tax incentives to 
promote local and foreign investments and priority industries, particularly projects 
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which are capital intensive, with high value added content and involving new and 
emerging technologies. The tax incentives include investment tax allowance, 
industrial adjustment allowance, infrastructure allowance, reinvestment allowance, 
capital allowance and preferential treatment of capital imports. 
The tax code typically allows capital allowance for tangible assets to be deducted 
over periods much shorter than their economic lives. The capital intensity 
hypothesis is that the companies with higher capital intensity would be expected to 
gain tax savings which, in turn, lower their corporate ETR. This hypothesis has 
been generally found applicable in developed markets. For example, it has been 
tested by Gupta and Newberry (1997) in the U. S. and Harris and Feeny (2003) in 
Australia. To the author's knowledge, however, this model has not been tested in 
emerging markets, such as Malaysia. 
Harris and Feeny (2003) use data from the Australian Tax Office (ATO) to model 
the effective tax rates of large Australian corporations. Their data appear to be 
superior to those previously used in the literature as they were allowed access to 
the ATO tax return database, while previous studies have had to rely on firm level 
data only. The ATO tax return data are confidential and remote access was 
authorized only to Melbourne Institute researchers under a specific research 
project agreement. They provide evidence that more capital intensive companies 
are associated with lower ETR. Harris's and Feeney's results indicate that 
companies utilize depreciation deduction to lower their taxable income. 
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Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Stickney and McGee (1982), both document a 
significant negative relationship between capital intensity and ETR. Stickney and 
McGee (1982) use capital intensity to explain corporate effective tax rates. They 
suggest that greater investment in depreciable assets should produce higher 
investment tax credits (ITC), and using accelerated depreciation should thereby 
result in greater tax savings and lower effective tax rates. They estimate that 
capital intensive firms should have a lower ETR. Their study, using individual 
firms, supports their contention. Gupta and Newberry (1997) similarly consider 
the issue of capital intensity and find strong support for a negative significant 
association between capital intensity and ETR. 
An older study by Siegfried (1974) uses the same rationale as Stickney and 
McGee (except that instead of an individual firm basis, he uses an industry wide 
approach), supports the conclusion that the more capital intense an industry is, the 
lower the taxes. Both the ITC and the more liberal depreciation methods should 
produce favourable tax treatment for capital intensive firms. The potential tax 
savings would also increase the expected cash flow of the firms. 
Capital intensity is expected to be negatively associated with ETR owing to the tax 
benefits associated with capital investments. Tax allowance for capital investment 
can therefore be used to reduce taxable income. This suggests the following 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
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H5: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher degree of capital intensity than non-tax 
avoiders. 
Previous empirical studies found a consistent negative relation between capital 
intensity and ETR, but have focused mainly on developed countries. This thesis 
examines the relationship between capital intensity and a company's effective tax 
liability from within the context of a developing country. Capital intensity is 
measured by the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
3.2.6 Dividend 
Profitable companies that earn income can use it either to invest in operating 
assets, acquire securities, retire debt or distribute to shareholders. Income 
distributed to shareholders is called a dividend. Issues arising in the dividend 
context are why are dividends distributed and what proportion of income should 
be distributed to shareholders. Many reasons exist why companies should pay or 
not pay dividends and how much they should pay. However, discovering why 
companies pay dividends and how much should be paid is still puzzling. 
The study of corporate dividend, behaviour is one of the most widely researched 
issues in finance. Researchers have different views of factors that affect dividend 
payment. Despite extensive debate and research, the question of why a corporation 
pays dividends remains a puzzle. Black (1976) refers to this issue as a dividend 
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puzzle with `pieces that just do not seem to fit'. Since then, Baker (1999) contends 
that the amount of theoretical and empirical research on dividend policy has 
increased dramatically as an effort to develop a clear picture of why dividend is 
paid. In more recent studies, Bernstein (1996) and Aivazian and Booth (2003) 
reclaimed the dividend puzzle and noted that some important questions remained 
unanswered. Brealey and Myers (2003) consider the dividend controversy to be 
one of the `10 unsolved problems in finance'. Financial economists developed 
various theories to help to explain this puzzle, that is, signalling, agency theory, 
bird-in-hand, tax-preference and tax-clientele theory. Most of the research has 
explained why companies pay dividends by focusing on one of these theories. This 
thesis will briefly review these major theories before focusing on the relevant tax- 
effect theory in developing the hypothesis. 
The signalling theory developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
(1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) suggests that managers use dividend 
payments to signal information to investors. They argue that information 
asymmetries between companies and outside shareholders may induce a signalling 
role for dividends. The arguments consider that dividends `signal' the well-being 
of the company to investors and so promote confidence. The more recent studies, 
Baker et al. (2002) and Nissim and Ziv (2001) provide strong support for the 
signalling explanation of paying 
dividend. Although managers can use dividend 
payments to convey information, 
dividend changes may not be a perfect signal to 
outside investors. Easterbrook 
(1984) contends that dividend increases may be 
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ambiguous signals unless the market can distinguish between growing firms and 
disinvesting firms. Soter et al. (1996) concluded from their study that dividend 
reduction was not a result of cash flow problems, but was a strategic management 
decision to improve the firm's long term financial flexibility and growth 
prospects. According to Easterbrook (1984), the problem with dividend signals is 
that it is not clear just what the dividend signal is, and why dividends are 
considered better signals than other methods. Thus dividends may not directly 
reveal the prospects of the company, so the message conveyed may be ambiguous. 
A second explanation of dividend relevance is agency theory. Some studies (for 
example, Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982; Jensen et al., 1992) argue that 
dividends should be able to reduce agency costs. This theory derives from the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, and the dividend 
mechanism provides an incentive to reduce the agency costs. Distributions of 
dividends will decrease firms' cash resources and thus managers will be forced to 
find external financing. According to Slovin et al. (1990), a manager subjects 
himself to intense scrutiny by accountants, investment bankers, and other market 
professionals when finding new capital. Thus the effect of intense scrutiny, other 
than from existing shareholders, will reduce agency costs. Therefore dividend 
payments may serve as a means of monitoring or bonding management 
performance. This explains how 
dividend may be useful in reducing the agency 
cost of management. Briefly stated, agency theory posits that by distributing 
resources in the form of dividend, the company cash flow is no longer sufficient to 
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satisfy the needs of the company, hence managers subject themselves to the 
scrutiny of capital markets in order to generate new funds. Therefore dividend 
payments induce managers to take action which reduces agency costs. Another 
explanation of agency theory argued by Jensen (1986) is that companies pay 
dividends to reduce the firm's discretionary free cash flow16 that can be used to 
fund investments which benefit managers. The latter explanation of the agency 
theory was supported by empirical evidence in studies by Agrawal and Jayaraman 
(1994), Jensen et al. (1992) and Rozeff (1982). 
Another explanation of why companies pay dividends is based on the bird-in-hand 
theory (dividend paid to reward existing shareholders). However, Bhattacharya 
(1979, p. 267) argues that the bird-in-hand explanation for dividend relevance is 
fallacious and asserts that "virtually no empirical support exists for the bird-in- 
hand explanation" for paying dividends. 
In addition to these theories of the effect of taxes on dividend payments made by 
individual companies, several studies conceptualize that corporate taxes influence 
the dividend decision (for example, see Bellamy, 1994; Lasfer, 1996). 
Another important explanation of dividend payment involves the theory of tax- 
preference. One of the explanations regarding tax-preference theory is the 
difference in treatment between capital gains (no capital gain tax) and dividend 
16 Free cash flow is cash available in the company from the operations after taking account of 
dividend paid to shareholders and expenditures to maintain assets. 
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whereby shareholders may prefer capital gains over dividend. The favourable tax 
treatment of capital gains over dividends, for example, may lead investors to 
prefer a low dividend payout to a high dividend payout, or, may cause investors to 
prefer non-dividend paying stocks. Black and Scholes (1974) find no evidence of 
this tax effect, while Kalay and Michaely (1993) and Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) find evidence that pre-tax returns are related to dividend 
yield. 
Another explanation of tax effect on dividend relevance is called the tax-clientele 
effect. The tax-clientele theory suggests that higher rate tax investors should, 
ceteris paribus, concentrate their portfolios on companies paying lower levels of 
dividends. Conversely, lower rate tax investors should, ceteris paribus, concentrate 
their portfolios on companies paying higher levels of dividends. As the tax effect 
differs for various investors, they are more attracted to the dividend policies that 
are appropriate to their particular tax circumstances. Investors with high income 
tax brackets would prefer shares with low payouts, while investors with low tax 
brackets would favour high payout shares. Ang (1987) provides a summary of the 
literature on dividend policy and the role of taxes, and concludes that the 
explanation of tax-effects on dividends is inconclusive. However, Dhaliwal et al. 
(1999) support the theory of tax clientele and provide evidence that dividend 
clientele are substantial enough to influence investor behaviour. Another related 
study, Lee et al. (2006), found strong evidence of a clientele effect. They exploited 
a unique dataset from Taiwan, where the capital gains tax rate is zero and found 
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evidence that highly taxed shareholders tend to hold shares that pay low or zero 
dividends and trade out of companies that increase dividends. The opposite is true 
for shareholders and institutions in lower tax brackets. 
Dividend relevance to explain the tax effect on dividend policy suggests that 
companies set their dividend policies to minimize their tax liability. Using UK 
data, Lasfer (1996) indicates that companies set their dividend policies to 
minimize their tax liability and to maximize the after-tax return for their 
shareholders. He found that tax exhausted firms reduced the level of dividends 
paid, while a lower tax burden on dividends in the hands of shareholders appears 
to encourage firms to pay higher dividends. He reports that a company, the tax 
liability of which was too low to make full use of Advance Corporation Tax 
(ACT), would encourage a lower dividend payout ratio. His findings that taxation 
affects firms' dividend policy are in line with other previous studies in the UK (for 
example, Lomax, 1990 and Edwards et al., 1987). 
Lintner (1956) developed a model which suggests that companies pay out 
dividends in accordance with the level of current earnings as well as the dividends 
of the previous year. Lintner's model has been used in a number of empirical 
studies in the U. S. and other countries. In the U. S., Baker et al. (1985) and Pruitt 
and Gitman (1991) support Lintner's work and conclude that the major 
determinants of dividend payments are future earnings and past dividends. 
Lintner's model has been tested in several other countries: in Canada by Chateau 
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(1979); in Australia by Shevlin (1982); in France by McDonald et al. (1975); in 
West Germany, the U. K., France and Switzerland by Leithner and Zimmerman 
(1993); and in the U. K. by Lasfer (1996). All found evidence to confirm that his 
findings are applicable in the developed markets tested. 
Recently, several studies have focused on a company's dividend behaviour in the 
regulated and emerging markets. In India, Pandey and Bhat (1994) support 
Lintner's model and show that the managers try to maintain an uninterrupted 
record of dividend payment. In Turkey, Adaoglu (2000) supports Lintner findings 
and concludes that earnings are the main determinant of dividend payments for 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) companies. 
In Malaysia, a number of studies on dividend behaviour support Lintner's model, 
for example, Pandey (2001), Kester and Isa (1996), Gupta and Lok (1995), 
Annuar and Shamsher (1993) and Isa (1992). Pandey (2001) indicates that large 
number of companies listed at Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) 
increase payment of dividends as earnings increase. Malaysian companies are also 
very prompt in ceasing to pay dividends when they suffer losses. He reveals that 
the dividend actions of Malaysian companies are very sensitive to earning 
changes. One of the objectives of his study was to examine empirically whether 
Malaysian companies follow stable dividend payment policies, as is generally the 
case in developed markets. His study provides evidence that the public listed 
companies in Malaysia 
follow less stable dividend policies where dividend 
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payments are closely related to changes in earnings. This thesis predicts that this 
phenomenon is due to the intention of maximizing shareholder's wealth. It is 
expected that companies will maintain a target dividend payout ratio and adjust 
the dividend payment accordingly with their earnings to maximize their 
shareholders' after tax returns. 
Malaysia's dividend imputation system differs from the classical system which is 
employed in several countries. '7 Under the classical tax system, corporate 
dividends are subject to double taxation as shareholders are personally taxed on 
dividends paid out of income that has previously been taxed at the corporate level. 
In contrast, under an imputation tax system, dividends are declared and paid out to 
shareholders after tax at corporate level. Shareholders, who have received net 
dividend, that is after tax is deducted at corporate tax rate, will gross up the 
amount of the dividend to be included in their taxable income and will receive a 
tax credit (or repayment) for the imputation that has been deducted at corporate 
level. Thus, the dividend tax credit received for tax paid at the corporate level 
wholly or partially eliminates the double taxation of dividends. 
Shareholders are usually taxed at progressive individual tax rates for corporate 
profit paid out as dividends. As far as shareholders' tax rates are less than 
corporate tax rate, they may maximize wealth with maximum dividend payout. 
" The classical system is currently employed in several countries including Belgium, The 
Netherlands and the United States. 
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Thus the imputation system is able to reduce tax liability for shareholders. 18 In 
Malaysia, it has always been the case that average personal tax rate is lower than 
the corporate tax rate. One would expect that, in Malaysia, shareholders would 
demand high dividend payout from a company's profits and managers who are 
interested in maximizing shareholders' wealth would be expected to declare 
generous amounts of dividends. 
Regarding corporate tax, profits of Malaysian companies are taxed only once at a 
28 per cent corporate tax rate. Appendix A shows the computation of tax payable 
for Malaysian companies. The company's net tax liability is derived after the 
deduction of Section 110 tax on dividend received from other companies and 
Section 132/133 double taxation relief. The company can pay dividend from profit 
after tax. 
Unlike the dividend imputation system in UK, a company first pays tax on 
dividend to the tax authorities when dividend is paid to shareholders and then this 
is deducted from the company's corporation tax liability. In Malaysia, under 
Section 108, the Income Tax Act, 1967, companies are entitled to deduct income 
tax at the current corporate tax rate of 28 per cent from dividends paid to 
shareholders, but, this amount is not forwarded to the tax authorities and not 
deducted from the company's tax liability. The company is required to maintain a 
Dividend tax credit received by shareholders will reduce their tax liabilities. However, it depends 
on their marginal tax rates and their ability to utilize 
imputation credit. Generally, shareholders in 
low tax brackets may prefer a higher dividend compared to shareholders in higher marginal tax 
brackets. 
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special memorandum account known as the Section 108 Franking Account to keep 
track of the amount of tax franking credits available. This Account shows the 
ability of a company to pay dividends to a shareholder. 
Table 3.1 shows an example of the Section 108 Franking Account for a company 
for three years. The company's tax paid is credited to this Section 108 account and 
can be utilized by the company to frank its dividend payment. This account also 
includes franking credits on dividends received from other companies (Section 
110) and double taxation relief (Section 132/133). However, this example assumes 
no dividend received from other companies and no double taxation relief. In both 
2003 and 2004, the amount of dividend paid is lower than the credit available, 
thus, the balance can be carried forward for franking future dividends. However, 
in 2005, the dividend is over franked, the Section 108 account shows a shortfall 
and this amount is a debt due to the tax authority. Thus if the dividend payment 
exceeds the tax credit available, the deficit will increase the company's tax 
liability. 
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Table 3.1 
An Example of Section 108 Franking Account 
It is assumed that XYZ Ltd resides in Malaysia and has a dividend imputation 
system. The corporate tax rate in the country is 28 per cent at the present. It has 
corporate tax paid of MYR 10,000, MYR 15,000 and MYR 16,000 for 2003,2004 
and 2005, respectively. The company pays the after tax income on dividend to its 
shareholders. The company increases the distribution of dividend over these three 
years and the amount of tax paid on dividend is MYR8,000. MYR 14.000 and 
MYR23,000 for 2003,2004 and 2005, respectively. It is assumed that the 
company has no tax credit under Section 110 and no douhle taxation relief under 
Section 132/133, over these years. 
Section 108 Franking Account 
Year 
Balance bl' 
Add: Income tax paid 
Add: Tax set off under Section 110 less 
Section 132/133 relief 
Compared aggregate 
[, ess: Tax deducted from dividend paid 
(Gross dividend (a, 28 per cent) 
Balance c17 (Debt duo to government) 
2003 2004 2005 
(MY R) ('ýI\ R) (NIVR) 
(1 ß. I)OO ý, UUU 
10,000 I5,000 WOOD 
17,000 19,000 
8,000 14,000 23,000 
2,111111 3,000 (4,0110) 
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Table 3.2 shows an example of Section 108 Franking Account for three different 
companies in 2005. It is assumed that all these three companies share similar 
conditions, which are that they have similar profits and tax credit brought forward. 
They also have no dividend received from other companies and no double taxation 
relief. However, these three companies paid different amount of dividends. 
Company A paid dividends less than the franking credit available and company B 
and C paid more than franking credit available. This is more likely company B 
and C have more distributable accounting reserves. However, a company's ability 
to declare dividends is subject to the availability of Section 10819 tax credit, the 
tax portion of the dividend payment exceeding the tax credit available is due as 
debt to government for both company B and C. 
19 Section 108 of the Income Tax Act 1967 is, in fact, a constraining factor. The section requires 
setting up a notional account to which a credit entry is made in the amount of the current year tax 
paid. A tax deduction on gross dividend is then debited to the Section 108 account. In the full 
imputation tax system in Malaysia, companies which declare dividends beyond the amount 
allowed by the available Section 108 credit balance will be in debt to the government. 
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Table 3.2 
An Example of Franking Account for Different Companies 
It is assumed that company A, B and C reside in Malaysia and have equal 
chargeable income of MYR 100,000 for each company in 2005. The corporate tax 
rate in the country is 28 per cent at the present. All the companies have no tax 
credit under Section 110 and no double taxation reliefunder Section 132'133 that 
year. It is assumed that the corporate tax paid is MYR28,000 fir each company. 
All the companies pay the after tax income on dividend to their shareholders. The 
amount of gross dividend distributed for company A, B and C is MYR9O. 000, 
MYR1 10,000 and MYR120,000, respectively. It is assumed that all the companies 
have the balance of MYR2,000 tax credit brought torward. 
Corporate Tax Computation 
Company A 13 C 
(MYR) (NIYR) (MYR) 
Tax payahlc: 
chargeable income (a: tax rate 28 per cent 28,0(10 18,000 ? 8, O0O 
Less: Section 1 10 tax on dividend -- 
Icss: Section 132! 133 double lax relief' --- 
Net tax payable 28,111111 28,1111() 2}{, 11110 
Section 108 Franking Account 
Company 
Balance hi, 
Add: Income tax paid 
Add: Tax set otf under Section I I(I less 
Section 132/133 relief 
Compared aggregate 
Less: 'lax deducted from dividend paid 
(Gross dividend (u 28 per cent) 
Balance cf / (Debt due to government) 
A B C 
(NIYR) (ý1ti'R) (MY12) 
ý, I)O( ?, OI1O 2, UU(1 
28,000 ? 8, (H)0 2! {, (l. U 
30, O00 30,000 3O, OOO 
25,200 ? (0+11(1 33.600 
4,800 (800) (3,600) 
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The impact of taxes on dividend policy is of interest for this thesis as companies 
which pay excess dividends might pay more tax. Based on this, this thesis seeks 
evidence of corporate tax avoidance strategies under the tax imputation system 
implemented in Malaysia. The tax hypothesis predicts that tax and dividend 
policies cannot generally be separated since changes in payout policies may affect 
tax liability. Thus the dividend decision is believed to be a factor in influencing 
corporate tax burden. 
To some extent, this topic has largely been ignored in the finance literature, where 
researchers tend to prefer to concentrate on the relation between dividend policies 
and stock market value, cash flows, profitability, debt and market-to-book ratio. 
Previous empirical studies (for example, D'Souza, 1999; Collins et al., 1996; Alli 
et al., 1993; Jensen et al., 1992; Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; Lloyd et al., 1985; 
Rozeff, 1982; Higgins, 1981) have identified a number of factors that influence 
dividend payout ratio, including profitability, risk, cash flow, agency cost and 
growth. 
However, there is a number of studies which examine the relationship between 
dividend and tax (for example, Hodgkinson, 2002; Bond et al., 1995; Chui et al., 
1992). One of Hodgkinson's (2002) suggestions is that companies appear to adjust 
dividend due to tax influence. The main finding of Bond et al. (1995) is that 
companies faced with the higher cost of paying dividend due to surplus advance 
corporation tax would lower the level of dividend payment. Chui et al. (1992) 
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focusing on the individual taxpayer, find evidence that individual taxes do affect 
the amount of dividend. 
To the author's knowledge, none of the previous studies allows for interaction 
between dividend and ETRs, hence this thesis is the first attempt to investigate 
empirically the relationship between dividend policy and company tax liability. 
The purpose of developing this hypothesis is to contribute to the dividend 
literature by analyzing the relationship between ETRs and a company's dividend 
decisions. 
The tax hypothesis predicts that companies will decrease dividend payments to 
avoid an increase in tax liability due to the restrictions on dividend payment in the 
Section 108 Franking Account. Under the imputation system, the company that 
reaches a decision to distribute dividends is subject to the credit available in 
Section 108 and if dividend payments exceed this amount, this would result in an 
increase in the company's tax liabilities which in turn would increase ETR. Thus, 
the increase in dividend payout ratio will increase the company's effective tax 
paid. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative foam: 
H6: Corporate tax avoiders have a lower dividend payout ratio than non-tax 
avoiders. 
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However, a company can restrict dividend payment subject to credit available in 
the Section 108 Franking account to avoid an additional tax burden. If this is the 
case, there may be no relationship between dividend payout ratio and ETR. One 
would expect that companies would maximize dividend payout to maximize 
shareholders' wealth, but restricted to the credit available in the Section 108 
account in order to avoid paying more tax. This is so as to avoid penalties for 
over-franking dividends. 
3.2.7 Managerial Ownership 
Managers exercise significant control over decisions that affect the output of the 
company as day-to-day operations are under their control. The problem is that 
their actions are typically not observable. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), one approach to reduce the agency costs2° is to increase managers' 
ownership. They argued that separation between owners and managers has 
resulted in divergent interests and to align these divergent interests, contracts are 
often written to minimize agency costs. Lower managerial ownership level is 
expected to lead to the creation of contracts to restrict the opportunistic behaviour 
of the management. According to Jensen (1986), for example, the higher the level 
of managerial ownership, the lower the degree of divergence of interests and 
agency costs accordingly, and vice-versa. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
20 The agency cost exists as a result of the relationship between a corporation's owner 
(shareholders) and its management, that is, there is a potential that the management may pursue 
goals other than to maximize shareholder wealth. 
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as managerial ownership increases, there is greater alignment of interests of 
managers and outside shareholders. Jensen (1986) and Hanson and Song (2003) 
found that managerial ownership helps to reduce the agency cost and increases 
firm value. However, studies also found that high managerial ownership can 
decrease firm value because of managerial entrenchment21 (for example, 
Shivdasani, 1993; Stulz, 1988; and DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). 
According to Baumol (1959), managers indulge their needs for power, prestige, 
and status by making long-run strategic choices designed to maximize corporate 
size and growth rather than corporate profits. In contrast, Fama (1980) argues that 
manager-controlled firms bear the full cost of failing to maximize firm value and 
thus would be reluctant to select accounting methods that did not maximize this 
value. Dhaliwal et al. (1982) provide evidence that accounting policy decisions are 
not independent of the ownership/control status of the firm. Their study suggests 
that, in general, accounting methods chosen by a firm depend on the firm's 
ownership. They found a significant difference in the depreciation methods 
adopted by manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms for financial reporting 
purposes. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) reveal that managers attempt to maximize 
their utility, which is positively related to their compensation. Previous studies 
tend to differentiate between owner-controlled (OC) firms and manager-controlled 
Z' Managerial entrenchment is related to voting power and control of the board of directors. It is 
where the position of managers 
is free from the check of control and the corporate assets can be 
less valuable. This is in contrast with convergence-of-interest effects. 
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(MC) firms. MC firms are seen as not to maximize shareholder wealth, but rather 
maximize their own utility by preferring managers'various self-interests. 
The conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders arising mainly from 
the separation of ownership and control have been well-documented. For example, 
research shown that OC firms differ from MC firms in term of performance (see 
McConnel and Servaes 1990), risk-aversion (see Palmer, 1973), executive 
compensation (see Dyl, 1988), and merger and acquisition activity (see Amihud 
and Lev, 1981), but none of the empirical studies, to the author's knowledge, 
focuses on the relationship between ownership and tax planning activity (ETR). 
Theory does not shed much light on the exact nature of the relationship between 
managerial ownership and tax planning activity, hence, this thesis carries out a 
preliminary investigation about the pattern of relationship between the two and 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature. 
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that managerial ownership may 
serve as an internal control mechanism for agency problems, a significant amount 
of theoretical and empirical work has been conducted. It has been argued that 
managerial ownership is positively related to firm performance because the 
alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders reduces agency costs. 
However, Jensen and Ruback (1983) claimed that small managerial ownership 
may still force managers toward value maximization due to the market for 
corporate control and 
in contrast, high managerial ownership will give them a 
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substantial fraction of control and enough power to make decision benefiting 
them. Several previous studies have examined the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance (for example, see Short and Keasey, 
1999; McConnel and Servaes, 1990 and Morck et al., 1988). 
McConnel and Servaes (1990) and Morck et al. (1988) all find a significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Morck et al. find a 
positive relationship between ownership and firm value at low levels of 
ownership, a negative relationship at intermediate levels and a positive 
relationship at high levels. One interpretation of Morck et al. (1988, p. 311) 
findings is that, "the increases of Tobin's Q with ownership reflect the 
convergence of interests22 between managers and shareholders, while the decline 
reflects entrenchment of the management team". McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find a positive relationship at low levels and a negative relationship at high levels. 
One major difference between the McConnel and Servaes study and the Morck et 
al. study is that the latter's sample only included large firms. 
Much effort has been expended in examining ownership structure and firm 
performance. The only study which examines the link between ownership and 
corporate tax is Newman (1988). Newman (1988) differentiated between owner- 
controlled firms and manager-controlled firms and suggested that manager- 
22 Convergence-of-interest indicates that the interest of managers and shareholders are convergent. 
The increase in management ownership will increase the company market value owing to a 
uniformly positive relationship. 
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controlled firms were more likely to have bonus plans based on after-tax 
provisions. The important factor is that, when making a capital investment 
decision, managers tend to take the investment tax credit into account more if the 
firm uses an after-tax bonus plan. Manager-controlled firms are seen as not 
maximizing shareholder wealth, but maximizing self-interest. Newman (1988) 
found that manager-controlled firms are more likely to have a bonus plan based on 
after-tax compared with before-tax income measures. It seems that one of the 
direct vehicles to create the higher wealth transfer is the use of taxes. The lower 
the tax paid, the higher the wealth to managers who are compensated on an after- 
tax basis. 
The motivation from Newman's (1988) study suggests that manager-controlled 
firms are more motivated to engage in tax avoidance strategies owing to the 
incentives of maximizing managers' wealth. Managers are more likely to benefit 
from tax avoidance strategy. Thus tax avoidance strategies may be more attractive 
to firms under managerial ownership. The exploratory evidence from Newman 
(1988) shows the systematic adoption of accounting methods to avoid tax by 
managerial ownership firms which have the greater propensity to maximize 
managers' wealth. 
Recently Desai and Dharmapala (2006) developed a conceptual framework for 
understanding managerial decisions towards tax avoidance activities. They 
provide a simple theoretical framework to help understanding of the interaction 
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between corporate governance and tax avoidance, which is how changes in 
incentive compensation can change corporate tax avoidance activity. They find 
that the increased use of incentive compensation reduces tax sheltering activities. 
In this thesis managers are seen as the people responsible for tax avoidance 
activity. They may be competing with each other in the same industry to lower the 
company's tax expense to increase their prestige. This constitutes harmful 
competition that would, in turn, affect a country's revenue. Unlike most prior 
studies which concentrate on the relationship between firm performance/value and 
managerial ownership, this thesis examines the relationship between managerial 
ownership and corporate tax planning (tax avoidance). From the tax perspective, 
managers are charged with the responsibility of initiating tax planning. There may 
be competition among managers of companies in the same industry to minimize 
their tax liabilities as this may be seen as a `successful' indicator of the manager's 
ability and may also increase their firm's value. If one manager's company's tax 
liability increased compared with companies in the same industry, it might affect 
his/her job security and decrease his/her value to the company. It is suggested that 
managerial ownership firms may have more incentives for tax planning, while tax 
avoidance activity may not only be seen as maximizing managerial wealth but 
may also increase the value of the firm (shareholders' wealth). This thesis 
investigates a link between managerial ownership and corporate tax avoidance 
behaviour as firm governance should be an important characteristic of corporate 
tax savings. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in an alternative form: 
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H7: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher percentage of stock owned by executive 
directors than non-tax avoiders. 
This is the first attempt to look at the link between managerial ownership and 
ETR. While data limitations prevent the inclusion of the managerial ownership 
variable in their study, Gupta and Newberry (1997) readily acknowledge the 
importance of managerial ownership effects on the ETR in their article. 
The importance of ownership concentration23 was recommended by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) as one of the key determinants of the corporate governance aspect, 
whilst, Gupta and Newberry (1997) acknowledge managerial ownership as 
carrying the effect of agency cost in the ETR study. 
A number of studies (for example, see Short and Keasey, 1999; Kaplan, 1994; and 
Morck et al., 1988; ) define managerial ownership as ownership by members of the 
board of directors. However, McConnell and Servaes (1990) define managerial 
ownership as equity owned by corporate officers and members of the board of 
directors. However, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) used the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) as a proxy for ownership, which is less widely used in managerial 
ownership studies. 
23 ownership explained the type of ownership in several ways, that is by individual, institution, 
state, foreign and managerial ownership. 
This thesis focuses on managerial ownership consistent 
with the theoretical 
frameworks adopted which are synergy, agency theory and hubris. 
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Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) define managerial ownership as 
ownership by members of the board of directors. It should be noted that Morck et 
al. figure managerial ownership as ownership stakes by directors who hold at least 
0.2 per cent of equity, whereas for Short and Keasey, managerial ownership is not 
subject to any minimum cut-off level. 
However, this definition differs from McConnell and Servaes (1990), who define 
management (or insider) ownership as equity owned by corporate officers and 
members of the board of directors. Abdullah et al. (2002) measured managerial 
ownership by aggregating the percentage of equity interest owned by the firm's 
executive directors. In addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) defined managerial 
ownership as the proportion of shares owned by the executive directors of the 
company as a group to total shares in issue. 
Managerial ownership plays an important role in the corporate governance 
literature as managers are responsible for managing the company. Public listed 
companies in Malaysia have concentrated managerial ownership24 (as elsewhere in 
Asia), hence the responsibilities for company success fall on the board of 
directors. There are different characteristics of boards of directors pertaining to 
companies in different nations. With respect to the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
24 La-Porta, Lopez and Shleifer (1999) stated that Malaysian firms were highly concentrated. 
Cheah and Chu (2004) found that the owners were also usually the directors of the company. 
Thillainathan (1999) identified ownership concentration for companies in Malaysia, and 
furthermore he claimed that 85 per cent of the public listed companies in Malaysia had owner- 
managers in that the post of the CEO, Board Chairman or Vice Chairman was either a member of 
the controlling family or an employee drawn from the ranks of the controlling shareholders. 
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Governance (2000), 25 there are no specified numbers recommended for members 
of the board and no maximum number of directorships prescribed, but the Bursa 
Malaysia listing requirements released in January 2001 require that at least one 
third of the board should be comprised of explanatory directors (independent 
director). The term independence26 as prescribed by the listing requirements and 
the Malaysian Governance Code refers to independence from management and 
significant shareholders. 
Non-executive directors are appointed to the board of directors to balance and 
reduce the agency costs. Weir and Laing (2001) claimed that non-executive 
directors must be explanatory directors to enable the board of directors to function 
effectively. Non-executive directors could not be effective in their monitoring role 
if they were not explanatory. 
3.2.8 Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) 
Callihan (1994) measured tax burden by using average ETR and highlighted that 
average ETR are appropriate for measuring cash flows and the distributional tax 
ZS The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was formally established in March 2002 and was 
largely derived from the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Ilampel Report 
(1998) in the UK. However, because of the different Malaysian business environment, the 
mechanisms on corporate governance in Malaysia may be not necessary be the same. 
26 The independence term is defined by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (1999, p. 
82) under rule 9 of the Listing Requirement as follows: "The composition of the board of directors 
should reflect the ownership structure of the company. Every listed company should have 
independent directors, that is, directors that are not officers of the company; who are neither related 
to its officers nor represent concentrated or family holdings of its shares; who, in the view of the 
company's board of directors, represent the interest of public shareholders, and are free of any 
relationship that would interfere with the exercise of explanatory judgment " 
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burden, while in contrast, marginal ETR are applicable more in analyzing 
investment incentives. Spooner (1986) measured the corporate tax burden based 
on the ETR. Wilkie (1988) stated that the average ETR could be used as a proxy to 
measure the tax burden of a company and might also be useful to interpret the 
efficiency and equity of a tax system. Iwamoto (1992) stated that the ETR is 
concerned with the amount of corporate income paid as corporate tax payment. 
The average ETR has been widely used to measure the tax burden of a company 
(for example, see Manzon and Smith, 1994; Porcano, 1986 and Zimmerman, 
1983). Rego (2003) interpreted ETR as a measure of the effectiveness of tax 
planning in which taxes currently payable are compared with what would be 
apparent from the income figure in the financial statements. Therefore, effective 
tax rates are often utilized as a measure of effective tax planning among 
companies. Hence, average ETR are the appropriate measure since they show the 
impact of on incentives, income shifting and tax avoidance. 
In contrast, marginal tax rate (MTR) has been used to measure tax effects on 
investments. For example, Hulten and Robertson (1985), Auerbach (1983) and 
Gravelle (1982), have used the MTR to analyze investment incentive. Iwamoto 
(1992) contends that the primary difference between the ETR and marginal tax 
rate is that the MTR expresses the tax burden on newly installed capital and the 
ETR measures the total tax burden on new and existing capital. 
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Usually, the different definitions of ETR are between average and marginal ETR. 
Researchers either use average ETR or marginal ETR, and it depends on the 
research itself. Average ETR is suitable to measure the distribution of tax burdens 
across companies or industries, whilst marginal ETR is suitable to analyze the 
incentives for new investments. This thesis uses the term ETR to mean average, 
not marginal, effective tax rates as to measure the tax burden of companies. 
There is a range of alternative formulae which may be used to define and measure 
ETR. Fullerton (1984) discusses the taxonomy of the differences in ETR 
definition, and Callihan (1994) surveys a synthesis of the ETR literature. Callihan 
(1994) and Omer et al. (1991) raise the issue of different measures of the ETR. 
Generally, ETR is defined as the ratio of observed taxes to profit from existing 
investments. The issue of measuring ETR is which taxes to include as the 
numerator and how to measure profit as the denominator. Several groups of ETR 
studies have measured ETR differently. For example, Zimmerman (1983) 
measures the effective tax rate as a ratio of income tax to operating income, where 
income tax represents the total income tax liability adjusted for changes in 
deferred taxes, and operating income is total sales minus costs of sales. 
Porcano (1986) measures effective tax rates as a ratio of current income tax to pre- 
tax book income adjusted by income or losses associated with minority interests 
and/or extraordinary items. He contends that his measure is superior as it better 
reflects a firm's ability to meet its tax obligations. Holland (1998) estimates the 
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corporate tax burden by using an effective tax rate which is calculated by dividing 
a firm's current corporation tax provision by its related level of income. In U. S., 
Hanlon and Shevlin (2001) discuss the calculation of ETR used by the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO uses the current portion of tax 
expense divided by net income. 
ETR is usually measured by dividing tax liability by profit. The difference among 
ETR studies is which taxes to include as the numerator and how to measure profit 
as the denominator. With regard to the numerator, that is, which taxes should be 
considered to represent the overall tax burden of a company, a few studies have 
used tax expenses and excluded deferred taxes (Omer et al., 1993; Kern and 
Morris, 1992), while others have chosen not to exclude deferred tax (Rego, 2003; 
Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Porcano, 1986). These 
latter studies chose not to exclude deferred tax because it would control for 
earning management strategies, since income increasing earnings management 
increases both the numerator (deferred taxes) and the denominator (pre-tax 
income). Thus the inclusion of deferred taxes in the numerator does not affect the 
overall result and the result also is not driven by earnings management. In 
addition, Clowery et al. (1986) argue that to include the present value of deferred 
taxes is not easy as it cannot be accurately estimated. 
The difference in measuring ETRs depends on the purpose of the study. Previous 
ETR studies have focused on different objectives within the study, for example, 
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Buijink et al. (1999) investigated the difference between ETR and the statutory tax 
rate (STR) across companies; Holland (1998), Callihan (1994), and Manzon and 
Smith (1994) concentrated on the tax burden of companies; Buijink et al. (2001) 
focused on corporate tax competition; and Rego (2003) examined corporate tax 
avoidance. This thesis utilizes the corporate tax avoidance study by Rego (2003) 
and measures ETRs as a proxy for corporate tax avoidance based on his study. 
Rego claimed that since ETRs compare the current tax liability generated by 
taxable income (to the tax authorities) with pre-tax income based on generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), ETRs measure the proficiency of a 
corporation to reduce its current tax liability relative to its pre-tax accounting 
income. Thus they reflect tax planning and measure the tax avoidance of 
companies. 
According to Rego (2003), tax avoidance activities create book-tax differences, 
which are either temporary or permanent differences between a company's 
financial accounting and taxable income. Thus the numerator is based on taxable 
income and the denominator is based on financial accounting income to 
accommodate book-tax differences. 
27 In addition, Rego (2003) employed 
sensitivity analysis which excluded deferred taxes from the numerator of ETR and 
found that they do not affect the main results of his paper. 
27 According to Mills (1998), whose study was conducted using U. S. data, firms with greater book- 
tax differences have larger Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit adjustment that is consistent with 
greater tax avoidance activities. 
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With regard to the denominator of ETR, that is, which income should be 
considered to represent the company's profit, according to Zimmerman (1983), the 
use of cash flow (instead of operating income) would eliminate the effects of 
different accounting treatments of income. A number of studies (Phillips, 2003; 
Rego, 2003; Porcano, 1986) uses pre-tax income as the denominator. They claim 
that ETR reflects a company's effective tax planning. Hence this thesis uses pre- 
tax income as the denominator of ETR. 
Rego (2003) measures ETR as the ratio of income taxes currently payable to pre- 
tax accounting income. Rego (2003) claimed that firms that avoid income taxes by 
reducing their income tax payable while maintaining their accounting income will 
have lower ETR, thus making ETR a reasonable measure of tax avoidance. 
3.3 Industry Effects 
Industry affiliations are also included as potential explanatory variables in this 
thesis because tax avoidance activity may also depend on the sensitivity of certain 
industries. By this is meant the notion that different industries may receive 
different tax treatments and the companies in these different industries might use 
those incentives differently to engage in tax planning. For example, with studies 
on U. S. firms, Rosenberg (1969) and Harberger (1959) indicate that the farming, 
textiles, petroleum, coal products and real estate sectors pay significantly lower 
income taxes than other sectors. Omer et al. (1993) found evidence of empirical 
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differences in ETR in the pharmaceutical industry and the petroleum refining 
industry. Another U. S. study by McIntyre and Nguyen (2000) indicates that ETRs 
vary widely by industry, with oil companies enjoying the lowest ETR. 
To the author's knowledge, prior studies on industry effects, however, focus more 
on Western data, particularly in the U. S.. Holland (1998) was the only ETR study 
for U. K. data. Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) examined emerging countries, that 
is, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. Kim and Limpaphayom 
(1998) suggest that industrial effects might be a potential explanation for 
differences in ETR, and acknowledge the importance of sector effects in their 
article, but do not include them as explanatory variables. Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) examine the issues of industry effects on ETR in Malaysia. They found 
evidence that, manufacturing firms and hotels had significantly lower ETRs than 
any other public listed companies in Malaysia between 1990 and 1999. Their 
study, however, was based on firm size only, whereas this thesis may explain 
differences in ETR by reference to several other variables. Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) classified industries into consumer, manufacturing, mining, finance, 
construction, trading, hotel and plantations, whereas this thesis uses seven 
categories which are: basic material, industrial, consumer goods, health care, 
consumer services, utilities and technology. The classification of these categories 
was based on industry sectors classified in the Thomson Analytic Database. 
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3.4 Other Companies' Characteristics 
Admittedly, the determinants of corporate tax avoidance strategy could be related 
to other factors besides a company's size, income, leverage, foreign activity, 
capital intensity, dividend and managerial ownership. A complete corporate tax 
avoidance model would ideally include other factors, such as bonus plans and 
R&D activity. Previous accounting choice studies (for example, see Newman, 
1988) have tested whether the existence of a bonus plan influences accounting 
procedures. Bonus plans based on after tax accounting earnings may produce tax 
avoidance behaviour, while a bonus plan based on before tax accounting earnings 
would not create such an incentive. Leauby (1990) reported that bonus plans based 
on after tax earnings encourage corporate income tax avoidance. Firms with such 
bonus plans appear to avoid tax more than other firms. 
Healy (1985) indicates that more than 50 per cent of the bonus plans studied in his 
research use income before taxes as a factor for bonus payouts. Newman (1988), 
whose study looks at tax laws and compensation plans, shows that 66 per cent of 
the firms had bonus payouts based on income before taxes. Newman found that 
firms using after tax bonus plans are more responsive to changes in tax regulations 
than firms with before tax bonus plans. Therefore an important element is whether 
an existing bonus plan is based on accounting earnings before or after income tax 
considerations. Even though bonus plans may be one of the tax avoidance 
strategies, this thesis does not include a variable for bonus plans because the 
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relevant information is not readily available and not all companies' managers 
disclose the data. 
With regard to the company involvement in research and development (R&D) 
activity, the R&D costs typically would create investment tax shields because such 
costs can be immediately written off for tax purposes even though the benefits are 
usually gains over a long period. This thesis does not include R&D as an 
explanatory variable as there is only a small number of public listed companies in 
Malaysian which are involved in R&D activities. According to Ismail and Yussof 
(2003), Malaysian companies are lacking in R&D activities owing to a lack of 
technological expertise. Fredriksson (2005), however, claimed that developed 
countries link their technology and innovation network not only outside the home 
country, but also bring it to selected emerging market economies, particularly 
noticeably in China, Hong Kong and Malaysia. Owing to low participation in 
Malaysian companies' involvement in R&D, several efforts have been made by 
the government to promote this activity. One of the efforts is related to tax 
incentives. In the 2004 budget, Malaysian industries were given a tax exemption 
of 50 per cent for five years in respect of income received from R&D. 
Company culture may also have an impact on tax avoidance behaviour. It is 
possible that some companies are simply more aggressive than others in engaging 
in tax planning strategies to obtain tax savings. However, this thesis does not 
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include this variable in the model owing to data constraints as corporate culture is 
largely unobservable. 
3.5 Summary 
Theoretically, this thesis presents a principal-agent model in explaining all the 
explanatory variables incorporated in the tax avoidance model. Managers are 
referred as to the persons responsible for engaging in corporate tax planning 
activities. These activities are motivated by the three elements of synergy, hubris 
and agency simultaneously. 
This thesis identifies seven firm characteristics that could explain managers' 
actions towards tax avoidance activities. Five firm characteristics, namely political 
cost, profitability, leverage, foreign activity and capital intensity, have been 
previously tested in developed countries such as the U. S., the U. K. and Australia. 
Most of the prior studies were based on a univariate variable, while this thesis 
utilizes multivariate variables from applicable hypotheses derived from the 
literature. The two new variables incorporated in the tax avoidance model are 
dividend and managerial ownership. This thesis posits other determinants for tax 
avoidance activity so as to improve on past research and contribute a new 
dimension to the literature. Managerial ownership is an indicator of the corporate 
governance perspective, where Malaysian companies are typically family-owned 
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controlled28 companies. This characteristic differs from those indents in developed 
markets and provides a different environment to be studied. 
Dividend is a puzzling issue in corporate finance which has never been resolved. 
One distinctive feature of the Malaysian capital market is the absence of a capital 
gains tax. This, coupled with the dividend imputation tax system, means that 
Malaysia offers a good ground to test the relationship between dividend and tax. 
In addition, this thesis controlled for industry effects as tax avoidance activity 
might differ systematically by industry. The focus of this thesis is to investigate 
the factors which might affect tax avoidance activity in the Malaysian business 
environment. 
The model developed, research design, methodology and data collection are 
discussed in Chapter 4 in the following chapter. 
28 The vast majority of the companies are controlled by their founders or by family members of the 
founders. 
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Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
To examine the relationship between firm characteristics and corporate tax 
avoidance strategies, this section starts with an introduction of a research model 
for tax avoidance. Then the methodology is discussed to set up the regression 
analysis used to test the model, as well as rationalization of explanatory variables. 
Finally, the data collection is discussed. 
The previous chapter shows the development of seven hypotheses in used in the 
research model. The hypotheses established are: 
. Hypothesis 1: Political Costs 
HI: Tax avoiding corporations are smaller in size than non-avoiding 
corporations. 
Hypothesis 2: Profitability 
H2: Tax avoiding corporations are more profitable than non-avoiding 
corporations. 
Hypothesis 3: Leverage 
H3: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher level of leverage in the capital 
structure than non-tax avoiders. 
" Hypothesis 4: Foreign Activity 
H4: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher level of foreign activity than non- 
tax avoiders. 
Hypothesis 5: Capital Intensity 
H5: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher degree of capital intensity than non- 
tax avoiders. 
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" Hypothesis 6: Dividend 
H6: Corporate tax avoiders have a lower dividend payout ratio than non-tax 
avoiders. 
" Hypothesis 7: Managerial Ownership 
H7: Corporate tax avoiders have a higher percentage of stock owned by 
executive directors than non-tax avoiders. 
With the above in mind, the present chapter will now consider the research model 
used to test the hypotheses, the methodology for every explanatory variable and 
the collection of the data. 
4.2 Research Model 
The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. 
Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over 
several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure 
cross-sections or pure time series studies. According to Fleischman (1995), such 
data will increase the explanatory power of the model. In addition, Caroll and 
Wasylenko (1994) suggested that this type of data will afford the greatest 
opportunity to disentangle the systematic relationship between explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables. 
The panel regression equation differs from a regular cross-section or time-series 
regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of 
panel data model can be specified as: 
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Yt=ai+/3Xt+s 
with the subscript i denoting the cross-sectional dimension and t representing the 
time-series dimension. In this equation, Y, represents the dependent variable in the 
model, which is the company's effective tax rate; X, contains the set of 
explanatory variables in the estimation model; and ai is taken to be constant over 
time t and specific to the individual cross-sectional unit i, whilst, c account for any 
unobservable explanatory variables that are not included in the estimation model. 
The following panel data regression model is employed to investigate the 
determinants of corporate tax avoidance strategies: 
ETRii =a+ fiIPC+/32IBIT+/J3STDB, r+/i4LTDB+ßisTDB+/i6STDM+Iii, LTDM 
+ 68TDMi1+ JJ9DFAu+/31oFA+, 6, ICAPINT,, +/312DPRI, +ß, 3MOn+C, r 
Where the dependent variable, ETR,, , is the effective tax rate for company t in the 
year 1. The explanatory variables include proxies for political cost (PC), income 
before income tax (IBIT), capital structure (leverage), foreign activity (DFA and 
FA), capital intensity (CAPINT), dividend payout ratio (DPR) and managerial 
ownership (MO). The definition and measurement of these variables are explained 
in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 
The Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variables Definitions Measurement 
FTR t: ffcctivc'l'ax Rates Natural lo, -, of I. a R 
PC Political Cost Natural log of total assets 
IBIT Income Before Income Natural log of 11311 
Tax 
STDB Short Tern Leverage Ratio of short term debt to equity 
(Book Value) (Book Value) 
I. TDB Long Terin Leverage Ratio of long term debt to equity 
(Book Value) (Book Value) 
TDB Total Leverage Ratio of total debt to equity 
(Book Value) 
S"l'DM Short Term Leverage 
(Market Value) 
L'I'DM Long 'l'erne Leverage 
(Market Value) 
TDM Total Leverage 
(Market Value) 
DFA Foreign Activity 
Dununy Variable 
IA Foreign Activity 
CAYINT Capital Intensity 
DPR Dividend Payout Ratio 
MO Managerial Ownership 
(Book Valuc) 
Ratio of short term debt to equity 
(Market Value) 
Ratio of long tcrii debt toi equity 
(Market Value) 
Ratio of-total debt to equity 
(Market Value) 
1, if firm reporting Iorcign assets 
or ti>rcign income, and 0 
otherwise. 
Ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
Ratio oftangible fixed assets to 
total assets 
Ratio of div'idend payment to net 
prof it 
Natural log of percentage of 
equity shares owned by executive 
directors 
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The model expresses leverage variable in both book and market value terms. Book 
value of the ratio is derived by dividing the book value of the debt by the book 
value of equity. The market value based ratio is derived by dividing the book 
value of debt by the market value of the equity. Leverage is decomposed into three 
categories that are short term, long term and total debt. Overall, the leverage 
variable can be categorized into six explanatory variables, namely, short term 
leverage book value (STDB), long term leverage book value (LTDB), total 
leverage book value (TDB), short term leverage market value (STDM), long term 
leverage market value (LTDM) and total leverage market value (TDM). 
All explanatory variables, except for dividend and managerial ownership, appear 
in previous studies and are included based on theoretical arguments to test whether 
firm characteristics have any significant influence on corporate tax avoidance 
behaviour. The dividend and managerial ownership variables are, to the author's 
knowledge, new variables in the analysis of ETR and are included in the thesis's 
model to capture any dynamic aspects of avoidance behaviour in the Malaysian 
business environment. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the sample selection procedures. All firm-years' 
observations were obtained from two databases, which are the Bursa Malaysia and 
the Thomson Analytic Database for 2001 - 2005, resulting in 5,000 observations. 
Banking and insurance companies were excluded because they are subject to 
different legislation from the other companies and the regulatory constraints faced 
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by these companies are likely to affect their ETR differently from other companies 
(740 firm-years). These companies tend to be highly regulated and relatively 
`safe' companies in Malaysia. Previous ETR studies (for example, see Rego, 
2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Manzon and Smith, 1994; Wilkie and Limberg, 
1993; Shevlin and Porter, 1992; Zimmerman, 1983; Wilkie, 1988 and Stickney 
and McGee, 1982) omitted companies with losses or zero income. These 
companies will create negative values for ETR which is not susceptible of 
economic interpretation in this context. In addition, most of the loss-making 
companies in the data set were loss-making for the entire period of the study. 
Thus, to be consistent with prior studies, this thesis also omitted company-year 
observations with losses or zero income which resulted in 1,970 firm-years. Firm- 
years with incomplete ETR data were also excluded (645 firm-years). One of the 
reasons of incomplete data is that the companies that changed their fiscal year- 
ends during the sample period. The change of fiscal year-ends would create 
financial reporting gaps or reduced accounting periods. The calculation of ETR is 
based on data which are available for every single year from 2001 to 2005, 
inclusive. Thus, the exclusion of these companies is to ensure that the ETR 
calculation is not misleading. The final sample comprises 1,645 firm-year 
observations as shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Number of firm-years 2001 - 2005 5,000 
Less: 
Banking and insurance companies (740) 
Companies-years with loss or zero income (1,970) 
Companies-years with missing ETR data (645) 
Number of firm-years available for ETR analysis 1,645 
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The ETR value of the sample companies should be constrained to lie below 100 
per cent. With regard to eliminating the effects of extreme value, ETRs greater 
than one were recorded as one. This is consistent with the approach taken by prior 
studies, such as Rego (2003), Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Gupta and 
Newberry (1997). There are several reasons why a company's ETR might be 
greater than one. One explanation is that, due to a consolidation process which 
combines subsidiaries companies with net operating losses. 
The companies, as per the Thomson Analytic Database classification, are grouped 
into seven industries or sectors: basic material (165), industrial (600), consumer 
goods (555), health care (45), consumer services (130), utilities (35), and 
technology (95). Basic material consists of industries engaged in manufacturing 
and distribution of mainly local resources, including quarrying, mining, steel, iron, 
chemical and aluminium production. The industrial sector is based on 
manufacturing industry which is other than basic material industries. Consumer 
good activities involve trade and distribution of raw materials for the food 
industry, processing agricultural products, trading material for textiles and 
automobile activities. The health care industry is engaged in developing, 
researching and marketing health care products. Consumer services are based on 
the operation and management of hotel and resorts, travel and tourism, the 
development of residential and commercial properties and provision of intra-city 
transportation. The utilities industry concentrates on basic infrastructure needs 
which are water supply, waste management, gas power generation, construction, 
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environmental services and trading. Technology industry main activities are to 
develop and provide technology, support the telecommunication industry, develop 
and market software and hardware components, and provide technical support and 
training services. Table 4.3 shows industry classifications. 
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Table 4.3 
Industry Classifications 
Industry Frequency Percent 
lndcodeO Oil and Gas I () .6 
Indcodel - Basic Material 165 1O 
lndcode2 - Industrial 600 36.5 
Indcode3 - Consumer Goods 555 33.7 
Indcode4 - Health Care 45 2.7 
Indcode5 - Consumer Services 130 7.9 
Indcode6 - Telecommunication 10 .6 
Indcode7 - Utilities 35 2.1 
lndcode9 - Technology 95 5.8 
Total 1,645 100 
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Various tax incentives have been given to the selected companies and sectors in 
order to promote both economic and social goals. Different tax incentives for 
different industries should provide possible reasons that may explain how 
companies could use tax incentives to lower tax liabilities. Various tax incentives 
which have been provided under the Promotion Investment Act 1986 and the 
Income Tax Act 1967 have been discussed in depth in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
Different industries which receive different tax treatments would lead to the 
different effective tax burdens. The regression model developed to explain 
industry effects on corporate tax liability is as follows: 
ETR it = aj +ß ljPCir + ßi 2 jIBITit +ß3 jSTDB u+ß4 jLTDB it + ßi s jTDB it + fi 6 jSTDMit + 
ß7jLTDMir + 6sjTDMit + , 69jDFAu + ßßojFAit + ßti, CAPINT it + ß1sJDPRit + 
/1 13 jMO it + ei: 
forj=l... 7 
OR 
ETR,: = a, +p PCrr + /3 2IBITu + /J 3STDB; r + /34LTDBu +A sTDBa +A 6STDMu + /i7LTDMI 
7 
+ßsTDMi+j69DFA, r+ f3ioFA; r+ fluiCAPINT,, +ßI2DPRI1+ßl3MOu+ cýIND,; r+at 
J-z 
where: 
INDj;, = 1, if firm i is in industryj 
IND;;, = 0, if firm i is not in industryj 
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Companies which engage in foreign activities are fundamentally different from 
domestic-only companies as they operate in different tax jurisdictions, culture, 
economic and political environments. DFA is a foreign activity dummy variable to 
test whether companies engage in foreign activity avoids more tax than their 
domestic counterparts. The equation below, which is the DFA interaction, is 
employed to test whether companies that engage in foreign activity have a 
systematically different relationship between firm characteristics and ETR from 
those that of purely domestic companies. 
ETRu = a; +(/I+ yIDFA)PCr: +(/62+y2DFA)IBIT;: +(/i3+y3DFA)TDBit + 
(ß4 +y4DFA)CAPINT it +(ß5+ ysDFA)DPRit +(ß6+y6DFA)MOu+eu 
4.3 Methodology 
This section will first discuss the regression analysis used to test the model, 
followed by the discussion of methodology applicable to all explanatory variables 
and the measurement of tax avoidance. 
4.3.1 Regression Analysis 
The analysis of the data has used the STATA programme which was designed 
specifically for the analysis of panel data (Baltagi, 2005). The use of data with 
both a cross-sectional and a time series allows the opportunity to increase the size 
of data set considerably as comparison with a pure cross-sectional and pure time 
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series data set. The increase in data size availability will reduce collinearity among 
the explanatory variables, thus improving the efficiency of the econometric 
estimates. Baltagi (2005) contends that pooling of time series cross-sectional data 
provides more observations, more variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degree of freedom and more efficiency. Baltagi claimed that pooled data are 
more proficient in identifying and measuring effects that are undetectable in pure 
cross-sections or pure time series data. Panel data estimations have several 
advantages over those pure cross-sectional or time series data estimations. One of 
the benefits of using panel data that they can control for individual heterogeneity, 
whilst pure time series and pure cross-section studies do not control this 
heterogeneity cause the risk of obtaining biased results. According to Baltagi 
(2005) panel data do not suffer from the omitted variable bias and because they 
can account for individual companies' heterogeneity. 
29 Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998) added that the measurement biases resulting from aggregation of firms or 
individuals and biases arising from omitted variables are reduced with the 
approach. Greene (2000) suggests that the merit of panel data over cross-section 
data is the ease of modelling the differences in behaviour across individual 
companies. 
29 For example, corporate tax avoidance is modelled as a function of size, profitability and 
leverage. These variables vary with different companies and time. However, there is a lot of other 
variables that may be company-invariant or time-invariant that may affect corporate tax avoidance, 
for example company culture. Some of these variables are difficult to measure or hard to obtain, 
thus omission of these variables leads to bias in the resulting estimates. However, panel data are 
able to control for these company-invariant and time-invariant variables whereas a pure time-series 
or pure cross-section cannot. 
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The hypotheses were tested in four ways. First, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
analysis was used with the pooled data set. This pooled regression treats each 
company in each year as an independent observation. The OLS pooled regression 
model is used as the base line for comparison with other regression. The OLS is 
used to test if the relationships are found to be robust in a company fixed-effects 
and random effects specification. 
Second, the regressions of fixed-effects and random-effects models are estimated. 
Fixed-effects models capture the effects of unobserved or unmeasurable firm 
characteristics that vary according to the firm, but are relatively stable over time 
for a given firm. However, the fixed-effects model has a limitation in that 
estimations are conditional or sample-specific, thus inferences are not 
generalizable outside the sample. This limitation can be overcome by the random- 
effects model which views variables as normally-distributed random variables. 
The daunting question is how to choose between the fixed-effects and the random- 
effects models. In principle, fixed-effects should be appropriate when the 
observations have been selected non-randomly, or if they represent an entire 
population. Random-effects should be appropriate when the observations have 
been selected randomly from a larger population. However, in practice, several 
other considerations should take into account. Fixed-effects involve the estimation 
of a parameter for each individual, and may cause of loss of degree of freedom 
when companies (n) are large in number and years (t) are few. However, random- 
effects do not require the estimation of parameters for the individual effects. 
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Another consideration is that random-effects require a specific standard 
assumption of the normality distribution, whilst fixed-effects require no such 
assumption. Hausman (1978) proposed and developed the Hausman specification 
test to test whether the fixed-effects or random-effects model should be used. In 
this thesis, the Hausman test favours the fixed-effects model than the random- 
effects model. However, with the fixed-effects model, two variables have been 
dropped from the regressions, namely the dummy variable foreign activity and 
managerial ownership. This is because the fixed-effects model does not allow the 
inclusion of dummy variables and one year data that are perfectly collinear with 
the individual effect, that is, data that do not change over time. In contrast, the 
random-effects model does allow the inclusion of these data which do not vary 
over time. Thus are random-effects model was estimated to overcome this 
problem. 
Third, the censored regression model uses Tobit estimators to restrict the effect of 
potential bias. The dependent variable values are filtered by means of truncation at 
both sides of ETRs. According to Buinjink et al. (2000), this filter is used to 
ensure that the most extreme observations are excluded from the analysis, without 
unnecessary loss of useful data. This estimation tends to reduce the influence of 
outlying observations, thus observations with either an ETR greater than double 
the statutory tax rate (56 per cent), or a negative/zero ETR are deleted. Therefore 
only those companies with an ETR in the range between 0 per cent and 56 per cent 
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are considered. This will censor the data set to include a more representative and 
reliable range of corporate ETRs. 
In all three stages of the analyses, the model includes the determinants of a firm's 
characteristics towards tax avoidance behaviour for public listed companies in the 
Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, KLSE30) 
and these differ across industrial sectors. The model examines the influence of 
industry effects on tax avoiding behaviour across companies. This test helps to 
assess whether the industry differences have an effect on tax avoiding behaviour. 
Finally, the interaction between the dummy variable proxying foreign activities 
and firm characteristics is presented. The aim of these interactions is to test 
whether companies which engage in foreign activities have systematically 
different relations between ETR and other firm characteristics from those that are 
purely domestic companies. 
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
This thesis used multiple years' data between 2001 and 2005, inclusively, which 
reflect a different economic environment across years. 
30 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) has changed its name to Bursa Malaysia on 26'h April 
2004. Even though the period of study covers from 2001 to 
2005, the name Bursa Malaysia will be 
used throughout the thesis. 
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The variable for political cost is PC, which is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
The data were transformed to natural logarithm so as to meet the homoscedascity 
requirement of equal variances. The profitability variable, that is income before 
income tax (IBIT) is a natural logarithm of income before income tax. Leverage 
can be defined in different ways depending on the objective of the analysis. For 
example, leverage may be defined as debt to assets, debt to capitalization or debt 
to equity. This thesis measures leverage as a ratio of debt to equity" to capture 
companies' financial decisions. Companies appear to make their choice of raising 
new finance based on whether to raise debt or equity. The focus here is to examine 
companies making debt or equity issues in an attempt to explain their tax 
avoidance behaviour. Since the dependent variable may have a different effect for 
different types of debt, leverage is measured as short term debt, long term debt and 
total debt. Debt, the numerator, then is divided into three components, short term, 
long term and total debt, whereas the denominator could be measured in book 
value and market value terms. In the Malaysian emerging market, companies 
employ both short term and long term debt to finance their operations. 
Furthermore, it is common for companies in Malaysia to substitute short term debt 
for long term debt and roll over short term debt. Thus it is more appropriate to 
define leverage with different components of debt. Each leverage ratio is 
measured in book value and market value terms, hence, six measures of the 
leverage ratio as an independent variable are used. A company's leverage is based 
on book value which is consistent with the practice of many corporate finance 
31 The equity value represents the common shareholders' interest in the company, and includes 
share capital and retained earnings (reserves). 
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researchers as book value is claimed to measure financial planning free of the 
distortions caused by the volatility of market prices. However, Lasfer (1995) 
suggests that the use of market value to measure leverage is more appropriated 
than book value, if it is available. This thesis uses both book and market value to 
measure leverage to gain insight into the difference between the two. According to 
Lasfer (1995), book value of leverage represents the long term effect of taxation, 
whereas market value indicates the short term effect. He did not differentiate 
between long term and short term leverage, thus uses book value and market value 
represent long term and short term effect. 
Two different proxies for foreign activity are used in the empirical test, which are 
DFA and FA. The foreign activity dummy variable (DFA) is used to indicate 
whether companies engage in foreign activity or not. Value 1 was given if a firm 
reports foreign income or foreign assets, and zero otherwise. This is to determine 
whether companies which engage in foreign activity have lower or higher ETR 
than companies which do not engage in foreign activity. In contrast to the foreign 
activity dummy variable, DFA, FA is a continuous variable and is the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales, which determines whether companies with extensive 
foreign operations have lower or higher ETR than companies with less extensive 
foreign operations. 
The capital intensity (CAPIN7) variable is included to capture companies' 
investment decisions. Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of tangible assets 
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to total assets. The dividend payout ratio (DPR) variable is measured as the ratio 
of total dividend to net profit that is the dividend paid to the after-tax profit for the 
company. The dividend variable is used as it is expected that high dividend 
payments may cause higher tax liability. 
The last variable included in the model is managerial ownership, MO. Managerial 
ownership is a natural logarithm of the percentage of shares owned by executive 
directors. This thesis proxies managerial ownership as the percentage of equity 
shares owned by executive directors at the accounting year end which is consistent 
with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Abdullah et al. (2002), who define 
managerial ownership as the percentage of equity interest owned by the firm's 
executive directors. The calculation of managerial ownership is the aggregation of 
shares owned by executives on the board of directors. Thus, the total managerial 
ownership is dependent on the number of executive directors holding shares. 
Interaction variables are also used. The interaction variable is the product of the 
foreign activity dummy variable and the explanatory variables. For example, 
DFA xPC is the interaction of DFA and PC, to test whether companies which 
engage in foreign activity have a systematically different relationship between 
firm size and ETR from those that have purely domestic activity. These 
interactions will follow for the other explanatory variables. 
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Hypotheses 1 and 6 predict a significantly positive coefficient on firm size and 
dividend, and the interaction of both firm size and DFA, and dividend and DFA. 
Hypotheses 2,3,5 and 7 predict a significantly negative coefficient on IBIT, 
LTDM, CAPINT and MO, and the interactions of those terms. 
4.3.3 ETRs as a Measure of Tax Avoidance 
In modeling the corporate tax avoidance determinants, the dependent variable in 
the model is the company's effective tax rate (ETR). Tax avoidance is related to 
the intention of the taxpayer to reduce tax through tax planning methods. Effective 
tax planning (tax avoidance) will reduce the present value of tax payments and 
lower the effective tax rates. Previous research considers effective tax rates (ETR) 
as a measure of effective tax planning (for example, see Mills et al., 1998 and 
Phillips, 2003). Academic researchers and policymakers have also been using 
ETR as an important measurement of the corporate tax burden for several decades 
(for example, see Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Zimmerman, 1983 and Stickney and McGee, 1982; U. S Treasury 1978 and 
Siegfried 1972). 
The analysis of this thesis utilizes the concept of effective tax rates (ETR) since it 
is the most appropriate tool to measure the distribution of a company's tax burden. 
This measurement was in line with Rego's proxy for tax avoidance that is also 
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consistent with the studies of Mills et al. (1998) and Phillips (2003). ETR is 
measured as the ratio of current income tax expense to income before income tax. 
ETRs were estimated by using financial statement data, since tax returns data are 
not publicly available due to company-level tax return data for corporations being 
confidential. Most researchers develop measures from financial statements to 
observe tax characteristics (for example, tax burden) due to absent data on 
companies' tax return information. Hulten (1984) stated that effective tax rates are 
a convenient device for summarizing the tax burden implied by the many complex 
provisions of the tax code. 
4.4 Data 
The data used for the individual variables will now be considered in more detail 
including a discussion of other sources than financial accounts which were used to 
collect the data. 
This thesis commences with the full population of companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia from 2001 to 2005. The data chosen start from 2001 as the year that the 
self-assessment system started to be implemented for companies in Malaysia. The 
observations are all of public listed companies in the main board and second board 
of the Bursa Malaysia. The data were in the form of panel data. Selected 
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companies were drawn from seven industries which are basic materials, industrial, 
consumer goods, health care, consumer services, utilities and technology. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis examines whether political costs, 
profitability, leverage, foreign activity, capital intensity, dividend and managerial 
ownership variable can explain effective tax rates (ETRs). The data for most of the 
variables were collected from the annual report, except for managerial ownership. 
As managerial ownership data are not available in the financial statements, these 
data were manually extracted from the Bursa Malaysia Companies' Database. 
32 
The data obtained was one year data which available at the end of 2005. The 
database incorporates data for public listed companies for the current year only, 
thus the data is for 2005 when the data were collected. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the inclusion of managerial ownership is necessary to explain 
the relationship of the corporate governance33 part of this study, that, is the 
potential for agency costs. The term `managerial ownership' in this thesis refers to 
the managers who are also the owners of the company, hence, the managerial 
ownership data collected excluded independent non-executive directorship from 
the shares owned by the board of directors. 
Most of the data were gathered from annual report. Vergossen (1993) and Streuly 
(1994), for example, argue that annual reports are an important and adequate 
32 The Bursa Malaysia Companies database can be accessed from http: //www. bursamalaysia. com 
33 The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee (1999, p. 10) defines corporate governance as: 
"the process and structure used to direct and manage the business affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing 
long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interest of other shareholders. " 
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source of information for investment decisions. Financial statement data are used 
for several reasons. First, financial statements are the only source of publicly- 
available information that allows the calculation of ETRs and the explanatory 
variables at the individual company level (Shevlin and Porter, 1992). Secondly, 
previous studies, such as Rego (2003), measure the tax burden based on ETRs 
which are obtained from financial statement data. Thirdly, the Bursa Malaysia 
requires all its listed companies to abide by the Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements. 34 Thus data gathered from annual reports are consistent as to in 
accounting policies and standards adopted. Fourthly, the Bursa Malaysia requires 
all its listed companies to be audited by qualified auditors. Hence annual report 
data is consistent in quality. Finally, Zimmerman (1983) found that ETRs 
produced by either financial statement data or Internal Revenue Service data were 
similar, and thus concluded that financial statement data produced an unbiased 
estimation of ETR. The financial accounts data are taken from the Thomson 
Analytic Database. 
4.5 Summary 
This section constructs the research model of the study, provides the regression 
analyses and details out the sample selection. The research model is developed to 
determine how well the selected explanatory variables predict the dependent 
34 One of the listing requirements requires that all its listed companies should prepare annual 
audited accounts according to the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and the 
Companies Act 1965. MASB has developed from the previous standard that is Malaysia 
Accounting Standards (MAS), as well as adopting the extant of International Accounting Standard 
(JAS). 
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variable, ETRs. The statistical tools which will be used to explain the relationship 
are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed-effect, random-effect and Tobit 
estimation. 
The next chapter presents the results of statistical analysis performed on the 
hypothesized variables. 
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Analyses and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into five parts. First, the results are discussed for all 
variables, descriptive statistics and the multicollinearity problem (Tables 5.1 and 
5.2). Secondly, the OLS regression result, including the industry effect (Tables 5.9 
and 5.10), is reported. Thirdly, panel data fixed-and random-effect model 
regression results, including the industry effect (Tables 5.11- 5.13), are discussed. 
Fourthly, a censored regression model using Tobit estimators including the 
industrial effect (Tables 5.14 and 5.15) is introduced and finally, the regression 
results of the interaction between the dummy variable and the explanatory 
variables (Table 5.16) are discussed. In-depth discussion of the results and their 
relationship to previous research is given in section 5.8 to avoid repetition 
throughout the chapter. 
5.2 The Model 
In the empirical model, the analyses regress the company's tax avoidance activity 
(ETR) against 13 explanatory variables. The general form of the model can be 
specified into Model 1 and Model 2. The models that posit the determinants of 
corporate tax avoidance strategy are explained by the following regression 
(coefficients' sign predictions are in parentheses) and are as follows: 
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Model 1: 
ETR =a+ß, PC,, (+) +ß IBIT(-) + ß3STDB,, (-) + ß, LTDB,, (-) + ß5TDB,, (-) +ß6STDM(-) + 
ß, LTDM(-) + ßRTDM(-) + ß1DFA(-) + ß,,, FA(-) + ßCAPINT(-) + ß,, DPR(+) + 
ß, 
3 
0,, () + ", 
with the subscript ; denoting the cross-sectional dimension and , representing the 
time-series dimension. The left-hand variable, ETR,,, represents the dependent 
variable in the model, which is the company's effective tax rate. a is a scalar, 
followed by 13 explanatory variables in the estimation model, and c accounts for 
any unobservable firm characteristic effects that are not included in the regression 
model. 
Model 2: 
+ ETR =a+ CPC,, + ? 2IBIT' + ß4LTDB + ß, TDB,, + ßNTDM + ßDFA + ßFA + ßCAPINT,, 
, 6, ZDPR + 
ß, 3M0,, + E 
Where IBIT* =1BIT-PC 
Model 2 is included to handle multicollinearity problems (see Table 5.2(a)), which 
includes transforming the profitability variable and dropping three leverage 
variables which are short term leverage book value, short term leverage market 
value and long term leverage market value. 
The way the results in this chapter will be presented is to outline key results from 
the regression analyses first for every model in every table. The results are then 
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compared with previous studies and their implications are determined at the end of 
this chapter. 
It is worth nothing that there may be many factors which influence tax avoiding 
activity apart from the 13 explanatory variables which are presented in Table 4.1, 
such as government policy and company culture. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
explanatory variables presented in Table 4.1 were used as the relevance for these 
variables is based on prior analytical and empirical tax avoidance research. The 
effective tax rate (ETR), as defined by Rego (2003), is the dependent variable. 
Among the explanatory variables, political cost is proxied by company size and is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of assets. Income before income tax (IBIT) is 
the natural logarithm of income before income tax. Leverage is the debt level and 
is categorized into six categories which are short term leverage (book value), long 
term leverage (book value), total leverage (book value), short term leverage 
(market value), long term leverage (market value) and total leverage (market 
value). Leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity for book value and to 
market capitalization for market value. There are two different proxies for foreign 
activities: (1) a dummy variable (DFA) equal to one if companies are reporting 
foreign assets or foreign income, and zero otherwise; and (2) the ratio of foreign 
assets to total assets (FA). DFA is to determine whether firms engaging in foreign 
activities have a lower or higher ETR than others and FA is to determine whether 
companies with more extensive foreign activities have a lower or higher ETR than 
other companies. Capital intensity (CAPINT) is the ratio of the net book value of 
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tangible fixed assets to total assets. Dividend payout ratio (DPR) is defined as a 
ratio of dividend payment to net profit. Managerial ownership (MO) is the natural 
logarithm of aggregating the percentage of equity owned by the company's 
executive directors. Most of the variables are measured in natural logarithm, so the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for every variable. The mean ETR 
(0.1144) is higher than median (0.0586) ETR with a wider range of ETR 
percentages between 0 per cent to 100 per cent. Mean (5.8358) and median 
(5.5310) for political cost is very similar and this pattern is also shown by income 
before income tax. However, there is a wide variation between the mean and the 
median for all categories of leverage. Capital intensity and dividend payout ratio 
have a close mean and median respectively with a range of percentages for 
dividend payout ratio between 0 per cent to 100 per cent. The natural logarithm of 
managerial ownership reports mean ownership to be 0.6643 with a median of 
3.1629. 
Referring back to Table 4.3 in the previous chapter, this shows nine industrial 
classifications of the sample. However, the industrial classifications of fewer than 
10 companies were omitted owing to the loss of degrees of freedom. Thus, the 
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regression for industrial effects dropped two industries, namely oil and gas, and 
telecommunication. 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Observations 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1`1 R' 0.1144 0.0586 0.1714 0.0000 0.9990 
PC" 5.8358 5.5310 1.4865 -1.3863 11.0587 
IBIT° 3.2049 2.9487 1.5337 0.0000 8.4561 
STDB 34.0755 13.1049 182.4366 -0.5896 5315.7490 
LTDB 20.2820 4 201 1 47.4886 -0.9977 1112.5910 
TDB 49.7903 20,9346 178.7193 -1.5873 5780.1150 
STDM 27.9908 12.1972 45.9864 0.0016 513.8553 
1. TDM 11.1581 3.8877 15.2905 0.0000 92.4281 
TDM 43.3730 17.6786 70.0461 0.0000 1006.1800 
DFA 0.3617 0.0000 0.4806 0.0000 1.0000 
A 9.3962 0.0000 21.3585 0.0000 100.0000 
LAPIN]' 42.8875 42.4571 20.3737 0.1443 95.3107 
DPR 28.8955 25.1083 23.7697 0.0000 99.0714 
MO; ý 0.6643 3.1629 4,6653 -9.2103 4.6052 
Notes: the descriptive statistics are based on the final sample of 1,645 co mpany-year 
observations . 
The dependent variable is effective tax rate (FTR). the explanato ry variable, 
are defined as follows: political cost (PC), income bel re income tax (11311 ). short term 
leverage book value (STDB), long term leverage hook value (1. "I 1)li), total lev erage hook 
value (TDB ), short term leverage market va lue (Sl1)M), long ter m leverage m arket value 
(LTDM), tot al leverage market value (TI)M), foreign activity dumm y variable (1)1 A), foreign 
activity (FA ), capital intensity (CAPINI ), dividend payout ratio (1)PR), and manaýcerial 
ownership (MO). 
" Log trans fo rmation has been specified for these variables. 
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Table 5.2(a) determines whether the explanatory variables are strongly correlated. 
It shows that a strong correlation exists between political cost and income before 
income tax (0.9093). Beside this high correlation, there are other high correlations 
between the six leverage variables, that is short term leverage book value and total 
leverage book value (0.9584), long term leverage book value and long term 
leverage market value (0.7910) and short term leverage market value and total 
leverage market value (0.7734). 
Size is a proxy for political cost and it is not surprising that there is a high 
correlation between political cost and income. Assuming the companies in the 
observations are representative of economic activity, companies in high-growth 
economies (large companies) are expected to have high income growth rates. 
These two explanatory variables are hypothesized to be related to ETR with 
opposite signs, that is political cost is expected to have a positive relationship with 
ETR whereas the income before income tax variable is expected to have a 
negative sign. Both explanatory variables are important variables which need to be 
maintained in the model. 
Correlations among variables in leverages varied from -0.2177 to 0.9584. The 
highest correlation is between short term leverage book value and total leverage 
book value. It is not surprising that these variables have a high correlation as they 
are all leverage variables, but this thesis would like to examine more precisely 
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which type of leverage has a strong effect on ETR, thus all six categories are 
included initially. 
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Table 5.2(a) 
Correlation of the Variables (Model 1) 
ETR PC IBIT STDB LTDB TDB STDM 
I: -I R 1.0000 
PC 0.0501 1.0000 
1131T -0.0481 0.9093 1.0000 
STDB 0.0624 -0.0448 -0.0989 1.0000 
1.11)13 0.0684 0.3000 0.1933 0.290Q 1.0000 
I DB 0.0784 0.0408 -0.0375 0.9584 0.5197 1.0000 
S ITDM 0.1460 -0.0465 -0.2177 0.5545 0.1915 0.5583 1.0000 
I. T1) M 0.0374 0.4310 0 291 1 0.1848 0.7910 0.3754 0.2293 
TDM 0.1249 0.1731 -0.0266 0.3821 0.4719 0.5070 0.7734 
DIA -0.0151 0.1944 0.2254 -0.0590 0.008% -0.0548 -0.0985 
FA -0.0762 0.1972 0.2254 -0.0320 -0.0058 -0.032% -0.0572 
CAPIN I -0.0944 0.0639 0.0287 -0.0185 -0.0316 -0.0403 0.001O 
DPR -0.1155 0.1120 0.0919 -0.0986 -0.1138 -0.1193 -0.192 
MO -0.0690 -0.5014 -0.4530 0.0535 -0.1376 0.0093 0.0935 
LTDM TDM DFA FA CAPINT DPR MO 
IA Dm 1.0000 
T DM 0.5938 1.0000 
DFA 0.0069 -0.0754 I. 0000 
FA -0.0052 -0.0363 0.4658 I. 0000 
C'A1) IN'I 0.0176 -0.0448 -0.061X -0.0045 I. 0000 
I)PR -0.1356 -0. I961 0.0498 0.0825 -0.0065 I. 0(X)0 
MO -0.1519 -0.0136 -0.0127 -0.0553 -0.0898 -0.0692 1.0000 
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Model 2 was created to take into account multicollinearity35 which will be 
presented as a comparison with Model 1. Table 5.2(a) shows high correlation 
between political cost and IBIT, short term leverage book value (STDB) and total 
leverage book value (TDB), long-term leverage book value (LTDB) and long term 
leverage market value (LTDM), and short term leverage market value (STDM) 
and total leverage market value (TDM) (as highlighted in Table 5.2(a)). 
Model 2 retains the political cost and IBIT variables, but drops three of the 
leverage variables which have a greater than 70 per cent correlation. Three 
explanatory variables have been dropped, namely short term leverage book value, 
short term leverage market value and long term leverage market value in order to 
handle high correlation between variables in leverage. Thus, Model 1 and Model 2 
are as below: 
Model 1: 
ETR =a+ß, PCN + ß2IBIT + ß., STDB + ß4L TDB + ß, TDB +ß3TDM + ß, LTDM + ß8TDM + 
ß, DFA + ß, FA + ßCAPINT,, + ß, 2DPR,, + ß, 3M0,, 
+ e, 
Model 2: 
ETR =a+?, PC,, + ¬2IBIT ,, + ß4LTDB + ß. TDB + /RTDM,, + QDFA + ß,, FA,, + ßCAPINT,, + 
Q, ZDPR + ß, MC + E 
Where IBIT* = IBIT-PC 
35 Multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation exceeded 0.80 (Gujarati, 1995) 
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Table 5.2(b) 
Correlation of the Variables (Model 2) 
ETR PC IBIT* LTDB TDB TDC DFA 
ETR 1.0000 
PC 0.0468 1.0000 
1131T* -0.22548 -0.0656 1.0000 
L: I DB 0.0746 0.3043 -0.2077 1.0000 
TDB 0.0779 0.0514 -0.1791 0.5244 1.0000 
IDM 0.1388 0.1819 -0.4525 0.4817 0.5096 1.0000 
DFA -0.0046 0.1693 0.0560 0.0293 -0.0361 -0.0303 1.0000 
FA -0.0560 0.1847 0.0599 0.0072 -0.0222 -0.0115 0.4714 
CAPINT -0.0811 0.1032 -0.0841 -0.0224 -0.0338 -0.0436 -0.0679 
DPR -0.1003 0.1075 0.0536 -0.1161 -0.1204 -0.2158 0.01 10 
MO -0.0530 0.4566 -0.0132 -0.1089 0.0210 0.0267 0.065? 
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The Collin test (Ender, 2006) has been used for checking the seriousness of the 
multicollinearity problems. The seriousness of the multicollinearity problem is 
measured by the condition number as an output from the Collin test. The greater 
the correlation among the variables, the higher will be the condition number. 
Ender (2006) suggests an informal rule of thumb that if the condition number is 15 
or more, multicollinearity is a concern, while if it is greater than 30, 
multicollinearity is a very serious concern. However, Belsley et al. (1980) suggest 
that only when the condition number is greater than 20, might there be potential 
problems. In these analyses, Collin tests were employed for several combinations 
of explanatory variables that may suffer from multicollenearity. Collinearity 
diagnostics for political cost and income before income tax has condition number 
16.3147 which is of concern but is not severe (Table 5.3). However, the Collin 
tests for all the high correlation leverage variables shows condition numbers 
ranging between 2.1245 and 7.1078 (Tables 5.4 - 5.7) which are all below 15. 
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Table 5.3 
Col[inearity Diagnostics for 
Political Cost and Profitability (IBIT) 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
PC 3.58 1.89 0.2794 0.7206 
11311 3.58 1.89 0.2794 0.7206 
Mean VIF 3.58 
Eigenval Condition 
Index 
Condition Number 16.3147 
Table 5.4 
Collinearity Diagnostics for 
Short Term Leverage Book Value and Total Leverage Book Value 
Variable VIF SQRT VII' Tolerance R-Squared 
S'IDB 11.85 3.44 0. (»44 0. (II56 
TDB 11.85 3.44 0.0844 0.91 56 
Mean VIF 1 1.85 
Eigenval 
1 2.0529 
2 0.9065 
3 0.0406 
Condition Number 
Condition 
Index 
1.000() 
1.5049 
7.1078 
7.1078 
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Table 5.5 
Collinearity Diagnostics for 
Long Term Leverage Book Value and Total Leverage Book Value 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
LI I)ß 1.39 1.18 0.7201 0.2799 
TDB 1.39 1.18 0.7201 0? 799 
Mean VII 1.39 
Eigenval Condition 
Index 
1 1.8369 1.0000 
2 0.7563 1.5585 
3 0.4069 2.1245 
Condition Number 2.1245 
Table 5.6 
Collinearity Diagnostics fier 
Long Term Leverage Book Value and Long "Term Leverage Market 
Value 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
LI DM 2.86 1.69 0.3500 0.6500 
11 [)U 2.86 1.69 0.3500 0.6500 
Mean V1F 2.86 
Eigenval Condition 
Index 
1 2.2260 1 
. 
(1(111(1 
2 0.6378 I . y6s 1 
3 0.1361 4.0437 
Condition Number 4.0437 
161 
Chapter 5 Analyses and Results 
Table 5.7 
Collinearity Diagnostics for 
Short Term Leverage Market Value and Total Leverage Market Value 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
STDM 1.40 1.18 0.7131 0.2869 
TDM 1.40 1.18 0.7131 0.2869 
Mean VIF 1.40 
Eigenval 
1 1.9228 
2 0.7356 
3 0.3417 
Condition Number 
Condition 
Index 
I. 0(100 
1.6168 
'. 3722 
2.3722 
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The normality test in STATA (2005) for numerical methods is either Shapiro- 
Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, or Skewness-Kurtosis tests. This thesis used the Shapiro- 
Wilk test for testing normality as recommended for sample sizes from 7 to 2,000. 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistic (1965) is the ratio of the best estimator of the variance 
to the usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the variance. The Shapiro-Wilk 
statistic for normality can be seen in Table 5.8 which shows that most of the data 
set was not normally distributed. The W statistic (p<0.00) is highly significant, 
indicating that the data are not normally distributed. This condition is not a 
surprise, as was indicated earlier, and was expected as it is very common in 
financial data sets. 
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Table 5.8 
Shapiro-Wilk 'Test for Normality 
Variable Obs w V Z Prob>z 
E IS 1519 0.9036 89.010 I I. 3U I 0.0000 
PC 1562 0.9509 46.528 9.678 0.0000 
[MIT 1547 0.9638 33.949 8.881 0.0000 
STD13 1117 0.0962 630.497 16.036 0.0000 
LTDB 1564 0.4476 523.697 15.791 0.0000 
"TDB 1563 0.1740 782.630 16.793 0.0000 
STDM 1089 0.5914 285.363 14.050 0.0000 
1. TDM 1542 0.8171 171,200 12.956 0.0000 
TDM 1262 0.6328 286290 14.140 0.0001) 
DFA 1645 0.9992 0.792 -0.588 0.7219 
FA 1463 0.7727 202.740 13.355 0.0000 
CAPINT 1294 0.7943 164.120 12.762 0.0000 
DPR 1365 0.9641 30.059 9.533 0.0000 
MO 1645 0.7152 282.682 14.254 0.0000 
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5.4 The OLS Regressions 
To find out the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables and the magnitude of the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable, the OLS regression is estimated. This thesis employs OLS 
regression to examine the aggregate effect of explanatory variables on tax 
avoidance activity and to identify the most significant explanatory variables. 
Table 5.9 presents the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables using 
OLS regression for both Model 1 and Model 2. Both models indicate a positive 
and significant relationship between political costs and ETR. Both tables also 
show negative and significant results for income before income tax, capital 
intensity and the dividend payout ratio for explaining ETR. The direction of three 
significant explanatory variables, namely, political costs, income before income 
tax and capital intensity, support prior expectations, except for the dividend payout 
ratio with an unexpected sign. Another three explanatory variables are significant 
in Model 1, namely long term leverage book value, long term leverage market 
value and the foreign activity dummy variable, where long term leverage market 
value is significant with the expected sign and both long term leverage book value 
and foreign activity dummy variable with unexpected sign. Model 2 records a 
significant value for total leverage book value but not with the expected sign. 
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Table 5.9 
OLS Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on Various Firm 
Characteristics for Companies from 2001 to 200-5 
Model I Model 2 
Explanatory Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
Variables Sign (Std Error) (Std Error) 
Constant -3.3713* 3.5061 
(. 5/5( (. 4965) 
PC + . 
5809* 
. 
2034* 
(. 1734/ (. 0532) 
1I3I1 -. 3414** 
( /67 ) 
11311-* - -. 3795** 
(. 1594) 
SII)B - . 
0007 - 
(. 00/4) 
L DB . 
0031 *** -. 0014 
(. 00/7) (00/6) 
TD13 - -. 0005 . 
0004** 
(. 0014) (. 0002) 
STI)M - . 0013 - 
(. 0024) 
1I DM - -. 0199* - 
(. 007 3) 
I I)M OUt) I -. 0003 
(. 0015) (. 0011) 
DI: A - . 2805*** . 1983 (. 146 3) (. 1470) 
1 'A - -. 0039 -. 0034 
(. 0028) (. 002N) 
C'API N"1 - -. 4430* -. 4155* 
(. 116) (. 1100) 
UPI( + -. 0137* -. 0112* 
(. 003 7/ (. 0032) 
MO - -. 0126 -. 0208 
(. 0165) (. 0148) 
F 8.59 7.50 
/p 0.0000) (p 0.0000) 
R 0.0830 0.0707 
Number of observations 887 887 
Notes: the value of the standard error is given in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates where: 
*int icutec St(1Iisticttl. ci nificunc e ar the I",, level 
**Indic atc'. S . ctaMfical. si nifkance (it ch, 5(", 
level 
***i, rclicutr. c. ciaiLsNcal. sign, ifIcunceac/h(' 1U" level 
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Table 5.10(a) shows the effects of industry on tax avoidance activity based on an 
OLS regression for Model 1, whilst Table 5.10(b) shows for Model 2. The results 
suggest the level of tax avoidance activity differs depending on the industry. 
Generally, from Table 5.10(a), the OLS regression shows that the tax avoidance 
activity is highly correlated with several explanatory variables for some industries 
but shows low correlation for other industries. This analysis revealed that basic 
material and industrial sectors have a high degree of correlation coefficient with 
tax avoidance activity. Both categories show that most of the variables (firm 
characteristics) record a significant coefficient consistent with the expected 
direction. Only two firm characteristics do not show significant coefficient for 
both industries, namely total leverage book value and foreign activity. 
Companies in the consumer goods category show significant coefficients with the 
expected direction for total leverage book value, capital intensity and managerial 
ownership, whilst the health care category indicates a significantly negative 
direction for capital intensity. Also most of the leverage variables are significant 
with the expected sign. 
Companies in the consumer services category have only one significant 
explanatory variable, which is the dividend payout ratio, but not in the expected 
direction. 
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Each category of companies in the utilities and technology sectors has significant 
coefficients for different explanatory variables. Utilities report capital intensity 
and managerial ownership as significant with the coefficients consistent with the 
expected direction, and also as significant income before income tax, long term 
leverage market value and dividend payout ratio, though the latter has a sign 
different from expected. In the technology category, short teen and long term 
leverage book value were also significant with the expected sign of coefficient. 
However, surprisingly, political cost, income before income tax and total leverage 
book value were significant with coefficients signs different from the expected 
direction. 
The R-square ranges from a low of 0.1224 for consumer goods to a high of 0.8359 
for utilities indicating a substantial contribution to explaining the variance, but 
note that R2 is high when these are fewer observations. 
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Table 5.10(a) 
Industry Difference based on OLS Regression Results of Tax 
Avoidance Activity on Various Firm Characteristics for Companies 
from 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign Material Goods 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(. ctrl error) ('Yhl error) (. tiid err'or) (. chI error) 
Constant 1.5600 -4.3309* -3.2209* 34.5231 
(1.9859) (. 6903) (1? 142) (20.4232) 
PC 2.7172* . 
9520* 2322 -2.1483 
(. 8668) (. 2 246) (. 2660) (4.7336) 
IBI'l - -1.8756* -. 6251** . 0490 . 2513 
(. 6524) (. 2598) (. 2268) (2.9522) 
STDB 1095** -. 0454 . 
0042*** 
. 0175 (. 0547) (. 0304) (. 0024) (. 0 323) 
IA DB I)B -. 0728 -. 0693** -. 0169 -. 3048*** 
(. 0750) (. 0325) (. 0248) (. 1322) 
TDB - . 
0971 
. 0467 -. 0029*** . 1236** (. 0600) (. 0306) (. 0016) (. 0447) 
S "I DM - -. 0344** -. 0152*** . 0073 -. 5352*** (. 0164) (. 0081) (. 0066) (. 2480) 
LTDM - . 1365*** -. 0228 . 0517 . 0234 (. 0795) (. 0145) (. 044.5) (. 1 30 5) 
I DM . 
0296** 
. 
0162** -. 0065 . 
2841 *** 
(. 0/19) (. 0062) (. 005 7) (. 1 326) 
D1: A 1.0314*** . 1514 . 4386 4.6156 (. 5792) (. 2200) (. 3203) (5.156$) 
FA - . 0001 -. 0037 -. 0054 . 
1013 
(. 0067) (. 0068) (. 0064) (. 1026) 
C'A1 IN 1 -3.2654* -. 5157* -. 4498*** -8.5107*** 
(. 7369) (. 1235) (. 2611) (3.864,1) 
DPR + -. 02899*** -. 007% -. 0087 . 
018% 
(. 0152) (. 0054) (. 0054) (. 0609) 
MO . 
0875*** 
. 
0196 -. 0598** -1.0535 
(. 0511) 02.57) (. 0-17.3) (1.114 3) 
1 7.70 12.23 4.67 8750.05 
(1) - 0.0000) (11 0.0000) (1) 0.0000) (p 0.0000) 
K 0.5097 0.1804 0.1224 0.7652 
No of Obs. 82 369 266 19 
Note: 
*indj( at .ý stuti. cýicul. cignific a nce at the 
I" level 
**incliccitc. ý tit the 5" ,, level 
***indicah, r . rtati. rtu nl. ci nh/ic'cutce at the 1 0". 
level 
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Table 5.10(a) (continued) 
Industry Difference based on OLS Regression Results of Tax 
Avoidance Activity on Various Firm Characteristics for Companies 
from 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Industry- 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign Services 
Constant 
PC' + 
IBI1 
SFDB 
L'f Dß 
I 1D13 
S 11)M 
1,1I)M 
'I Dm 
1)I :; A 
In 
c AI INT 
[)PR 
MO 
Coefficient 
(ti7d error/ 
-2.1209*** 
(1.074-1) 
. 
1177 
(. 49? k) 
-. 2548 
(. 712 ) 
-. 0147 
(. 0499) 
0072 
(. 0088) 
. 
0075483 
(. 0088119) 
. 
0167 
(. 03-55) 
. 
0182 
(. 0286) 
-. 0040 
(. 0078) 
1.0670 
(l. 3403) 
-. 0100 
(. OI R6) 
. 
O170 
(. 2349) 
-. 0239** 
(. OlO3) 
. 
0366 
(. 0704) 
16.25 
(p 0.0000) 
R2 0.1589 
No of Obs. 80 
Notc: 
*lnIýICU(C'. S . 
statistical . ýlý111ýic unc'e at 
the Po l('i i'/ 
* *indicates 
. statistical. sigFri/ic uFICC at thc 
S"o IPtt'l 
***indicates stati. stical. c9, 'ni/icancc at iIi' /0°o Irr'/ 
coefficient 
O ad ('ITO) ) 
9.6011** 
(5.394-1) 
-. 1554 
(. 6366) 
. 
5)X0*** 
(. 2757) 
-. 30X5 
(. l)'43) 
-. 345O 
(? 028) 
. 
3295 
(. 2007) 
. 
0057 
(. 0328) 
. 
1021* 
(. 0321) 
. 
0015 
(. 0077) 
. 
4603 
(. 76 / 7) 
. 
01() 
(. 009.3) 
-4.4224** 
(/. s2N9) 
-. 0364* 
(. 0/ 09) 
-. 3250** 
(. 1345) 
17.78 
/h 0.0000) 
(1. x359 
33 
Coefficient 
(. st(/ cri-O/ ) 
4.9183 
(/. 3050) 
-4.0548** 
(1.1(077) 
4.6213* 
(1.3497) 
-1.0497** 
(. 4667) 
-I. 1509* 
(. 3? 4/) 
. 
9765*** 
(. 4597) 
. 
2745 
(. "'7) 
. 
5374 
(. 39481 
-. 1428 
(. /3/2) 
-2.9676 
(2.0090) 
-. 0537 
(. 0697) 
-1.1545 
(1.64; 6i) 
. 
0123 
(. 0334) 
. 
7172 
(. 4421) 
22.06 
(/) 0.0000) 
0.8336 
27 
170 
Chapter 5 Analyses and Results 
Table 5.10(b) shows the result for industry difference on OLS regression for 
Model 2. Model 2 seems to follow the pattern of Model 1 in that most of the firm 
characteristics which are significant in Model 1 are also significant in Model 2, 
although the results are somewhat less strong. Several variables which are 
significant in Model 1 are insignificant in Model 2, including total leverage market 
value, foreign activity dummy variable, dividend payout ratio and managerial 
ownership in the basic material category. 
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Table 5.10(b) 
Industry Difference based on OI. S Regression Results of Tax 
Avoidance Activity on Various Firm Characteristics for Companies 
from 2001 to 2(105 (Model 2) 
ludustrv 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Carc 
Variables Sign 
Constant 
PC f 
IBI * 
I. I'DB - 
TDB - 
TDM 
DFA 
FA - 
CAPIN] - 
[)PR 
MO 
Material 
( Oet, ticient 
(. ct(l error) 
-1.930 
(?.? 849) 
. 
8053** 
(. 013) 
-1.724 * 
(. 6 518) 
-. 0075 
(. 0ll9) 
-. 0123 
(. 0086) 
0.0000 
(. 0067) 
-. 7666 
(. 564 3) 
. 
0072 
(. 0058) 
-2.41 I4** 
(. 756,1) 
-. 0222 
(. U155) 
-. 0078 
(. 0ßh: 5) 
3.07 
(p 0.0022) 
(. 'OC ticicnt 
(std c'r-rurl 
-4.2721 * 
(. 7206) 
. 
261246** 
(. 09801(27) 
-. 6453** 
(.? 699) 
(. 0027) 
. 
0001 
(. 0004) 
(. 0022) 
. 
1524 
(. 0, M) 
-. 0069 
(. 0065) 
-. 4794* 
(. 1255) 
-. 0039 
(. 0049) 
. 
0040 
0243) 
14.68 
(p 0.0000) 
Goods 
(oef! cirn( 
(tied crror) 
-3.375R** 
(1.1506) 
. 
26 1** 
(. 109) 
-. 076O 
(. ? 743) 
. 
0066 
(. 0008) 
-. 0003 
(. 0005) 
. 0O10 
(. 00.30) 
. 
53(, 5*** 
(. 3 16) 
-. 0059 
(. (1074) 
-. 46 I(1*** 
(. _'3/Sl) 
-. ()Oa)h** 
(. 00.17) 
-. 0615** 
(. 024 ) 
4. x{(6 
(p 0.0000) 
0.1088 
323 
( ociliclent 
(. cld error) 
21.0952 
(/6. ) 9<'(5) 
- I. 6692 
(1.4X151 
. 
2390 
(?. 1 3? /l 
. 
004 I 
(. (119 ) 
. 
0071 
(. 0/. 5/) 
-. 
0232*** 
(. 0120) 
7.42M3 
(5.2114) 
. 
1195 
(. 1042) 
-5.3758 
(3.6/5/) 
. 
UIUI 
(. 004 3) 
-1.4572 
(l. 090X') 
5.56 
(h U. (Ill 5l 
0.6475 
19 
K' 0 . 
2733 0.1584 
No. of Obs. 97 406 
Note: 
*indicates statistical unu"c at thu' /",, /ci '/ 
**ifulic(Ne. c ciati. cti(al. cigni/icuncc-tit Me i" level 
***iýzdtculc'. c statistical "ciýýniýicuitcc' tit I/Ic' 
10"', /fiel 
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Table 5.10(b) 1continuedl 
Industry Difference based on OLS Regression Results of 'Cax 
Avoidance Activity on Various Firm Characteristics for Companies 
from 2001 to 2005 (Model 2) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities 
Variables Sign Services 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(. Sid c'110/) (st(/ error) 
Constant -2.2160 7.7844 
(1.3497) (5.373? ) 
PC + -. 1579 . 
5584 
(. 2064) (. 3862) 
IBI f* - -. 2432 . 
81 16* 
(. 3997) (. 3049) 
1_"I DI3 - . 
0002 -. 012% 
(. 0049) (. 023 3) 
1 DB3 - . 0007 . 0193 (. 0041) (. 0185) 
TDM - . 
0021 
. 0033 (. 0033) (. 0059) 
DFA - 1.0392 . 0034 (. 9310) (. 8648) 
FA - _. 0067 . 
0048 
(. 0158) (. 0/25) 
CAI'INi - . 1025 -3.60%0*** 
(. 1924) (1.8679 
DPR 1 -. 0187** -. 0396* 
(. 0083) (. 011045) 
MO - . 0194 -. 2318** 
(. 06S7) (. 1-118) 
f 6.61 17.65 
(h 0.0000) (h 0.0000) 
R 0.1306 0.7354 
No. of Obs. 90 33 
Note: 
*inclicat s . ýtcrti. ýtic al. ci nificancc at the 
1 " level 
**17111(Cc1tc, c. 1'tclu st/c ll signiýIcan ce at the 5"u level 
***iýzclicu/ec stati. stical. signifIca nc e at the 10(',, level 
Fechnology 
Coctiicicnt 
(.. tail (")"ror) 
-2.9981 
N. 423 1) 
1.6251 *** 
(. 8724) 
2.52 Q** 
(1.1351) 
. 
0440 
(. 0475) 
. 
0019 
(. 0/hl) 
-. 0002 
(. 0(151) 
-2.7747*** 
403 7) 
-. 0391 
(. 044(/) 
(. 40 13) 
-. l)394*** 
(. 0226) 
. 
95KH* 
(.? 244) 
10.18 
(h 0.0000) 
1). (, 501 
35 
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5.5 Fixed-Effects and Random-Effects Estimations 
As discussed in the previous chapter, to overcome issues of non-independence 
between the observations, fixed-effects and random-effects models were 
estimated. Table 5.11(a) presents the fixed-effects estimation results and Table 
5.11(b) presents the random-effects estimation results. As mentioned earlier, the 
research design for this thesis includes fixed-effect and as well as random-effect 
models. The Hausman36 test is a criterion used for choosing between fixed-effects 
and random-effects models. The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) 
compares the fixed-effect37 and random-effect38 models and suggests that the more 
efficient model should be estimated. The results from the Hausman test indicate 
that the fixed-effect model should be used in the thesis. Although the Hausman 
test results are in favour of the fixed-effect estimations, the estimation requires 
two explanatory variables in the model to be dropped, namely foreign activity 
dummy variable and managerial ownership. Foreign activity was dropped because 
it is a dummy variable and managerial ownership was dropped because only one 
year's data were available. As a result the random-effect model was also 
estimated. 
36 Hausman's (1978) test tests the null hypothesis where the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed-effects 
estimator. The Hausman test checks whether the fixed-effects and random-effects model is more 
efficient. 
37 Fixed-effect models assume the unobserved variables differ between subjects but are constant 
across time for the same subject. Fixed effect is the most common type of panel data regression 
model. 
's Random-effect models assume that unobserved variables may be either of the fixed effects or 
between effects type. As the random-effect model takes into account both types of effects, it is 
sometimes assumed to be more efficient than fixed-effects model. 
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The results in Tables 5.11(a) and 5.11(b) should be more reliable than those 
obtained by the estimated OLS models. Compared with pooled OLS regression 
data analysis, the use of a panel data set provides stronger evidence concerning the 
determinants of corporate tax avoidance strategies and confirms the earlier OLS 
analysis. It also heightens the confidence about the relationships and causality 
among company variables and the avoidance behaviour. The panel results also 
suffer less from the time-series problems of multicollinearity and the endogeneity 
effects between variables. The pooled OLS regression does not control for the 
individual firm effects and may introduce bias in parameter estimates and 
overstate the t-statistics. Therefore, the analyses utilize the panel data and employ 
fixed-effects regression to control for the underlying time-variant heterogeneity 
among companies in the observations. Table 5.11(a) presents results of the fixed- 
effect model and comparison with OLS pooled regression reveals differences in 
parameter estimates and enhanced explanatory power of regressions. 
The intercept term for the fixed-effect model is significantly positive. This 
indicates the reluctance of the Malaysian companies not to engage in tax avoiding 
activity. The results from the fixed-effect estimation 
for both models indicate that 
political cost, income before income tax and 
dividend payout ratio exert a 
significant influence on ETR. Surprisingly, 
both models do not provide support for 
the political cost hypothesis and dividend payout ratio which reports negative 
significant associations with the ETR measures. 
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However, as for the random-effect estimation, it does provide support for the 
political cost hypothesis as it has a positive significant coefficient in Model 1 but 
not in Model 2. Dividend payout ratio is significant in both models, but with the 
sign different from expected. Moreover, both models indicate negative and 
statistically significant, different signs as expected for income before income tax 
and capital intensity. Generally, by using panel data and controlling for company 
fixed-effects or random-effects, the analyses found meaningful correlations 
between the firm's characteristics and tax avoidance behaviour. 
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Table 5.11(a) 
Fixed-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on Various 
Firm Characteristics for Panel Data of Companies for 2001 to 2005 
Explanatory Expected ModelI Modelt 
Variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient 
(Std Error) (Std Error) 
Constant 3.1M1 ' 2.5940*** 
(1.6936) (1.5607) 
PC + -. 6843* -. 6695* 
(. _'660) (.?? 
2 6) 
11311 - -. 4685* - 
(. 1 26) 
I13IT* - -. 4I 12* 
TDB 
SCDM 
S"CDR - -. 0043** 
(. 0020) 
I. TDB - -. 0053** 
(. 0027) 
TDB - . 
0050** 
(. 0020) 
STDM - -. 0057 
(. 0036) 
IA DM - . 
0157 
(. 0/07) 
1DM - -. 0000 
(. 0022) 
FA - -. 0015 
(. 0057) 
LAPIN I- -. 0529697 
(. 237/) 
DPR -. 000 I ** 
(. 00-36) 
1: (11,619) 4.63 
Prob . chi? 0.0000 
R' ý4'itltin 0.0760 
Between 0.0 183 
Overall 0.0094 
Number of observations 887 
Note: 
*(/((, %.. ý. eignifu ancc° tit the l t, /(' 'C/ 
**n? [llc'Cl1P. 5' . claI/. ch('a! 
ý Sl 71lý/C'[! 7J('(' at the S°o level 
***indicate. c. ctult. ýttcu/. ýigni(icurrcrutthe /0 level 
sTDf3 
L TDB 
i. 154/) 
. 
0012 
(. (ll)/7 
.( 
001 
(. 0003) 
. 
0005 
(. 00/4) 
-. 0052 
(. 0056) 
0121 
(. 23/4) 
-. 007X* 
4.99 
0.0000 
0.0521 
0.0222 
0.0125 
S87 
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'Fable 5.11(b) 
Random-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity, on 
Various Firm Characteristics for Panel Data of Companies 
for 2001 to 2005 
Explanatory Expected ModelI Modelt 
Variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient 
(Std Error) (Std Error) 
Constant -3.2 132* -3.4061 
(. 7341) (. 6609) 
PC' + . 4945* . 0790 
(. 1522) (. 0798) 
1131"1 - -. 4367* - 
Ll? ") 
IBI I* - -. 4849* 
(. 1140) 
S1 D13 - -. 0034*** - 
/. 0020/ 
1: 1 DB - -. 0032 -. 000 
(. 0026) (. 0015) 
1DB - . 
0041 ** 
. 
0006*** 
(. 0020) (. 0()113) 
S"I I)M - -. 0026 - 
I. TDM - -. 0Q43 - 
(. O0S6) 
TDM - -. 0013 -. 0019 
(. 0020) (. 00/2) 
DIA - . 
3701 
. 
2959 
(. 22) 9) (1 1 
FA - -. 0045 -. 005 5 
(. 0040) (. 0040) 
CAPINT - -. 2783** -. 3 185** 
(. 1 24) (. 1-102) 
DPR -. 0109* -. 0094* 
(. 0031) (. 00M) 
MO - -. 1)262 -. 0325 
(. 0-101) 023 ) 
Wald chit 37.20 38.32 
Prot) > chi? 0.0004 (). 0000 
R' Within 0.0272 0.0217 
Uctweeii 0.0772 (). ()6x() 
overall 0.0588 0.0606 
Number of observations XX7 887 
Note: 
*! llelif NP. 1' . 
ctai,, st1CUý. 1'1,171ý1c'([Itc'c' [It tilg ýýýn 
ý('i e/ 
"indicates Statistical %ignilicunc c tit the 5° le el 
(c'. %.. Yuti. ýltccrl. ýigni/icci, tceut the i(i olevel 
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Tables 5.12(a) and 5.12(b) show the results of individual regressions for every 
industry in the sample using panel data random-effect tests for Models 1 and 2 
respectively, while Tables 5.13(a) and 5.13(b) present the results of the fixed- 
effect test for Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. These tables show whether or 
not statistically significant relationships exist between tax avoiding strategy and 
the explanatory variables in each industry. Given that the random-effect model has 
superior results, only this model is discussed. 
The random-effect estimation for Model 1 can be seen in Table 5.12(a). The 
political cost variable has the predicted positive sign and was significant in basic 
material, industrial and technology regression. Surprisingly, the political cost sign 
in technology was not as predicted. The income before income tax variable has the 
expected negative sign and was significant in basic material, industrial and 
consumer services. However, IBIT variable was significant but has different sign 
from expected in the technology regression. Most of the variables for leverage 
were significant in utility regression. Long term leverage book value was 
significant for both utilities and technology regression with the expected negative 
sign. Short term leverage book value was only significant in the utilities regression 
with the predicted sign. Total leverage book value and long term leverage market 
value were both significant in utilities but not with the expected sign. The foreign 
activity dummy variable was significant in the consumer services and technology 
regressions but not with the expected sign in consumer services. Capital intensity 
had a negative expected sign and was significant in basic material, industrial and 
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utilities. Dividend payout ratio had a negative significant sign in industrial and 
utilities which was not as predicted. Managerial ownership was barely significant, 
and only in utilities regression with the expected sign. Short term leverage market 
value, total leverage market value and foreign activity were not significant in any 
of the seven regressions. 
In comparison, Model 2 (Table 5.12(b)) indicates that the coefficient of income 
before income tax (IBIT*) is negative and statistically significant in both the basic 
material and industrial categories, whilst positive and statistically significant in 
both the utilities and technology categories. The coefficient of capital intensity is 
negative and statistically significant in the basic material, industrial, utilities and 
technology categories. The coefficient of dividend payout ratio is negative and 
statistically significant in consumer goods, utilities and technology with sign 
different from predicted. From Model 2, the results show that at least one firm 
characteristic has a relationship with ETR in the basic material, industrial, utilities 
and technology industries. 
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Table 5.12(a) 
Random-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on 
Various Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel 
Data of Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign Material Goods 
Constant 19741 -4.51 SO -3.63()-'** 34.523I 
(4.0700) (. 9489) (1.6598) (? 7.3717) 
PC' + 1.9028* 1.0474* 2365 -2.1483 
(. 6619) (. 2107) (. 3200) (5.9433) 
IBM 1.4954* -. 8292* -. 0404 . 
2513 
(. 3908) (. 1869) (. 2 
. 
512) (3.8894) 
SI DB - -. 0085 -. 0658 -. 00I O . 0175 (. 0704) (. 0442) (. 0036) (. 038O) 
LTDB . 
0241 -. 0680 . 
0077 -. 3048 
(. 0922) (. 0457) (. 0332) ('451) 
1 DB -. 0016 . 
0655 
. 
0010 
. 1236 (. 0709) (. 0442) (. 0038) (. 0r 8' 3) 
STDM -. 0467 . 0028 . 0055 -. 5382 (. 0327) (. 0084) (. 0108) (. 4384) 
1.1DM - -. 1377 -. 0205 -. 0047 . 
0234 
(. 0974) (. 0177) (. 0554) (. 131)9) 
1DM - . 
0412 -. 0019 -. 0058 2841 
(. 0280) (. 0065) (. 0097) ('4IS) 
DFA - -. 8312 . 
1760 
. 5140 4.6150 (. 7893) (3212) (. 39193) (7.4233) 
FA -. 0041 -. 0038 -. 01() I . 
1013 
(. 0117) (. 0069) (0077) (. 1410) 
CAPINT - -2.9020* -. 4195* ? 192 -8.5107 
(. 8659) (. 1569) (35S4) (5.41)00) 
DPR + -. 0113 - . 
0092** -. 0067 . 
0188 
(. 0122) (. 0045) (. 0056) 
. 
0748) 
Mn - . 
0744 
. 
0042 -. 0644 -1.0535 
(. 0954) (. 03-11) (. O486) (1.0511) 
Wald chit 35.61 38.20 16.59 16.30 
Prob > ch12 0.0007 0.0003 0.2188 0.2334 
R2 Within 0.2518 0.0272 0.0328 0.6749 
Between 0.5169 0.2562 0.1146 0.9999 
Overall 0.4781 0.1479 0.1007 0.7052 
No ot'Obs 82 369 266 19 
Note: 
*iýtdicutcs scat . ct/cc(l srgnifIc unce at the 
/°o level 
**111(ýIC(11P. ' 
. 
stati''t! ('[1l c ni lcance at the Po level 
** *in, licales . ctati. clical . tiigni/ic ance at the 
/()"" 
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Table 5.12(a) Icontinuedl 
Random-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on 
Various Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel 
Data of Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign 
Constant 
PC 4 
I131I 
SI I)R 
I. I D13 
TDB 
ST DM 
1.7 UM 
I I)M 
I)I A 
FA 
CAPINT 
I)PR 
M() 
Services 
-?. 6b13 
(3.313X) 
. 
2567 
(. 5272) 
-. 7457*** 
(. 4376) 
-. 0457 
(. 0398) 
-. 0123 
(. O/I/o 
. 
0156 
(. 0113) 
. 
0259 
(. 03 9/0) 
. 
0050 
(, 0259) 
-. 0072 
(. 0099) 
?. 3403** 
(1.1736) 
. 
0022 
(. 0125) 
. 
3489 
(. 40/1) 
-. 0125 
(, 0097) 
. 
0126 
/.! 1 ? h/ 
Wald chit I.. 44 
Prob - chit 0? R() 5 
R2 Within 0.1949 
Between 0.1984 
Overall 0.0X93 
No of Obs 80 
Note: 
*ilnlicwteýsteltivicell significance (I/ the P" 
* *inrliý utýý. ti . statistical , ci, ýýtri/ic unccý at 
ihc' 50" level 
***üidicuicý. c sluü. clicul. ei, ýýni/icrrýu e at Ihcc 10" level 
9.6011 4.9183 
(6.076 5) (s. 98S4) 
-. 1584 -4.0548* 
(. 7570) (1.3591) 
. 
5280 4.6213* 
(. 3619) (l. I)N 9) 
-. 3085** -1.0497 
(. 1431) (. 6593) 
-. 340** 1.15O9*** 
(. 1609) (. 6162) 
. 
3295** 
. 
9765 
(. 1565) (. 0030) 
. 
0057 . 
2745 
(. 0410) (. 2117) 
. 
1021* . 
5374 
(. 0305) (. 4400) 
. 0015 -. 1428 
(. 009/) (. 1291) 
. 
4603 -2.9676*** 
(1.0091) (1.6049) 
. 
0101 -. 0537 
(. 0132) (. (lNS7) 
4.4224** -1.1544 
(/. 8454) (1. _'265) 
-. 0364* . 01234 
(. (119) (. 027tß') 
. 
3250*** 
. 7172*** 
(. 1725) (.; 9r''4) 
96.78 65.14 
0.3092 0.7046 
0.9895 0.7855 
0.6359 (1.8330 
33 27 
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Table 5.12(b) 
Random-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on 
Various Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel 
Data of Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 2) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer I fealth Care 
Variables Sign Material Goods 
( onstant -. 4157 -4.3583* -3.905** 21.0952 
(3.9411) (. 9479) (1.4 542) (23.1024) 
PC + . 4740 . 1467 . 1681 -1.0692 
(. 46-18) (. 1207) (. 1525) (1.88 75) 
IBIT* - -1.300* -. 8629* -. 2701 . 2390 
(. 4302) (. 1775) (. 2115) (2.3060) 
LTDB - . 0015 -. 0100** . 
0071 
. 
0041 
(. 0158) (. 0040) (. 0095) (. 0232) 
T D13 - -. 0127 . 
0001 
. 
0002 
. 
0071 
(. 0135) (. 0009) (. 0007) (. 0/0-? ) 
1 DM - . 
0021 -. 0010 -. 0032 -. 0231 
(. 0092) (. 0027) 003 6) (. 0150) 
DFA - -. 6503 . 
2292 
. 
6100 7.42x3 
(. 7995) (. 3251) (. 38991) (6.4202) 
FA - . 
0018 -. 007X -. 007X .1 
195 
(. 0119) (. 0066) (. 007) (. 1270) 
CAPIN'I - -2.1X12** -. 3939** -. 34X6 -5.3758 
(. 87/0) (. 160/) (. 3355) (4.725/) 
DPR -. 0051 -. 0060 -. 0097*** . 0101 (. 0 130) (. 0043) (. 005 /) (. 00-10) 
MO - . 0066 -. 0034 -. 0636 -1.4572 
(. 0959) (. 0320) (. 0392) (1.4107) 
Wald chit 15.67 36.76 19.21 14.70 
Prob % chit 0.1095 0.0001 0.0377 0.1430 
R Within 0.1091 0.0370 0.0399 0.5119 
Between 0.2632 0.2059 0.0731 0.9999 
Overall 0.2514 0.1313 0.0950 0.6475 
No o1'Obs 97 406 323 19 
Note: 
*indicates statistical. 1; ignificnnce at thr 1O, h'i"C/ 
**ütýGcatc. ý statistical significance at the 5°o level 
***llll%1('(16('. 1' statistical sig ifican e at the /0 le vel 
183 
Chapter 5 Analyses and Results 
Table 5.12(b) Icontinuedl 
Random-Effects Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on 
Various Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel 
Data of Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 2) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign Services 
Constant - 1.3036 7.7844 -2.9981 
0.96'1) (6. /1931) (3.6/71)) 
PC + -. 5292 . 
5584 I. 6251 ** 
(. 3391)) (4380) (7237) 
II31T* -. 5523 . 8116** 2.5280** 
(. 3931) (. 3874) (1.0718) 
LTDB - -. 0059 -. 012% . 0440 
(. OO8'7) (. 0260) (. 0491) 
TDB - . 
0048 
. 0193 . 
0019 
(. 0078) (. 0205) (02 1) 
TDM - -. 0000 . 
0033 -. 0002 
(. 0052) (. 0082) (. 011 ;) 
DFA - 1.9694*** . 
0034 -2.7747* 
(1.0241) (1.1074) (l. 0254) 
FA - . 
0024 
. 
0048 -. 039 I 
(. 0145) (. 0148) (. 0600) 
CAIIINT - . 
1846 -3.6080*** -1.2219** 
(. 3809) (2.1 l3 3) (. 590 3) 
DPR -. 0086 -. 0396* -. 0394*** 
(. 0102) (. 0/20) (. 02/4) 
MO - . 0049 -. 2318 . 9588* (. 1001) (. /6()6) (. 2780) 
Wald chi? 11 26 61.15 44.59 
Prob chi2 0.3379 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 Within 0.1102 0.1491 0.4150 
Between 0.2035 0.9264 0.8639 
Overall 0.0812 0.7354 0.6501 
No of Obs 90 33 35 
Note: 
*indjc. Itc, . 5'iat 
, tkkal significance al ill(' l °o l(. '%'e/ 
**indicale. c statistical. ciýni/ic'cmce at th(' ? "(, level 
***U7C11['U1P. C. 1'I[l/Lti'hCUI. ý'f tit //IC l0" level 
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Table 5.13(a) 
Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on Various 
Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel Data of 
Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Basic Material Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign Goods 
Constant 5.2598 . 
5426 10.273 1 *** 159.1744 
(11.0456) (2.15 53) (5.4 51 3) (74.504-1) 
PC 1.1220 -. 2000 -2.179s* -2.9230 
(1.5-180) (. 4 33 4) (. 75 M) (8.0/24) 
IBIT - 1.3339* -. 7429* -. 1419 . 
5492 
(. 4794) (. 2389) (. -? 4S-? ) (4.5332) 
ST DB - . 0173 -. 0521 -. 0030 . 
0731 
(. 0774) (. 0438) (. 0043) (. 0504) 
I. TD13 - . 
0170 -. 0350 . 
0205 -. 9354 
(. 1148) (. 0457) (. 0452) (. 41I2) 
DB - -. 0145 . 
0505 
. 0021 (. 0772) (. 0439) (. 003/) 
STDM - -. 0632 . 
0134 
. 
0117 -1.9121 
(. 0154) (. 0092) (. 02/2) (. 8'8'90) 
LTDM - -. 1252 . 
0(1(11 
. 
0003 
. 
2161 
(. 1317) (. 0212) (. 0812) (. 1412) 
TDM - . 0561 -. 0140*** -. 0088 . 946 (. 0412) (. 00") (. 0170) (. 44 f? ) 
IFA - -. 0138 . 0014 -. 0098 -2.6269 
(. 0270) (. 0/08) (. 0100) (1.3290) 
CAPINT - -2.6660*** . 1032 -. 0169 -22.0903*** 
(1.5862) (. 3417) (. 7()23) (S. 7344) 
DPR -. 0033 -. 0079 -. 0065 . 
0332 
(. 0153) (. 0054) (. 0070) (. 0$44) 
Wald chi? 1.47 2.67 2.35 1.82 
Prob % chi2 0.1767 0.0030 0.0100 0.3408 
R' Within 0.2690 0.1024 0.1298 0.8698 
Between 0.3570 0.0401 0.0883 0.2312 
Overall 0.3072 0.0078 0.0535 0.0619 
No of Obs 82 369 266 19 
Note: 
*i, tclicarc'. c statistical. sign)/icut)ce at the /Ü0 level 
* *inc/)cures . slali slical . tigni1irunc e at the 
5" level 
***Nllllcate, 1' . 
1'([111.5'/lClll signifIca ce at the /0' lev el 
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Table 5.13(a) Icontinuedl 
Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on Various 
Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel Data of 
Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 1) 
Explanatory Expected 
Variables Sign 
(omstant 
PC 
IBII' - 
S"I DB - 
I. IDB - 
TDB - 
s FDM - 
[. rDM - 
- -I D NI 
I-A 
C'APIN I 
MIR 
Consumer 
Services 
5.4341 
(9-1155) 
-. 3585 
(. 9193) 
-. 9557*** 
(. 5400) 
-. 046() 
(. 044 ) 
-. 0132 
(. 0/31) 
. 
0161 
(. 0/23) 
. 
0252 
(. 0455) 
. 
0063 
(. 0299) 
-. 0074 
(. 0/08) 
. 
00276 
(. 0134) 
-. ')348 
(. 8508) 
-. O1073 
(. Ill/1) 
Industry 
Utilities "Technology 
-20.5982 29.0093 
(17.; '7,1'/ (33.3/5/) 
. 
78 11 -4.5770 
(_2.3251) (3.9322) 
1.1106** 
. 6340 (. 4047) (4.0947) 
-. 2611 ** -. 6517 
(. 1075) (. 9647) 
-. 22882** -. X174 
(. /231) (. M45) 
. 
2645** 
. 6329 ( /22/) (. 9142) 
_0119 -. O101 
(. 0446) (. 4 0) 
. 
0700 
. 
5087 
(. 04/22) (. 7429) 
. 
0049 
. 
0270 
(. 0076) (. 2862) 
-. 0150 -. 0571 
(. 0/ 39) (. '3hi) 
. 
9()66 -3.4381 
(2.0305) (-1.7984) 
. 
0038 -. 0176 
(. Ol? 8) (. (149/) 
2.29 25 
0.0680 0.0799 
0.6273 0.8564 
0.0673 (). ()O()8 
0.0639 0.1)947 
33 27 
Wald chi? 1.08 
Prob > chi2 0.3962 
R' Within 0.2093 
Between 0.0002 
Overall 0.0015 
No of Ohs 50 
Note: 
Signi/h a ee at tltcj /" level 
* *inclicntcý. ý . ýtuli. ýticu/ siglri/ic since at 
the 5"o level 
** *inciic utcý. c . ctali. ý'lic ui sr rtiýic ante cu! the 
1011. level 
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Table 5.13(b) 
Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Tax Avoidance %ctivity on Various 
Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel Data of 
Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 2) 
Industry 
Exnlanatorv Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign 
Constant 
Pc 
1111-1 * 
LTDB 
TDB 
'I DM 
IA 
C APINT 
DPR + 
Material 
5.6881 
(/ _'. 
0406) 
. 
7534 
(1.6645) 
-1.1435** 
(. 525 7) 
. 
0007 
(. 0218) 
-. 0043 
(. 0212) 
. 
0036 
(. 0/21) 
-. 0149 
(. 0308) 
-2.5900 
(1.716039) 
. 
0030 
(. 0/6/) 
1.2154 
(2.0520) 
-. 4604 
(. 4036) 
-. 6192*** 
(. 2275) 
. 
0079 
(. 0051) 
-. 0007 
(. 0010) 
-. 0044 
(. 0032) 
-. 0047 
(. 0087) 
. 
2859 
(. 144 
-. 007 
(. 00 0) 
Wald chit 1.06 3.63 
Prob % chi? 0.4015 
0.0005 
R' Within 0.1240 0.0902 
l3ctwccn 0.0791 0.0516 
o vcrall 0.0847 0.0140 
No ol'Obs 
97 405 
Note: 
sta1i. fi 1. cignif cance tit the 
/°u level 
*171C%! C(! I('. C statistical si'nifIcanc ' at 
the o 
level 
Niccrl. cigni/icuncý' cN the 10" level ý' stuti ***iýidicuýý' . . 
Goods 
4.594(1 59.3602 
(1. /51) 
-I. 5854* -4.0661 
(. 5807) (i. , 805) 
--1572 . 
9774 
(. 3117) (2.95-10) 
. 0034 -. 0241 
(. 01 54) (. 0 
.5 
78) 
. 
0006 
. 
0285 
(. 0011) (. 0-? 95) 
. 0014 -. 0175 
L 005'? ) (. 0304) 
-. 0144 -. 3708 
(. 0/00) (L 1734) 
. 590x -10.1245 
(. 6340) (9. / 2) 
-. (1100 . 
1)321 
(. 0066) /. OX02) 
3.10 0.92 
0.0025 0.55}{8 
0.1016 0.5498 
0.0841 0.5542 
0.0546 0.172)) 
321 19 
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Table 5.13(b) Icontinuedl 
Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Tax Avoidance Activity on Various 
Firm Characteristics for Industry Differences based on Panel Data of 
Companies for 2001 to 2005 (Model 2) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign Services 
Constant 12.0346 -21.4906 34.5556** 
(10.2463) (18.1288) (/ 5.0967) 
PC -1.2093 . 
8082 -5.2642*** 
(1.0247) (2.4244) (2. X896) 
1131T* - -. 6544 1.1475** . 4003 (. 5776) (4492) (1.8494) 
LTD13 - -. 0073 -. 0019 . 1054 (. 0/02) (. 021') (. 11896) 
TD13 - . 
0062 -. 0086 . 
0426 
(. 0090) (. 0203) (. 0557) 
TUM - -. 0003 . 
0044 -. 0461 
(. 11062) (. 0066) (. 03 1l ) 
FA - . 
0047 -. 015X . 
20117*** 
(. 0165) (. 0131)) (. 0987) 
CAPINT - -. 9693 1.310 -3.9886*** 
(. 9454) (2.247 3) (2. ONO7) 
1)PR -. 0029 . 0076 -. 0206 (. 0124) (. 0/50) (. 0274) 
Wall chi? 0.92 1.82 4.54 
Prob -ý chi? 0.5089 0.1390 0.0057 
R2 Within 0.1159 0.4470 0.7077 
Between 0.0014 0.029S 0.3534 
Overall 0.0001 0.0245 0.0408 
No of Obs 89 33 33 
Note: 
*intlh (Ites stali. S'h[Y11. cignithwilt e a! the 
l °o 
S1(Itislic u! . ýr l/r/ir(i)1(( at 
11w 5°o /evel c **il/dic uic' . . 
***1)7l%Ic ate. . st 
atistical J'lý'l71ý! ('lln e a! the 
10' level 
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5.6 Tobit Censored Regressions 
Table 5.14 shows the results of the Tobit censored regression model of the 
dependent variable for Model 1 and 2. As ETRs can be explained as ratios, they 
are easily affected by outliers. To correct for such outliers, the truncated 
regression model was employed to left censoring at 0 per cent and right censoring 
at 56 per cent of ETR, thereby removing the most extreme negative and positive 
observations. The statutory tax rate (STR) for Malaysian companies is 28 per cent 
and this model was censored at double value of STR (56 per cent) to eliminate the 
possibility of unreliable data. This model censored at double value of STR is 
consistent with model used by Buinjink et al. (2000). The filter only removes a 
small part of the sample and does not bias the mean upward and downward. In this 
table, for Model 1,18 per cent of the observations (158) are censored at zero while 
2 per cent (18 observations) are censored at 56 for a total of 20 per cent censored 
observations (176). The analyses reported below are for the filtered observations. 
The result of both models shows that seven of the 13 factors are significantly 
related to tax avoidance activity. Both models indicate that political cost, income 
before income tax, foreign activity and capital intensity possess a significant 
influence on ETR with the expected direction. In addition, both models indicate 
that the foreign activity dummy variable and dividend payout ratio variable have a 
significant influence on ETR but it is not in the expected direction. Moreover, the 
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coefficient for managerial ownership is negative and statistically significant in 
Model 2, but not in Model 1. 
In conclusion, the factors most frequently significantly associated with tax 
avoiding activity are political cost, income before income tax, capital intensity and 
dividend payout ratio, which are significant in Tobit regression and also in panel 
data random effect tests and OLS regression. Moreover, in this Tobit regression, 
another three explanatory variables are also indicated to be statistically significant, 
namely long term leverage market value, foreign activity and managerial 
ownership. 
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Table 5.14 
Tobit Regression Model Censored at 0 per cent and 56 per cent of ETRs 
Model I Model 2 
Explanatory Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
Variables Sign (Std Error) (Std Error) 
Constant -3-1457* 3. () 20 
(. 4268) (. 38m)) 
PC + . 
422X* 
. 
3215* 
(. /046) /. 09'? 9) 
IEn i- 2230** 
(. 0922) 
fill I'* - _ iýoc** 
STD13 - . 
0006 - 
(. 0020) 
L_I DB - . 
0033 -. 00I 
(. 0025) (. 0011) 
I DB - -. 0005 . 0004 (. 0019) (. 0003) 
SI DM - . 
0022 
- 
(. 0024) 
1.1 DM - -. 0I89* - 
(. 0066) 
F DM - . 
0004 
. 
0004 
(. 0018) (. 0009) 
DIA - . 
2729** ? 011*** 
(. 1205) (. 1/00) 
FA - -. 0052** -. 0040*** 
(. 0025) (. 00-15) 
CAPINF - -. 3287* -. 3I93* 
(. 0746) (. 0720) 
DPR -. ()083 * -. 0064* 
(. 0024) (. 0022) 
MO - -. 0113 -. 0103*** 
(. 01.31) (. 0/10) 
LR chi2(l3) 75.55 65.54 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.00(10 
Pseudo R2 0.0246 0. O I KR 
Number of observations 887 1012 
I. ctt-Censored Observations 158 187 
Right-Censored Observations is 19 
Uncensored ( )bservatiuns 711 8(16 
Note: 
*iudic urns . wuri. cric ul . ci, ýniiic'upc'<' tit 1/u' lo level 
**rndiýnlc. ti siaii. stical signiýiý a/u e at 1/U' 5° 
***in, /ic rNvýv dilli'dic tI /S i', ific[n (e cut 1/U' 10" level 
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Tables 5.15(a) and 5.15(b) estimate the result of Tobit regression for seven 
industries classifications in the observations for Model 1 and 2 respectively. The 
sample was limited to those companies which have an ETR between 0 per cent 
and 56 per cent as discussed in section 4.3.1 of the previous chapter. 
The results are similar to results from the OLS, fixed-effect or random-effect 
models. The results where firm characteristics hardly had an influence on ETR in 
the three previous regressions (OLS, fixed-effect and random effect) for consumer 
goods, health care and technology, however, largely track the relationship between 
firm characteristics and ETR for these industries in the Tobit model. 
In Model 1 (Table 5.15(a)), two industries, basic material and industrial have 
results almost identical to the random-effect model and both industries in term of 
political cost, income before income tax and capital intensity are significantly 
related to ETR with signs as expected. However, the other industries have 
different significant levels in every variable and every model. Interestingly, the 
health care industry which is hardly significant in the previous model, indicates a 
negative and statistically significant relation for long term leverage book value, 
short term leverage market value and capital 
intensity. Moreover, managerial 
ownership which is hardly significant in any industry is recorded as statistically 
significant with the expected direction in the consumer goods industry. 
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Surprisingly, in the technology industry, both political cost and income before 
income tax have a significant coefficient but not with the expected signs. In 
conclusion, the analyses show that the industry does seem to have an impact on 
the relationship between firm characteristics and tax avoidance activity and this is 
shown most strongly in the Tobit regression model. 
Model 2 indicates an almost identical pattern with model 1 for the basic material, 
industrial, consumer goods and consumer services sectors. Both utilities and 
technology industries indicate positive statistically significance for income before 
income tax but not with the sign expected. However, the health care industry 
indicates statistical significance for total leverage market value but with a different 
sign than in Model 1, although, this industry indicates statistical significance with 
the expected sign in Model 2. 
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Table 5.15(a) 
Tobit Results Censored at 0 per cent and 56 per cent of ETR for 
Industry Differences (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign Material 
( unstant 1 . 
2462 
(?. /515) 
PC l . 60 3* (. 4744) 
11311 --1.0726* 
(. 3473) 
STD[3 - -. 1501 
(. 1006) 
II )13 -. 0995 
(. 1118') 
11)13 - . 13874 
(. 10/5) 
S"I I)M - -. 0150 
(. 0241 
Lll)M - . 1443*** 
(. 0770) 
'I DM - . 
0179 
(. 001) 
[)FA - -. 4286 
(. 3615) 
FA - -. 0041) 
(. 0060) 
CAPINT - -2.42M7* 
(. 5091) 
DPR -. 0103 
(. 0091O 
MO - . 
0511 
(. 0476) 
I. R chi2(13) 52.18 
Prob = chi? 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1798 
No. ot'Observations R_' 
Lett-Censored 18 
Right-Censored 5 
Uncensored Observations 59 
Note: 
at the /"u level 
**indicates stati. stical. crgnr/ic rwee at the 5° le, rl 
***rnrlicutcý at thn' /0° let 
Goods 
-4.0800 -2.6930* 33.77US** 
(. 6159) (/. 1)376) (13.49/2) 
. 
7177* 
. 
125M -2.0034 
(J5ä4) (. -, /so) /1.9_1711 
-. 3943* . 0067 . 1901 (. 1459) (. / 09) (1.9162) 
-. 0297 . 
0047 
. 0121 (. 0402) (. 002 9) (. 0236) 
-. 0564 -. 0199 -. 3079** 
(. 0417) (. 0232) (. 1210) 
. 
0307 -. 0032 . 12X2** (. 0403) (. 0025) 1.04611/ 
-. 0138*** . 
0070 -. 5333** 
(. 0073) 1.006 7/ (. ' 15 9) 
-. 0156 . 
0546 
. 
022 I 
(. 0150) (. 038/) (. 0644) 
. 
0166* -. 0063 ? 8I4*** 
(. 0056) (. 0061) (. //()0) 
. 1214 . 
4865** 4.410 
(. 20 -IN) (. 2307) (3 - 
65 0 4) 
-. 00470 -. 0046 . 
0967 
(. 0046) (. 0053) (. 0699) 
-. 4157* -. 3475 -8.3020** 
(. 11997) /. 2225) (2.6620 
-. (1(142 -. 0052 . (1159 (. un35) (. 0043) 
. 
0290 -. 0642** -1.0157 
(. 0192) (. 0269) (. 1+132) 
79.13 33.92 3(1.1)6 
0.0000 0. (1(11-1 0.0046 
0.061' 0.0379 0.4804 
369 266 19 
61 57 1 
7 -' 
301 207 17 
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Table 5.15(a)Icontinuedi 
Tobit Results Censored at 0 per cent and 56 per cent of ETR for 
Industry Differences (Model 1) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign Services 
Constant -2.3207*** -1.6180 5.3674 
(1.265) (4.795/) (3.2470) 
pC F . 1295 -. 2169 -3.8315* 
(. 3469) (. 6082) 1.9097) 
IBIT - -. 2207 . 
5185 4.6391 * 
(. 3259) (. 4021) (. 79I S) 
STDB - -. 0019 2942* -. 4770 
(. 0291) ( 083 ) (. 2989) 
LTDB - -. 0072 -. 3137* -. 724l ** 
(. 0083) (. 0936) (. 2759) 
1 DUU - . 
0063 
. 3027* . 4240 (. (108'4) (. 0910) (. O90) 
SI I)M - . 
0015 
. 
OO IR 
. 
1444 
(. 0269) (. 0234) (. 0928) 
LTDM - . 
0201 
. 
0799* 
. 6215* (. 0160) (. 0234) (. 044) 
TDM - -. 0031 -. OOU 1 -. 0505 
(. 0071) (. 005 /) (. 0570) 
UFA - . 
3695 
. 
7464 -1.77'5** 
(. 4417) (. 58'90) (. 7230) 
FA - . 0007 . OO39 -. 1075** 
(. 0100) (. 007 3) (. 04 3) 
CA 1) 1NT - . 
0259 -2.1926*** -1.740O** 
(. 1793) (1.2018) (. 6348) 
DPR + -. 0177* -. 0422* . 0201 (. 0066) (. 0088, (. 01.?.? ) 
MO - -. 0001 ?? II . 7390* (. 03O0) (/330) (.? 279) 
IR chi2(13) 17.70 60.04 57.04 
Prob = chit 0.1694 0.000(1 ((. 0000 
Pseudo R'_ 0.0669 0.5710 0.5}{79 
No. ol'Obscr%ati+m: SO 33 27 
Lett-Censored 6 R 6 
Right-Censored 2 - 
Uncensored Observations 72 25 20 
Note: 
*in(li('ul('. S . 1v(7ti. 
Nicul. cif, 'Rifi( al l("(' tit flit, I" /010/ 
**in(/i(. c /( . StaIl. 
c/i(Yl!. Iigflh/ica 19cC Ut Ill(' 5" ll'rrl 
***indica/es 
. cia! 
rsilea/ A7 'llilic all(c at lil(' /0", 
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Table 5.15(b) 
Tobit Results Censored at 0 per cent and 56 per cent of' H: TR for 
Industry Differences (: Model 2) 
Iadustrv 
Explanatory Expected Basic Industrial Consumer Health Care 
Variables Sign Material 
Constant -1.7041 
(2.1350) 
PC 1.6154* 
(. 4785) 
II3IT* - -1.050R* 
(. 3570) 
I_TDB - -. 0137 
(. 0/28) 
TDB - -. 0091 
(. 0092) 
fDM - . 
0025 
(. 0068) 
1)l A -. 2'508 
(. 4099) 
FA - . 0021 
(. 006-1) 
(': SPIN 1 - I. 8349* 
l4? ) 0142) 
DIT -. 0072 
(. 01(1') 
MO -. 0272 
(. 0490) 
LR chi2(13) 24.88 
Prob -- chi? 
0.0056 
Pseudo R2 0.0730 
No. of'Observations 97 
Left-Censored 22 
Right-Censored 5 
Uncensored Obser%ations 70 
Note: 
*rndiculc'.. stali. %licul. tii'nIli( u/tc c' a! jilt' l"., k'ee'l 
**i! nliculcý. e. ctuti. clicul. cigni/icnnce (it the 5°,, level 
***inrlic a! e. ý . ý7crti. ýliealSi, 'nificance at the 
Ill" Jeve 
Goods 
-_2.4309* 19.734 
(.??! h) (. W)38j (15.1476) 
. 
5961 * 
. 
0822 -1.5031 
(1443) (1807) 71 (2 .. 
5 75 
-. 3143** . 0571 -. 0665 (1346) (. 1550) (1.5429) 
-. 0? 17* . 
0019 
. 0031 (0032) (. 0064) (. 0/52 
(l(1O I 
. 
0000 
. 0075 (. 0007) (. 00()-5) (. 0/07) 
. 0067* . 
0012 -. 0248** 
(. 0021) ( 00-15) (. 0100) 
. 1220 . 4288*** 7.1097 (. 1900) (2212) (4.20 
. 
SO) 
-. 007() -. 0022 . 
1113 
(0044) (. 0030) 0833) ) 
3K9ý{* 3830*** 
-5.2208 
(. 0944) (2061) (3.091 S) 
-. 0025 -. 0053 . 
0037 
(0032) ( 003 7) (. (W l. il 
. 0125 -. 0565* -1.37491 
(. 017; l (. 020'/1 (9_149) 
75.35 32.41 20.73 
0.0000 0.0003 0A231 
0.0535 0.0301 0.3313 
405 321 19 
65 72 1 
7 3 
333 246 17 
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Table 5.15(b)leontintied I 
Tobit Results Censored at 0 per cent and 56 per cent of ETR for 
Industry Differences (, N-1odel 2) 
Industry 
Explanatory Expected Consumer Utilities Technology 
Variables Sign Services 
Constant -2.2479*** 4.7908 -3.9734 
(l. 2-1.56) (6.476, ý, ' 6.35? 3) 
I'( -. 0295 -. 4853 -1.064 
(. 3 5) (. 69/7) (. H843) 
1131T* - -. 0584 1.0163*** 2.3904* 
(. 2910) (. 5509) (. 7994) 
IA DB - -. 0003 -. 0049 . 
0464 
(. 0053) (. 0/73) (. 034 ,' 
( Uß . 
0015 
. 0109 -. UOf, h (. 0047) (. 0141, ' (. 02 2N) 
T DM - . 0010 . 0021 . 0003 (. 0032) (. 0052) (. 0170) 
UFA . 
3260 
. 2924 -1.1635 (. 3951) (. 7l 56) (. 7(1'52) 
I-A - . 
0027 
. 0016319 -. 0571962 
(. 0100) (. 0100, ' (. 052()) 
LAPIN I- . 
1099 -2.5555 -. 5405 
(. 1690) (1.6740) (., 7.3/2) 
I)PR 1 -. 0120*** -. 0409* -. 0149 
(. 0062) (. 0099) (. 0146) 
MO -. 0159 - '14 . 
7160* 
(. O3 S9) (. 16 3 9) (. _2I) 
1. R ch12(13) 13.01 43.55 39.96 
Prob =- chit 0.2231 0.0000 11.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0443 0.4141 0.3331 
No. c)l'Observations 89 33 33 
Lclt-('encored 7 8 9 
Right-Censored 2 - I 
Uncensored Observations 80 25 23 
Note: 
*tiarlicutc. ý sIaIi. cllcu/. ýignifIcance a t the Po ley l 
**indicates . ctati. sticul sa. ii 
icunce at the S"o level 
***! l7[lf('[lles . stati. 
ý'11c'[I1 . ý7 
uiifI 'auic t' at i/ic 10"', level 
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5.7 Interaction 
Table 5.16 presents the result of the OLS regression to estimate the coefficient 
where, in addition to dummy variables, interaction variables are included for the 
dummy variable of foreign activity. The interaction term, for example DFA xPC, 
tests whether companies that engage in foreign operation have a different 
relationship between ETR and political cost from those that do not engage in 
foreign operations. 
The political cost hypothesis predicts that larger companies suffering political 
costs will have a higher ETR, thus resulting in the estimated coefficient for 
political cost being positive. Consistent with the political cost hypothesis, holding 
the other explanatory variables constant, a one per cent increase in size is 
associated with a 0.008917 increase in ETR in Model 1, and a one per cent 
increase in size is associated with a 0.006098 increase in ETR in Model 2. 
Consistent with hypothesis 2, the estimated coefficient on income before income 
tax is significantly negative. Holding the other variables constant, a one per cent 
increase in income before income tax is associated with a 0.005145 decrease in 
ETR in Model 1, and a one per cent increase in income before income tax is 
associated with a 0.002821 decrease in ETR in Model 2. Consistent with 
predictions, both models indicate a negative coefficient and are statistically 
significant for capital intensity. Moreover, Model 1 supports hypothesis 3 in that 
highly leveraged companies have a higher interest tax shield, which in turn 
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reduces the ETR. The expected results envisaged a negative correlation between 
the foreign activity dummy variable and ETR and a positive correlation between 
dividend payout ratio and ETR. However, the results from this table surprisingly 
show that the foreign activity dummy variable has a significant positive 
correlation with the ETR and dividend payout ratio has a significant negative 
correlation to ETR, for both models. 
The results on the interaction shows that DFAxPC (-0.5243) is significantly 
negative in Model 1. This indicates that larger companies which engage in foreign 
activity report a lower ETR. This is not consistent with the political cost 
hypothesis and suggests that larger companies that engage in foreign activity do 
not suffer from political scrutiny. Both Models 1 and 2 indicate negative statistical 
significance in DFAxCAPINT. This indicates that companies with higher levels of 
capital intensity which engage in foreign activity report a lower ETR. The 
interaction of DFAxMO is significantly negative in Model 1, showing that 
companies with a higher levels of managerial ownership which engage in foreign 
operation report a lower ETR. Inconsistent with hypothesis 3, however, both 
models indicate the estimated coefficient in DFAxTDB to be significantly positive, 
which suggests that more highly leveraged companies which engage in foreign 
operations report a higher ETR. Hypothesis 3 predicts that companies with a 
higher level of leverage will have a lower ETR. 
199 
Chapter 5 Analyses and Results 
Table 5.16 
OLS Regression including the Interaction of Foreign Activity Dummy 
Variable with the other Explanatory Variables 
Lxplanatory Expected Modell Modelt 
Variables Sign 
Constant -5.2 119* -4 _4,, ýW (. 7762) 
PC . 
8917* 
t. 17-53) 
11311 - -. 5145* 
(. 1531) 
I13IT 
S l'D13 - . 
0009 
(. 0025) 
LTDI3 - -. 0026 
(. 0040) 
FI)13 - -. 0001 
(. 0025) 
STUM - -. 0015 
(. 0032 
LTDM - -. 0163 *** 
(. 008o 
1 DM - . 
0013 
(. 0023) 
DFA - 3.8035* 
(1.057/ 
FA - -. 0048 
(. 0032) 
CAPIN'I - -. )757** 
(. 1102) 
UPR -. 0130* 
(. 003s) 
MO - . 
0197 
(. 0215) 
Note: 
*irtcllculc'. c . ciati. ý7ic crl .c 
i, ýýrri/icurrc r at the 
**j, u/i( Ui['. c . t! [! 
(Lý'/lý'UI 
. cigi 
1ý1C(! II['(' (1! the ? °u /eve/ 
** *indic utc'. c . +luli. ýtic u 
l si ni/ic uuc e u! lhc' 10" lrý c'l 
(. 67NO) 
. 
fi0<)R* 
(. 1505/ 
-. 282** 
(. 132 ) 
-. UUi9* 
(. 00-1/) 
. 
0007** 
(. ()()()4) 
(. (lll 1) 
2. (214* 
/. '/7 $ 
-. 00 3 
(. )O 1) 
(. 0034) 
(. 0179) 
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Table 5.16 Icontinuedl 
OLS Regression including the Interaction of Foreign Activity Dummy 
Variable with the other Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory Expected Modell 
Variables Sign 
DIA -PC -. 5243** 
DIA k 1[3IT 
DFA X'I DI3 
UFA x('AI'[N F 
[)FA XI)PR 
1)FA xMO 
F 
(. 2502) 
- . 
3169 
(. 21-58) 
. 
0053** 
(. 00-13) 
-. 4336** 
i. / 3) 
-. UO lR 
(. 0062) 
-. 0647** 
(0.345) 
5.02 
(1p -- 0.0000) 
R 0.0990 
Adjusted R 0.0793 
No. of Observations 887 
Note: 
*indicates statistical. cignificunce at thce level 
**indicatc'. c s7uti. +tica! significance at the 5°,, level 
***indreutcý5 . ýtuti. ýtrccrl significance at the 
10°0 level 
Model 2 
-. I620 
(.? 31_') 
. 
0173 
(.? 0/4) 
. 
0054* 
(. 0020) 
-. 4120** 
(. 0X5) 
-. 0084 
(. 0059) 
-. 0436 
0325) 
5.68 
(p 0.0000) 
0.0837 
0.006901 
1012 
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5.8 Summary 
In conclusion, all of the estimation models indicate that four firm characteristics 
out of eight are associated with tax avoidance activity in public listed companies 
in Malaysia. Three of the four characteristics, namely political cost, profitability 
and leverage support the hypotheses developed in the model, while dividend 
payout ratio does not support the hypothesis. The evidence shows that these firm 
characteristics are important determinants of corporate tax avoidance as they are 
significant in every estimation (OLS, fixed-effects, random-effects and Tobit). 
In addition, the Tobit regression estimations found all firm characteristics to be 
statistically significant and provided evidence that all variables developed in this 
thesis have a significant influence on ETR. The results confirm that all 
explanatory variables, namely political cost, profitability, leverage, foreign 
activity, capital intensity, dividend payout ratio and managerial ownership, are 
important determinants of tax avoidance activity in Malaysia. Managerial 
ownership, which is hardly significant in any of the regression estimations, was 
found to have a significantly negative effect in relation to the ETR in Model 2, the 
Tobit estimation. Except for the coefficient for the foreign activity dummy 
variable and dividend payout ratio, all the significant regressors have signs which 
are consistent with the priori expectations. 
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The results indicate that the type of industry reveals significant difference in tax 
burden and some signs were different from those expected. The summary of the 
regression results, which indicate significant difference in estimations, is shown in 
Table 5.17. 
5.8.1 Political Cost 
Political cost appears with a significant positive sign in every estimation except 
the fixed-effect model. This result holds true under all regression specifications 
and is consistent with some prior research (see Rego, 2003; Omer et al., 1993; and 
Zimmerman 1983), which concludes that larger companies have a higher ETR. 
This finding gives support to the political cost hypothesis advanced by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) that larger companies suffer from political cost that increases 
their ETR. Larger companies pay higher income taxes than smaller companies, as 
a result of increased visibility and government scrutiny. 
5.8.2 Profitability 
The estimated coefficient of profitability appears with a significant negative sign 
for every regression. The negative relation between income before income tax and 
ETR indicates that companies with greater resources have more incentives and 
ability to engage in tax planning. This finding is consistent with those reported by 
Rego (2003) and Manzon and Plesko (2002). Rego (2003) documented that 
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corporations with greater pre-tax income have a lower ETR and claimed that firms 
with greater pre-tax income avoid more income tax than companies with lower 
pre-tax income. Manzon and Plesko (2002) stated that profitable companies have a 
lower ETR as they are able to use tax deduction, credits, and exemptions with 
greater efficiency than less profitable companies. 
5.8.3 Leverage 
Almost all six variables in leverage, in Model 1, show a negative sign, as 
predicted, in every estimation, and at least one variable is significant from six 
leverage variables in every regression. The fixed-effect model is superior in 
explaining the relationship between leverage and ETR where three variables, 
namely, short term leverage book value, long term leverage book value and total 
leverage book value, are significant. It seems that leverage measures based on 
book value perform better than leverage measures based on market value. This 
suggests that the increases in leverage (book value) will decrease the ETR, hence 
`higher' tax avoider will have higher leverage than `lower' tax avoider. This 
finding is consistent with those documented by Gupta and Newberry (1997), Mills 
et al. (1998) and Stickney and McGee (1982). 
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5.8.4 Foreign Activity 
There are two different variables proxied for foreign activity, namely, DFA and 
FA. The foreign activity dummy variable (DFA) differentiates between companies 
engaging in foreign activity and domestic-only companies. The foreign activity 
variable (FA) consists of companies engaging in foreign activity only, 
differentiated between extensive foreign activity and less extensive foreign 
activity. Both variables for foreign activity (DFA and FA) are significant in tobit 
regression with a positive coefficient for DFA and a negative coefficient for FA. 
a) DFA 
A significant positive sign for the foreign activity dummy variable, which is not as 
expected, suggests that companies that engage in foreign activity have a higher 
ETR than companies which do not engage in foreign activity. The finding 
contradicts Leblang (1998), who claimed that companies that engage in foreign 
operation may have significantly greater opportunities to escape tax because of 
opportunities offered by cross-border transactions. The 
finding might offer support 
for the contention that the costs of avoidance should be lower for companies that 
operate in a low-tax jurisdiction, such as Malaysia which may be considered a 
low-tax country when compared with European countries or others in the ASEAN 
region. For example, in Thailand, the company tax rate is 30 per cent for all 
corporations listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. In Indonesia, the corporate 
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tax rate is 30 per cent, Malaysia has the next lowest tax rate in South-East Asia 
after Singapore (20 per cent). However, companies engaging in foreign operations 
might be subject to foreign statutory tax rates that are higher in companion with 
the Malaysian tax rate. Thus, this factor may produce a positive relationship 
between companies engaging in foreign operation and ETR. 
Another explanation may be because of certain restrictions in Malaysian 
legislation towards foreign operations. Malaysia has developed a more open 
economy in an attempt to strengthen its global trading position. Even though most 
products can be freely exported, however, certain products are controlled in terms 
of export by government regulation for several reasons, for example, when some 
products are in short supply, goods are deemed 'sensitive', 39 hazardous items or 
are prohibited by international agreement. 
40 At one time, the Malaysian national 
automotive industry was protected to help it prepare for competition with foreign 
manufacturers. In March 2006, 
however, the Malaysian government outlined 
several new objectives for the 
National Automotive Policy, including a reduction 
of import duties for foreign cars. Cars from Asian countries can be imported at the 
Asian Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)41 rate of 5 per cent, which is 
a reduction of between 20 per cent and 40 per cent (depending on engine 
capacity), while for non-Asian cars the rates of reduction are between 5 per cent 
and 30 per cent. 
39 sensitive products include poultry and swine products, coffee, tea, copra, manioc and rice. 
ao prohibited by international agreement is typically to prevent endangered wild life species being 
exported. 
41 Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) is related to the importer that should only levied 
on and paid import duty at the CEPT rate of duty which has been specified. 
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With regard to the Asian foreign business activity, the original six countries 
(Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand) have agreed to 
eliminate duties on all products by 2010 and for new members (Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam) by 2015. Malaysia eliminated tariffs for 60.3 per 
cent of her products by 2003, followed by Indonesia 54.7 per cent and Philippines 
and Thailand for less than five per cent. 
However, the regression result of the DFA variable, which shows that companies 
that engage in foreign activity have higher corporate ETR, might be a result of this 
tariff reduction. It is still at the early stage of implementation and is due to be fully 
implemented in 2010. 
b) FA 
A significant negative coefficient for the FA variable indicates that companies 
which engage in foreign operations with more extensive foreign activity have a 
lower ETR than companies with less extensive foreign activity. This finding 
supports the contention that companies with more extensive foreign operations 
have more opportunity to engage in tax planning by taking advantages of tax 
loopholes, such exploiting other differences in the tax rules of different countries 
and by being eligible to accept opportunities from tax subsidy agreements with 
host countries. This finding supports Rego's (2003) work that corporations with 
more extensive foreign operations engage in tax planning and report a lower ETR. 
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5.8.5 Capital Intensity 
Capital intensity is significant for all the regression models with a significantly 
negative coefficient except in the fixed-effect model. This result provides findings 
consistent with previous studies and supports the idea that investment in tangible 
assets would lead to greater tax savings, as shown by lower ETR. Harris and 
Feeney (2003), Gupta and Newberry (1997), and Stickney and McGee (1982) also 
report a negative association between capital intensity and ETR. 
5.8.6 Dividend 
The variable which has not been examined previously in any ETR studies, to the 
author's knowledge, is dividend payout ratio (DPR) which appears to have a 
significantly negative relationship with ETR for every regression. Even though 
DPR reveals a different sign from expected, nonetheless, it shows the strongest 
results among all the other variables. The results suggest that increases in DPR 
will decrease the ETR, that is, companies which have a higher DPR will tend to 
have a lower ETR. This finding does not support hypothesis 6 developed in this 
thesis, namely that corporate tax avoiders will have a lower dividend payout ratio 
than non-tax avoiders. However, the result could be explained in that the company 
is likely to set dividend policies to maximizing dividend payment but restricted 
only to franking credit available to avoid pay more tax. The finding suggests that 
the tax imputation system encourages companies to pay higher dividends, but is 
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subject to credit dividend availability, to avoid an increase in companies' tax 
liability. 
5.8.7 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is also a new variable included in the model to explain tax- 
avoider activity and appears to have a negative statistical significance towards 
ETR in the Tobit regression for Model 2. The regression in other estimations 
indicates a negative but statistically insignificant correlation. Most of the 
estimations suggest that the executive composition in the board of directors' 
ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia is explanatory of tax planning 
activity. However, the Tobit regression model provides evidence that executive 
composition is significantly correlated with tax avoidance activity. The results 
indicate that the managerial ownership exerts a significant influence on ETR thus 
supporting hypothesis 7 developed in the thesis. 
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Table 5.17 
The Summary of Significant Regression for all Estimations 
OLS FIXED- RANDOM- 
EFFECT EFFECT 
MODEL Political Cost (Political Cost) Political ((»i 
1 Profitability Profitability Profitability 
(11)13) STDB STOB 
l"TDM 1 TDB (ý1.1)13) 
(DFA) (1 DB) Capital Intensity 
Capital Intensity (Dividend) (Dividend) 
(Dividend) 
MODEL. Political Cost (Political Cost) Profitability 
2 Profitability Profitability (I1)13) 
(TDB) (Dividend) Capital Intensity 
Capital Intensity (Dividend) 
(Dividend) 
Notes: 
The explanatory variables in acronyms are deüncd as follows: 
STDB: Short term leverage bock value 
I. TDB: Long term leverage hook value 
TDB: Total leverage book value 
ADM: Long term leverage market value 
DFA: Foreign activity dummy variable 
MO: Managerial ownership 
(Significant variables, but not in expected directions are in parcnthe, c ) 
T OBIT 
Political (o»t 
Protitabilitý 
i II)r\1 
(UI : \) 
ForclL n : \rtiv itv 
Capital Intensity 
( Dividend ) 
Political Cost 
Profitability 
(DIA) 
rriLn Activity 
Capital Intensity 
(Di" idcnd ) 
MO 
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5.8.8 Industry Effects 
Table 5.18 summarizes the significant regression for every explanatory variable 
across industry. Based on industry effects, almost all regressions present similar 
results, which indicate significant results for the similar explanatory variables with 
the same direction. 
In general, the four industries showing the strongest correlation between firm 
characteristics and tax avoidance activity are basic materials, industrial, utilities 
and technology, whereas the other industries, consumer goods, health care and 
consumer services, show weaker correlation. The results confirm the importance 
of the industry effect in the relationship between firm characteristics and tax 
avoiding activity. 
Both the basic material sector and the industrial sector consistently show lower 
ETRs compared with other industries. Particularly, companies with higher 
profitability, leverage and capital intensity pay significantly less tax than any other 
industry. It is not surprising as it is likely that the industrial sector42 enjoys various 
tax benefits in order to promote both economic and social goals, including 
enhancing efficiency or competitiveness, fostering high-technology, protecting 
domestic products, increasing exports and widening job opportunities. Alavi 
42 Both basic material sector and industrial sector are considered as manufacturing or industrial 
sector. Basic material mainly 
focus on manufacturing local resources such as quarrying and 
mining, while the industrial sector engages 
in manufacturing activities other than basic material 
sector. 
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(1996) indicates that there is in Malaysia a long standing industrial policy to 
promote companies in the manufacturing sectors. The Malaysian government 
provided various tax incentives to stimulate and support such companies. Several 
incentives have been provided, including incentives to strategic industries, 
incentives to strengthen industrial links, incentives for industrialised building 
systems and incentives for outsourcing manufacturing activities. The incentives 
given include pioneer status, investment tax allowance, reinvestment allowance 
and accelerated capital allowances (up to 100 per cent tax exemptions). These 
incentives are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Both basic material and industrial sectors recorded that higher profitable 
companies pay less tax which is confirmed from all the regressions (OLS, fixed- 
effects, random-effect and Tobit) for both Models 1 and 2. These results support 
hypothesis 2 in that, more profitable companies have more resources and are thus 
better able to engage in effective tax planning. These findings are consistent with 
those reported by Rego (2003) and Manzon and Plesko (2002), normally that more 
profitable companies pay lower tax than less profitable companies. Both basic 
material and industrial sectors indicated that the higher capital intensity companies 
have paid significantly less tax in OLS, random-effects and Tobit regressions. This 
result suggests that the tax incentive for the industrial sector in Malaysia (which 
provides higher capital intensity companies with an advantage from accelerated 
capital allowances under the Promotion of Investment Act (1986)), have resulted 
in lower ETRs. 
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The results suggest that both the basic material and industrial sectors suffer from 
the political cost hypothesis, thus supporting hypothesis 1. This finding contradicts 
Derashid and Zhang (2003) who do not find evidence that larger companies pay 
more tax than smaller companies, but find strong evidence that small companies 
pay more tax than large companies in Malaysia. However, the result from this 
thesis supports the finding reported by Rego (2003) and Omer et al. (1993). Thus, 
the evidence is strong that companies in the basic material and industrial sectors 
pay less tax than companies from other sectors, particularly for profitable and 
higher capital intensity companies. The evidence supports the notion that increases 
in leverage or foreign activity lead to a lower ETR, as indicated by the statistically 
significant coefficients shown in the OLS regression. 
Results from the technology sector indicate that the industry effects exert a 
significant influence on tax avoiding activity. Firm characteristics, namely 
leverage, foreign activity and capital intensity, are found to be statistically 
significant with a negative relationship with ETR. Thus there is some evidence to 
support the intuitive notion that debt financing, foreign operation and capital 
intensity can be used by Malaysian companies to lower the effective tax payment. 
These results are predictable as the Malaysian government focuses on national 
science and technology to sustain economic development and to improve quality 
of life and national security in the 21" century. One of the policy goals of Vision 
2020 is that science and technology are central in building a more innovative and 
vibrant economy. Besides developing policy and activities to maximize and utilize 
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the advancement of science and technology, the Malaysian government also offers 
several incentives to stimulate this sector. A number of tax incentives has been 
introduced, including those for software development, use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT), increased exports and the multimedia super 
corridor. Those incentives enable companies to enjoy tax benefits such as pioneer 
status, investment tax allowance, accelerated capital allowances, special deduction 
and duty-free. Thus, these tax incentives are likely to have implications for the 
results in this category which suggest that leverage, foreign activity and capital 
intensity have a negative and statistically significant relationship with ETR. These 
results can be explained by the fact that companies in the ICT industry engage in 
heavy capital investment and thus have high capital intensity and debt finance. 
Moreover, these companies enjoy special tax treatment from the government 
which might motivate local companies to find new technology from abroad, as 
well as attract investors from abroad to do business in Malaysia. Interestingly, 
foreign activity is only found to be statistically significant in this technology 
sector and not in other sector. This might be explained by the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) project which offers several tax benefits, including a tax holiday 
for a maximum of 10 years. The MSC has been used as the most important 
activity to attract foreign technology into the country. 
The coefficient for foreign activity is negative and statistically significant with 
ETR only for the technology category. This may be explained through the 
incentives designed for this category. Malaysia offers one of the most attractive 
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incentive packages in the ASEAN region. The incentives have been formulated to 
attract foreign investment in order to gain access to new technology as well as 
earn export income. One of the incentives for the use of ICT is a tax exemption on 
the value of increased exports. Companies in the ICT sector are eligible for tax 
exemptions equivalent to 50 per cent of the value of increased exports. 
The results for the technology sector, however, show that larger companies have a 
significantly lower ETR compared with basic material and industrial sector which 
shows a different result. This finding contradicts hypothesis 1 developed in this 
thesis that larger companies suffer from political costs and thus pay higher tax. 
The reason why this industry may not suffer from political costs may be because 
the industry is supporting government goals and is in a good position to lobby and 
exert influence for favourable tax treatment from the government. The Malaysian 
government offers new incentives to high technology companies in the hope of 
drawing more of them into the country and boosting the competitiveness of the 
high technology companies. 
Surprisingly, both the technology sector and the utility sectors show the more 
profitable companies have a positive influence on ETR. The result is contrary to 
hypothesis 2 developed in this thesis. It appears that companies with higher 
income would have a higher ETR than other companies. Thus, from the industry 
effect, not all companies with higher income would pay less tax. 
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Results from both the consumer goods and utility sectors reveal that capital 
intensity and managerial ownership have a negative significant relationship with 
ETR. The basic principle of business activities for both consumer goods and utility 
sectors is to meet the basic needs of the nation. The results confine that these 
characteristics are important determinants of tax avoidance activity in most 
industries. 
The results in the health care category indicate that leverage and capital intensity 
have a negative significant influence on ETR. The result is predictable as this 
sector is concerned with heavy and high technology machinery which might 
involve high capital intensity and high leverage. The result is consistent with the 
work by Omer et al. (1993) who found evidence that the pharmaceutical sector 
paid significantly lower income taxes than firms in other sector. 
Overall, almost all sectors except, for the health care sector, found evidence that 
companies with high dividend payout ratio have a significantly lower ETR. This 
contradicts the hypothesis developed in this thesis. One explanation may be that 
companies tend to pay dividend not only subject to profitability but also subject to 
franking credit available so as to avoid paying more tax. 
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Table 5.18 (continued) 
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5.9 Conclusion 
The empirical evidence presented here considers all of the firm characteristics 
employed in the research model which can affect a company's ETR. Using panel 
data and appropriate statistical methodology which exploits the cross-sectional and 
time series variations in the observations, it is found that all of the explanatory 
variables have a statistically significant coefficient with the predicted sign except 
for the foreign activity dummy variable and the dividend payout ratio which are 
significant with a different sign from that expected. 
With regard to industry effect, the results confirm the importance of industry 
differences in explaining the corporate tax burden. Four sectors, namely basic 
material, industrial, utilities and technology demonstrate a high correlation 
between firm characteristics and tax avoidance activity. The evidence, however, is 
not always consistent with predicted direction across industries, particularly for 
the technology sector. 
The next chapter, Chapter 6 provides the discussion and conclusions of the 
empirical findings, and builds upon the estimations from this chapter. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
Tax collection generates large amounts of revenue and is a vital source of income 
for government to promote overall economic stability and growth. Since Malaysia 
implemented a self-assessment system for companies in 2001, it is important to 
ensure compliance by taxpayers. The aim of this thesis is to determine in part the 
characteristics of companies that systematically avoid taxes, resulting in lower 
effective tax rate (ETRs). 
This thesis determines whether political cost, profitability, leverage, foreign 
activity, capital intensity, dividend and managerial ownership are factors affecting 
corporate tax avoidance strategies. The first five explanatory variables are based 
on previous research and another two variables, namely dividend and managerial 
ownership which proxy for capital structure and corporate governance, are 
included in the model predicting tax avoidance behaviour. The ability of variables 
such as political cost, profitability, leverage, and capital intensity to explain 
corporate tax avoidance for developed markets has been extensively tested and 
generally confirmed, although the findings for political costs produced mixed 
evidence. Most previous research applies univariate analysis to examine firm 
characteristics with regard to ETR. Foreign activity has been conceptualized as a 
determinant of ETR for several studies, but only a few studies (for example, Rego, 
2003; Jacob, 1996) have tested it empirically. Even though the foreign activity 
variable has rarely been analyzed, it is readily acknowledged, according to Rego 
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(2003), that it should have an important impact on tax avoidance. The remaining 
two variables, which are dividend and managerial ownership, are chosen because 
of their particular applicability to Malaysia. 
Corporate tax avoidance issues have been addressed for a number of years within 
the developed market context, whereas corporate tax avoidance research for 
companies in developing countries is largely non-existent. The determinants of the 
tax avoidance strategy used in previous research are carried over into the 
Malaysian context, with additional new factors identified in the Malaysian 
business environment. 
There are only two ETR studies which provide evidence about the emerging 
markets of South-east Asia (Derashid and Zhang, 2003; and Kim and 
Limpaphayom, 1998). However, these studies have not comprehensively tested all 
factors. Derashid and Zhang (2003) focused on the relationship between political 
cost, leverage and capital intensity in relation to ETR, whereas Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998) concentrated on firm size aspects in relation to ETR. The 
objective of their studies was to examine the relationship between tax rates and 
firm characteristics, and not focus on tax avoidance. The focus of this thesis is to 
determine the influence of all variables established in developed countries on tax 
avoidance activity in Malaysian companies. These variables are used together with 
the new variables that have been identified as potentially relevant. 
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The analyses also consider the industry effects to examine the relationship 
between different sectors and tax avoidance activity. The Malaysian case is 
interesting because according to Alavi (1996), Malaysia has followed an 
aggressive industrial policy, implementing various tax incentives to promote both 
economic and social goals. The `Industrialization Strategy' has been a long- 
standing Malaysian government policy to diversify and industrialize the economy. 
To implement the strategy, various benefits including tax benefits have been 
offered to strategic companies and selected sectors to promote economic and 
social goals. Hence Malaysia provides an appropriate environment to test the 
theories linking industry effects and tax avoiding activity. The consequences of 
the industrialization strategy could enable Malaysian companies to utilize tax 
incentives to maximize after-tax return and to influence and lobby the government 
for favourable tax treatment. On the other hand, the findings also serve as a good 
guide for the tax authority to measure the aggressiveness of tax avoidance activity 
in Malaysian companies. 
This thesis contributes to the corporate tax avoidance literature in several ways. 
First, the major contribution of this thesis has been the identification of key factors 
which influence the corporate tax avoidance strategies of public listed companies 
in an emerging country, namely Malaysia. The results have important implications 
as tax avoiding activity is growing and is a great concern for the government, 
particularly the tax authorities, as reported by Potas (1993). 
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Secondly, this thesis is the first to document the link between corporate tax 
avoidance and firm characteristics in an emerging market. It extends the evidence 
outside the developed countries to include emerging market experience in the 
Malaysian market. 
Thirdly, the thesis suggests that the hypotheses established and tested in developed 
countries can also be generalized to developing countries. As well as adding 
updated results to the earlier work done by Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) and 
Derashid and Zhang (2003), the analyses in this thesis are more comprehensive. 
Fourthly, as a result of the above, the thesis also contributes new evidence to the 
corporate tax avoidance literature. Finally, the thesis includes the analyses of 
industry effects on the tax planning patterns of companies. It shows that firm 
characteristics and the industry effects have a significant impact on companies' tax 
planning activity. 
The analyses are performed using data derived from the financial statements of 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia during a five year period from 2001 to 
2005 inclusively. The data were collected from two sources, the Thomson 
Analytic Database and Bursa Malaysia Companies Database. To be included in 
the observations, a company had to meet several screening criteria which are 
designed to minimize measurement errors. For inclusion in the sample, a company 
must report a positive income, hence companies that had losses or zero income 
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were excluded as they would have introduced confounding effects and the results 
would be difficult to interpret. The exclusion of these companies is consistent with 
previous studies such as Rego (2003), Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Manzon 
and Smith (1994). Companies classified as financial institutions (including banks, 
finance and insurance companies) are excluded, because governments impose 
specific regulations and controls upon them, which may affect their tax burden. 
Companies for which a full data set was not available were also excluded. Based 
on the selection criteria, the number of firm-years available for observation 
totalled 1,645. 
The hypotheses were tested using Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed-Effects, 
Random-Effects and Tobit models to estimate the regression equations. This 
differs from most previous research where linear relationships are assumed by 
applying the OLS regression model only. The results are presented with a 
comparison between two models. Model 2 is a transformation of Model 1 to 
handle the multicollinearity problems. From the analyses, there are almost 
identical results for both models, thus illustrating that multicollinearity does not 
seriously bias the results. 
Previous research examining factors that affected ETR has found a wide variety of 
relationships between firm characteristics and ETR. This thesis attempts to 
reconcile the contradictory evidence in the literature by combining all the firm 
characteristics in the literature and adding the characteristics which are proposed 
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to have an impact in the Malaysian environment. In particular, this thesis 
investigates the determinants of firm characteristics that engage in tax avoiding 
activity. Generally, tax avoiding activity, represented by tax planning, increases 
the after-tax return by reducing the present value of tax payments. The 
measurement of tax planning is based on the ETRs which has been widely used in 
previous studies (for example, Philips, 2003; Rego, 2003; and Mills et al., 1998). 
Consistent with these studies, this thesis defines ETR as the ratio of income tax 
currently payable to pre-tax accounting income. The ETR, which is the dependent 
variable in the models, is a proxy for corporate tax avoidance. The explanatory 
variables include political cost, income before income tax, leverage, foreign 
activity dummy variable, foreign activity, capital intensity, dividend payout ratio 
and managerial ownership. The choice of explanatory variables is motivated by 
previous studies and also by consideration of the Malaysian business environment. 
Substantial amounts of previous research have investigated the relationship 
between ETR and firm size (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998), pre-tax income 
(Wilkie, 1988), leverage and capital intensity (Stickney and McGee, 1982) and 
foreign activity (Rego, 2003). Dividend payout ratios are included to see whether 
the implication of the dividend imputation system implemented in Malaysia, 43 is 
different from U. K. and U. S. counterparts. In addition, no capital gains are 
imposed in Malaysia. Managerial ownership is included due to a wide range of 
companies in Malaysia being family owned businesses. This thesis extends the 
range of factors that contribute to explaining tax avoidance activity by testing two 
43 The full dividend imputation system is also present in Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. It 
is different from the U. K. dividend imputation system (as it enables carry forward of advance 
corporation tax) and the U. S. counterpart which is subjected to double taxation. 
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developed hypotheses that have not, as yet, been tested empirically as business 
conditions elsewhere did not permit this. 
The relationships between ETR and certain firm characteristics are consistent 
across the ETR literature. For example, Mills et al. (1998), Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) and Stickney and McGee (1982) each reported a negative association 
between ETR and leverage and ETR and capital intensity. However, the 
relationship between ETR and the other firm characteristics, which are firm size, 
profitability and foreign activity, is inconsistent across studies. The most 
controversial variable in the previous literature is firm size. 
As regards the determinants of corporate tax avoidance activity of Malaysian 
public listed companies, the results of fixed-effect and random-effect models 
confirm the results of the pooled OLS regressions, showing that the coefficients of 
most variables are significant and in the predicted directions. The use of the Tobit 
effect model improves estimation further. There are, however, some differences in 
the results across the models used. The difference is that the managerial ownership 
variable is insignificant in the pooled OLS regression, and becomes significant in 
the Tobit regression. This is may be due to Tobit regression limit the data set for a 
more reliable range of corporate effective tax rates. As compared with the fixed- 
effects and random-effects regressions, two variables, managerial ownership and 
foreign activity, are insignificant, but turn out to be negative statistically 
significant in the Tobit regression. Thus, the results provide some evidence that all 
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firm characteristics developed in this thesis have an influence on corporate tax 
avoidance strategy. Most of the findings reported here confirm the findings 
reported in earlier studies in developed countries. There is at least some evidence 
across the models that almost all of the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant with the predicted sign. The results also reveal that the new explanatory 
variable, namely managerial ownership, supports the hypotheses established in the 
thesis. Each of the individual explanatory variables will now be discussed in turn. 
6.2 Political Cost 
With regard to the political cost hypothesis, large companies are predicted to 
suffer from political scrutiny and they will attempt to reduce the extent of that 
political scrutiny by resisting aggressive tax avoidance and thus will have a higher 
corporate ETR. The results indicate that larger companies face political cost, and 
this is consistent with political cost hypothesis. The estimated coefficients on 
political cost in all regression specifications in this thesis are significantly positive. 
The finding supports some of the previous literature, namely Rego (2003), Omer 
et al. (1993) and Zimmerman (1983). However, Derashid and Zhang (2003) report 
a negative relationship between company size and ETR. The differences in results 
may be partly attributed to sample selection (industry composition), ETR 
definition (inclusion/exclusion of deferred taxes) and the time period under 
investigation. For example, the difference in findings between Zimmerman (1983) 
and Porcano (1986) has been identified by latter study as being due to a difference 
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in the ETR definition. Derashid and Zhang (2003), for example, do not control for 
company's income as proposed by several other studies such as Shevlin and 
Porter, 1992 and Wilkie, 1988, who argue that it is important to control for 
changes in firms' operations (profitability) when examining factors associated 
with variability in ETR. Thus a positive relationship between company size and 
ETR which was not found in Derashid and Zhang (2003), may be a result of not 
controlling for company income. Stickney and McGee (1982), and later Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), argue for the need to include several fine characteristics in their 
multiple regression models to explain the variability of ETR. It is therefore 
possible that the previous contradictory findings regarding the relationship 
between firm size and ETR are due to model misspecification. 
Despite the differences between the developed countries and the Malaysian 
business environment, the results indicate that the political cost hypothesis 
remains valid for public listed companies in Malaysia. 
6.3 Profitability 
The analyses reveal a significant negative relationship between income and ETR 
throughout all regressions. Holding the other firm characteristics constant, it is 
found that companies with greater income have lower ETR. The negative 
relationship between income and ETR is consistent with the prediction that 
companies with higher level of income have more incentive and resources to 
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engage in tax planning. The finding is in line with results reported in several 
studies such as Rego (2003), Manzon and Plesko (2002) and Mackie (1999). Rego 
(2003) contends that companies with greater pre-tax income would have greater 
incentives and resources to engage in tax planning. Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
claim that profitable companies can make more efficient use of tax deductions, 
credits and exemptions compared with less profitable companies, resulting in 
greater book-tax differences. Mackie (1999) suggests that more profitable 
companies would be able to take advantage of net operating losses carried forward 
from previous years. The thesis concludes that after controlling for firm size, 
leverage, foreign activity, capital intensity, dividend and managerial ownership, 
more profitable companies have lower ETRs. The result holds under all the 
regression estimations and is consistent with previous research, which concludes 
that more profitable companies have greater resources to engage in tax planning 
which lowers their ETR. 
6.4 Leverage 
It is reasonable to suggest that taxes are important in relation to financing 
decisions, and several empirical studies have found evidence to support this. In 
addition, this thesis also provides clear evidence of the tax effects of financial 
decisions. The tax shield theory predicts that a company with relatively high levels 
of debt would have higher interest deductions and which would in turn lower 
ETR. The analyses clarify the relationship between tax shields and the incentive to 
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use debt. The debt tax shield affects corporate finance decisions by reducing the 
corporate ETR, hence lowering the cost of capital. The hypothesis is supported 
strongly by the results. The results from the analyses confirm a negative 
relationship between leverage and companies' ETR. The findings are consistent 
with a growing body of research, such as that by Gupta and Newberry (1997), 
Graham (1996) and MacKie-Mason (1990), who find that tax status is affected by 
corporate finance decisions. The results confirm the tax shield hypothesis that 
increases in debt lower the company's ETR. The extent to which a company 
benefits from interest tax shields will in part depend on whether it has other tax 
shields such as investment tax allowances. However, despite various tax 
incentives, allowances and reliefs offered to companies by the Malaysian system, 
it appears that leverage is still an important determinant in lowering the corporate 
tax liability. The analyses allow the inference that companies quite aggressively 
use debt to benefit from interest deductions. The findings agree with the notion 
that Malaysia's tax structure favours debt financing. It demonstrates that the tax 
benefits of both short term and long term debt are found to be important in 
determining a company's capital structure. Part of the answer may be that 
Malaysia's existing tax structure favours both types of debt financing. Consistent 
with the tax shield theory, the results reveal that companies with more debt in their 
capital structure have a lower corporate ETR. The results also reveal that book 
value leverage appears to be a better explanatory variable than market value 
leverage. Leverage based on book value is consistent with the practice of many 
corporate finance researchers (for example, Pandey, 2004; Lasfer, 1995) as book 
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value is claimed to measure financial planning free of the distortions caused by the 
volatility of market prices. In summary, this thesis provides evidence that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between leverage decisions and ETRs in the 
emerging Malaysian market. The finding supports the intuitive notion that debt 
financing can be used as a tax shield for public listed companies in Malaysia. 
6.5 Foreign Activity 
With regard -to foreign activity, there are two different proxies under 
consideration. First, empirical tests were performed on the entire sample of 
companies, namely companies engaged in foreign activity and domestic-only 
companies. This was to determine whether companies which engage in foreign 
activity have lower or higher ETRS than domestic-only companies. Secondly, 
empirical tests were performed on the companies engaged in foreign activity only, 
to distinguish between companies with more extensive foreign activity and less 
extensive foreign activity. This is to determine whether companies with more 
extensive foreign activity have lower or higher ETRs than companies with less 
extensive foreign activity. 
6.5.1 Foreign Activity Companies and Domestic Only Companies 
The results suggest that companies engaging in foreign activities have higher 
ETRs than domestic only companies. The significant positive relationship, as 
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discussed in Chapter Five, is perhaps a result of Malaysian companies already 
operating in a low tax jurisdiction. Thus it is found that companies engaging in 
foreign activities have higher ETRs compared with companies with purely 
domestic activity. The distinct feature of the Malaysian capital market is that it has 
among the lowest corporate income tax rates among ASEAN countries in 
particular, and generally worldwide. However, the interdependence of operations, 
finances and technology may encourage companies to engage in operations in 
high-tax countries. Thus companies engaging in foreign operations are subject to 
higher foreign tax rates compared with the Malaysian corporate tax rates. Even 
though foreign activities more typically may provide opportunities for companies 
to avoid tax, however, in the case of Malaysian companies, they are exposed to 
higher foreign tax rates. Furthermore, the results of comparing the ETR of 
companies engaging in foreign activity and domestic only companies, supports 
Collins and Shackelford's (1999) assertion, which was confirmed by Rego (2003), 
that empirical research does not provide conclusive evidence that companies 
engaging in foreign activity pay less income tax than domestic-only companies. 
6.5.2 Extent of Foreign Activities 
This thesis develops the hypothesis, supported by the results, that companies with 
more extensive foreign activities have a lower ETR than companies with less 
extensive foreign activities. This finding is in line with the results documented in 
several studies, for example Harris and Feeny (2003), Rego (2003) and Leblang 
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(1998). This is as a result of tax benefits being available for foreign activities. For 
example, companies with more extensive foreign activities are able to engage in 
more effective tax planning than companies with less extensive foreign activities. 
Even though Malaysia has among the lowest corporate income tax rates 
worldwide, several other tax benefits exist that could be of advantage to 
companies which extensively engage in foreign activities. Companies which 
frequently engage in foreign activities could use their foreign operations to avoid 
income taxation. According to Rego (2003), companies engaging in foreign 
activities have opportunities to avoid income taxation by exploiting differences 
between the tax rules of different countries and the tax subsidy agreements with 
host countries. Despite the ability to take advantage of the tax rules of different 
countries or tax benefit agreements with host countries, Malaysian tax law also 
provides several tax incentives for companies engaging in foreign operations that 
could lower taxable income. Thus the results suggest that companies reporting 
higher levels of foreign activities are likely to engage in international tax planning, 
which reduces the corporate effective tax rate. 
6.6 Capital Intensity 
This thesis documents a significant negative relationship between capital intensity 
and ETR, resulting from tax preferences associated with investments in fixed 
assets. The result is consistent with the 2003 Harris and Feeny study on companies 
in Australia. Previous U. S. studies (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Stickney and 
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McGee, 1982) note the same finding as a result of accelerated depreciation 
provisions. In Malaysia, various tax benefits are associated with capital 
investments. Malaysian companies have been offered a number of tax incentives, 
particularly for activities which are capital intensive, with high value added 
content and involving new and emerging technologies. The tax incentives include 
investment tax allowances, industrial adjustment allowances, infrastructure 
allowances, reinvestment allowances, accelerated depreciation and preferential 
treatment of capital imports. The Malaysian tax code typically allows tangible 
assets to be depreciated over a period much shorter than their economic life. It 
demonstrates that companies are influenced by tax benefits in investing in fixed 
assets. Thus the evidence supports the notion that higher capital intensity resulting 
in higher depreciable costs and tax treatments leads to a lower ETR. 
6.7 Dividend 
The theoretical principles underlying the formulation of a company's dividend 
policy include signalling, agency theory, bird-in-hand and tax-preferences. The 
U. S. survey report by Baker et al. (1985) indicates that the most important 
determinants of dividend policy are the company's future earnings, the pattern of 
past dividends, the availability of cash, and concern about maintaining or 
increasing share price. In addition, in Malaysia, the availability of the dividend 
imputation system may be considered an important factor. This thesis rationalized 
the dividend payout ratio decision by appealing to tax effect preferences in order 
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to try to contribute to the solution of the dividend puzzle. This thesis has analyzed 
the dividend decision in the presence of a dividend tax imputation system. Under 
Malaysia's imputation tax system, imputation credits are stored at the company 
level and provide a tax benefit to shareholders once they are distributed as a 
dividend. The existence of this system not only provides benefits to shareholders 
but also to the company as it is no longer burdened with double taxation. Dividend 
payout ratios vary widely among companies. This thesis finds evidence that 
dividend payout ratios are not randomly distributed among companies. In the 
developed market, profits have long been regarded as the primary indicator of a 
company's capacity to pay dividend. Pruitt and Gitman (1991) indicate that 
current and past year profits are an important factor in influencing dividend 
payment. In another related study, Baker et al. (1985) reveal that future expected 
earnings are a major determinant of dividend payment. In Malaysia, Pandey 
(2001) confirms that companies increase their payment of dividends as earnings 
increase. This thesis focuses on the overall impact of taxation on dividend while 
taking into account the issue of the dividend imputation system. 
The company is hypothesized to have a positive relationship between dividend 
payments and corporate tax liability, owing to the franking account feature of the 
dividend imputation system. The dividend results are consistent and significant 
throughout all estimations, although, with a direction different from expected. The 
results suggest that the companies maximize dividend payment to lower their 
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ETR. One explanation may be that companies only pay dividend to the credit 
available in the franking account to avoid further tax burden. 
Even though the results are most consistent and significant in all estimations, they 
do not significantly contribute to solving the dividend puzzle. There is a matter 
left to future research and should be of interest to corporate finance researchers. 
6.8 Managerial Ownership 
The managerial ownership pattern in Malaysia is more family oriented 
(domination by family members). According to La-Porta et al. (1998), Malaysia 
has a high family ownership concentration and is reported to have an average of 
54 percent of shares family-owned in public companies. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) reveal that there is a number of listed companies in Malaysia with 
substantial family shareholdings which elect family members to sit on the boards 
both as executive and non-executive directors. According to Nicholls and Ahmed 
(1995), in countries where families have substantial equity holdings, there is 
generally little physical separation between those who own and those who manage 
capital. Thus their dominance could provide them with more power to force 
management into making decisions. The analyses from this thesis reveal that, 
consistent with the agency theory, companies with high levels of managerial 
ownership engage in tax avoiding activity more than companies with lower levels 
of managerial ownership. The results provide the evidence in support of 
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hypothesis 7 developed in this thesis. Substantial evidence has been found which 
supports the expectation that tax avoiding activity will be more prevalent in 
companies with high levels of managerial ownership. 
The motivation of tax avoidance strategies in companies under managerial 
ownership are influenced by elements of synergy or agency theory. Malaysia has 
an Anglo-American rather than the Continental European financial system. The 
Anglo-American capital markets model is characterized by the objective to 
maximize shareholder wealth, while the Continental European model is driven to 
maximize wealth of all stakeholders including management, labour, the local 
community, suppliers, creditors and even the government. Based on synergy- 
motivated tax planning, managerial decisions are expected to be made with the 
intention of increasing shareholders' wealth, partly by lowering a company's tax 
burden and increasing firm value. Based on agency-motivated tax planning, the 
management incentive is to maximize personal wealth or utility. Managers engage 
in tax planning to increase their prestige or career prospects, making them more 
valuable because of their ability to lower taxes. The results confirm the importance 
of this new explanatory variable in ETR studies. The finding in this thesis helps to 
establish a starting point for exploring empirically the importance of managerial 
ownership in tax avoidance studies. Several studies (for example, Derashid and 
Zhang, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997) have acknowledged that agency theory 
might be relevant to managerial ownership and tax avoidance. This thesis has 
answered the call by Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
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for an empirical specification that a greater degree of managerial ownership leads 
to more aggressive tax planning, resulting in lower tax burdens. 
6.9 Industry Effects 
This thesis has also examined whether there is an industry effect in corporate tax 
avoidance activity. The observed companies are grouped into seven industries: 
basic material, industrial, consumer goods, health care, consumer services, utilities 
and technology. This industry classification is different from Derashid's and 
Zhang's (2003) study which is based on the Bursa Malaysia classification whereas 
this thesis based on the Thomson Analytic Database. The Thomson Analytic 
Database includes two important sectors which are frequently given tax incentives, 
namely the industrial and technology sectors. The results reported that companies 
across different industries do have significantly different characteristics and levels 
of tax avoiding activity. 
It appears that the strongest correlation between firm characteristics and tax 
avoidance activities are found in four sectors, namely basic material, industrial, 
utilities and technology. Even for the industries where the weakest correlations are 
found (consumer goods, health care and consumer services), the estimations are 
found to influence substantially tax avoidance activities. 
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This thesis documents mixed results for the political cost hypothesis in different 
industries. There is evidence that large Malaysian companies have higher ETR 
than small Malaysian companies in the basic material and industrial sectors. 
However, a significant negative relationship was found in the technology sector, 
indicating that larger Malaysian companies have a lower ETR than smaller 
companies. This anomaly can be explained by the fact that the Malaysian 
government is now promoting science and technology as a tool to sustain and 
build economic development. Thus the technology sector may not suffer from so 
much political scrutiny as it is supporting the government's mission and is in a 
good position to lobby and influence for favourable tax treatment by the 
government. Furthermore, the technology sector enjoys various tax incentives that 
can benefit this sector by lowering its tax burden. 
With regard to the profitability hypothesis, not all industries show that more 
profitable companies have a lower tax burden. There is strong evidence that more 
profitable companies pay significantly less tax in both the basic material and 
industrial sectors. However, in the utilities and technology sectors, more profitable 
companies pay more tax than less profitable companies. The utilities sector is 
based on basic needs including water supply, waste management, gas power 
generation, construction, environmental services and trading, whereas the 
technology sector develops and provides technology and technical support. Both 
sectors are important as the utilities sector supplies basic needs to the nation and 
the technology sector carries out the challenges to fulfil Vision 2020. Thus one 
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explanation of the significant positive relation between profitability and ETR in 
these sectors may be that these sectors are important and under the supervision of 
the government and are thus unable to engage in more aggressive tax planning. 
The coefficient for leverage is negative and statistically significant with tax 
avoidance in most sectors except for the consumer services sector. Strong 
evidence for the role of interest tax shields is found in the basic material, industrial 
and health care sectors. Both the basic material and industrial sectors are 
manufacturing types of industries. According to Derashid and Zhang (2003), the 
manufacturing segment has been one of the fastest growing sectors in Malaysia, 
whereas, the health care sector engages in more research and development 
activities. Thus, all these sectors require a high level of funding to finance their 
activities. Companies which favour debt finance would be able to take advantage 
of the interest tax shields, thus lowering the company's effective tax rate. 
One of the most striking results is that foreign activity is found to be strongly 
statistically significant in technology sector. Malaysia offers a wide range of 
incentives for companies to engage in foreign activities, particularly in the 
technology industry. For example, various incentives have been introduced not 
only to bolster domestic economic development, but also to spur export activities 
by offering a variety of tax exemptions and deductions. The development of 
technology plays a crucial role in the government's plans. One of the 
government's aims is to attract multinational corporations through the 
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development of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). The government is also 
keen to promote exporters by offering them a variety of tax benefits. Malaysia also 
has three Science and Technology (S&T) parks for which typical activities are 
high-tech manufacturing, R&D, and software and IT services. S&T parks' 
strategies include ensuring a rapid transfer of R&D results to high-tech industries. 
The parks are able to attract many world class high-tech companies from the 
developed countries to shift their activities into these parks. Various tax incentives 
are offered as foreign technology transfer is important to upgrading Malaysia into 
a developed country. As documented by the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2002), Singapore recorded the highest technology transfer index (1.95), followed 
by Malaysia (1.08), Taiwan Province of China (0.90) and the Republic of Korea 
(0.82). Thus, Malaysia's science and technology environment provides incentives 
for companies to carry out foreign activities. 
There is evidence that all industries except for the consumer services sector utilize 
capital intensity to reduce corporate tax. The negative association between capital 
intensity and ETR appears to be significant in almost all industries, implying that 
companies are moving from labour intensive to capital intensive systems through 
the industrialization policy implemented by the Malaysian government. The only 
sector which seems not to employ capital intensity tax provisions to lower the 
company's tax burdens is consumer services. This sector's activity is associated 
with hotels and resorts, travel and tours, and transportation activities which do not 
really involve high investment in machinery and equipment like the other sectors. 
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This would suggest a reason why this sector is unable to exploit capital intensity to 
lower its tax liability. 
The results show that dividend has a significant negative coefficient towards ETR 
in all sectors except for the health care sector. This indicates that almost all sectors 
show evidence of maximizing dividend payment, but not in the health care sector. 
One explanation may be that this sector engages in higher risk activities due to 
research and development (R&D), and companies may choose to limit their 
dividend payouts. Rozeff (1982) suggests that high risk companies in general tend 
to have low dividend payouts. 
Managerial ownership indicates a strong relationship with ETR in the consumer 
goods and utilities sectors. Consumer goods are based on activities such as trading 
and distributing raw material for the food industry, processing agricultural 
products and trading textile material. This kind of industry is purported to have a 
high percentage of shares owned by family member. Consistent with agency- 
motivated tax planning, managers undertake tax planning activity with the 
intention of maximizing their wealth. The utilities sector is based on basic 
infrastructure needs, which are water supply, waste management and gas power 
generation. The evidence supporting managerial ownership characteristic as 
significant factor in this industry for lowering its tax burden is consistent with 
synergy-motivated tax planning, that is, tax planning activity is to maximize 
shareholders' wealth. 
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6.10 Summary, Limitations and Future Studies 
6.10.1 Summary 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this thesis confirms the importance of all 
explanatory variables to explain corporate tax avoidance strategies. Even though 
all of the explanatory variables, namely political cost, profitability, leverage, 
foreign activity dummy variable, foreign activity, capital intensity, dividend and 
managerial ownership, have significant coefficient in relation to ETR, nonetheless, 
two explanatory variables, namely foreign activity dummy variable and dividend, 
are significant with a direction different from that expected. 
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will be able to explain to tax authorities 
the factors affecting corporate tax avoidance strategies for public listed companies 
in Malaysia. Thus this thesis may partly assist tax authorities, policy makers and 
financial analysts to understand the economic consequences of their regulations on 
the tax paying entities. In brief, larger companies have higher ETRs than smaller 
companies due to the fact that larger companies suffer from political costs. More 
profitable companies avoid more taxes than less profitable companies as they have 
greater resources to engage in tax planning. Despite the other non-debt tax shields, 
it appears that debt is still an important determinant in lowering the corporate tax 
burden. Companies engaging in foreign activity have a higher tax burden than 
companies which do not engage in foreign activity. The explanations for this 
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finding may be because Malaysia is already a low tax jurisdiction area, hence 
companies engaging in foreign activities face higher foreign statutory tax rates 
which might force them to declare or shift foreign income into Malaysia and 
experience higher ETRs. However, companies with more extensive foreign 
activity have lower tax burdens than companies with less extensive foreign 
activity. This finding supports the contention that companies with more extensive 
foreign activity have more opportunity to engage in tax planning compared with 
companies with less extensive foreign activity. The result also reveals that 
investment in tangible assets would lead to greater tax savings as a result of 
various tax incentives such as investment tax allowances, industrial adjustment 
allowances, infrastructure allowances, reinvestment allowances and accelerated 
depreciation. The findings show a significant negative relationship between 
dividend and ETR, indicating that companies which maximize dividend payment 
will lower their tax burden. Even though the findings are significant throughout all 
the estimations, however, the direction is different from expected. Therefore the 
dividend result should be interpreted as showing correlation, not causality. The 
result provides substantial evidence that companies with high levels of managerial 
ownership avoid more tax than low levels of managerial ownership, thus 
supporting the synergy and agency theories developed in this thesis. 
In addition, the findings confirm the importance of industry effects in the 
relationship between firm characteristics and tax avoiding activity. The evidence 
shows that companies across different industries do have significantly different 
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firm characteristics and levels of tax avoiding activity. It is found that industrial 
and technology sectors pay significantly less tax than any other sectors. The 
results can be explained by the various tax benefits offered for both sectors. The 
industrial sector has been provided with various tax incentives based on a long 
standing industry policy to promote and support companies in this sector. The 
Malaysian government also offers various tax incentives for the technology sector 
as science and technology has become part of achieving the Malaysian 
government's Vision 2020 aspiration, which is to be a fully developed and 
industrialized country by the year 2020. 
6.10.2 Limitations and Future Studies 
It remains to conclude this thesis by highlighting the limitations of this study, as 
well as to suggest some recommendations for future research. One limitation of 
this thesis is that the data is based on public listed companies only and does not 
include non-listed companies. Because of Malaysian financial accounting law, 
only public listed companies have to disclose their financial statements. Thus this 
thesis does not examine the association between corporate tax avoidance and firm 
characteristics for non-listed companies in Malaysia. 
Another limitation is the tax avoidance model might not be complete. Corporate 
tax avoidance may take many different forms and utilize many different structures, 
hence it is difficult to formulate a single model. This thesis, however, identifies a 
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number of firm characteristics which may explain tax avoidance. There may be 
other factors influencing tax avoidance, including merger and acquisitions which 
have not been included in this study. 
This thesis builds an analytical model of the hypotheses and provides strong 
empirical evidence in its support. It contributes to a further understanding of the 
factors which might affect corporate tax avoidance strategies. This thesis, thus, 
provides a basis for future studies to examine factors other than those included 
here. Additional variables, which either have been neglected or have been the 
subject of only limited investigation, could be more fully explored. Two additional 
variables have been considered in this thesis which is dividend and managerial 
ownership. Further research might include the other characteristics that have not 
been included in the model, such as compensation plans, research and 
development (R&D), merger and acquisitions, net operating losses, tax advisers 
and company culture. In the future, as more data becomes available, one could 
explore and identify additional variables that may have an influence on the tax 
avoidance activity of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
This thesis has concentrated on the impact of corporate tax on the dividend 
imputation system. Under the dividend imputation system, however, researchers 
could investigate both corporate and personal taxes. Future research is suggested 
to determine the shareholder aspect of the dividend imputation system as this 
thesis focuses on corporate tax and not individual tax, hence preventing the 
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inclusion of shareholder implications. This system is expected to benefit 
shareholders as long as company tax rates are the same or lower than the 
shareholder's highest marginal tax rates. Thus it is predicted that shareholders 
with lower marginal tax rates would prefer dividends more than shareholders with 
high marginal tax rates. Future work is suggested to examine the shareholder 
perspective, particularly in countries with a large difference between company tax 
rates and the individual highest marginal tax rates. 44 
A particular problem in corporate tax avoidance studies, including in this thesis, is 
the issue of how to define ETR. There are many ways to measure ETR and this 
may lead to the different findings between studies. As discussed earlier in Chapter 
Three, this thesis defined ETR in line with Rego (2003), as it reflects a company's 
effective tax planning, and hence makes it a reasonable proxy for tax avoidance 
activity. Future research could also include the effect of different definitions of 
ETRs on corporate tax avoidance studies. 
44 Malaysia has a 28 per cent flat corporate tax rates and a 29 per cent highest marginal tax rate for 
individuals. 
247 
References 
Table of Statues 
Model Colonial Territories Income Tax Ordinance 1922 (United Kingdom) 
Income Tax Ordinance 1947 
Sabah Income Tax Ordinance 1956 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance 1958 
Sarawak Inland Revenue Ordinance 1960 
Companies Act 1965 (Act 125) 
Income Tax Act 1967 (Act 53) 
Income Tax (Qualifying Plant Annual Allowances) Rules 1968 
Investment Incentives Act 1968 
Income Tax (Promotion of Exports) Rules 1986 
Promotion of Investment Act 1986 (Act 327) 
U. S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Labuan Offshore Business Activity Tax Act 1990. 
Budget 1997. (1998) 1997/1998 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Promotion of Investments (Promoted Activities and Promoted Products) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Order 1999 
Budget 2002. (2003) 2002/2003 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Budget 2003. (2004) 2003/2004 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Law Reports 
W. T. Ramsey Ltd v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] A. C. 300 
Furniss v. Dawson [ 1984] A. C. 474 
Peabody v. The Commissioner for Taxation [ 1994] ATC 4140 
Government Reports 
Hampel, R. (1998). Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report. Gee, 
London. 
Cadbury, A (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance. Gee, London. 
The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee 1999 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2002 
248 
References 
References 
Abdullah, S. N., Ku Ismail, K. N. & Lode, N. A. (2002). Disclosure of extraordinary 
items and income smoothing behaviour in Malaysia. Jurnal Pengurusan 21, 
57-75. 
Adaoglu, C. (2000). Instability in the dividend policy of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE) corporations: Evidence from an emerging market. Emerging Market 
Review, 1(2), 252-270. 
Agrawal, A. & Jayaraman, N. (1994). The dividend policies of all-equity firms: A 
direct test of the free cash flow theory. Managerial & Decision Economics, 
15(2), 139-148. 
Agrawal, A. & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397. 
Aivazian, V. & Booth, L. (2003). Do emerging market firms follow different dividend 
policies from U. S. firms? The Journal of Financial Research, 26(3), 371-387. 
Alavi, R. (1996). Industrialisation in Malaysia: Import substitution and infant 
industry performance. London: Routledge. 
Alchian, A. A. & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs and economic 
organization. American Economic Review, 62(5), 777-795. 
Alchian, A. A. & Kessel, R. (1962). Competition, Monopoly and Pursuit of Money. In 
Aspects of Labor Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Alli, K., Khan, A. & Ramirez, G. (1993). Determinants of dividend policy: A factorial 
analysis. The Financial Review, 28(4), 523-547. 
Allingham, M. G. & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. 
Journal of Public Economics, 1(3/4), 323-338. 
Amihud, Y. & Lev, B. (1981). Risk reduction as a managerial motive for 
conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 605-617. 
Ang, J. S. (1987). Do dividends matter? A review of corporate dividend theories and 
evidence. New York: Salamon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial 
Institutions, New York University. 
249 
References 
Annuar, M. N. & Shamsher, M. (1993). Earning and dividend behaviour. Journal of 
Social Science and Humanities, 1(2), 171- 177. 
Auerbach, A. J. (1983). Corporate taxation in the United States. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2,451-505. 
Auerbach, A. J. & Hines, J. R. (1988). Investment tax incentives and frequent tax 
reforms. American Economic Review, 78(2), 211 - 216. 
Baker, H. K. (1999). Dividend policy issues in regulated and unregulated firms: A 
managerial perspective. Managerial Finance, 25(6), 1-19. 
Baker, H. K. Farrelly, G. E. & Edelman, R. B. (1985). A survey of management views 
on dividend policy. Financial Management, 14(3), 78-84. 
Baker, H. K., Powell, G. E. & Veit, E. T. (2002). Revisiting managerial perspectives on 
dividend policy. Journal of Economics and Finance, 26(3), 267-283. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 3rd edition. John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd. 
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2003). BNM Annual Report 2003. Retrieved 30 October 
2005, from Bank Negara Malaysia, Central Bank of Malaysia Web site: 
http: //www. portsworld. com/banknegara/annual report 03. htm 
Barclay, M. J. & Smith, C. W. Jr. (1995). The maturity structure of corporate debt. 
Journal of Finance, 50(2), 609-631. 
Bardai, B. (1991). Evaluation of the 1988 Malaysian Tax Reform Proposals: A 
General Equilibrium Approach. PhD Dissertation, University College, 
London. 
Bathala, C. K., Moon, K. P. & Rao, R. P. (1994). Managerial ownership, debt policy, 
and the impact of institutional holdings: An agency theory perspective. 
Financial Management, 23(3), 38-50. 
Baumol, W. J. (1959). Business Behavior, Value and Growth. Wiley, New York. 
Bellamy, D. E. (1994). Evidence of imputation clienteles in the Australian equity 
market. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 11(2), 275-287. 
Belsley, D., Kuh, E. & Welsch, R. (1980). Regression Diagnostics: Identifying 
Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: Wiley. 
250 
References 
Bernstein, P. L. (1996). Dividends: the puzzle. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
9(1), 4-15. 
Bhattacharya, S. (1979). Imperfect information, dividend policy, and `the Bird in the 
Hand Fallacy. ' Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 259-270. 
Black, F. (1976). The dividend puzzle. Journal of Portfolio Management, 2(2), 5-8. 
Black, F. & Scholes, M. (1974). The effects of dividend yield and dividend policy on 
common stock prices and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 1(1), 1-22. 
Bond, S., Chennells, L. & Devereux, M. (1995), Company dividends and taxes in the 
UK, Fiscal Studies, 16(3), 1-18. 
Brealey, R. A. & Myers, S. C. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance. 7`l' edition. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Brennan, M. J. & Schwartz, E. S. (1978). Corporate income taxes, valuation and the 
problem of optimal capital structure. Journal of Business, 51(1), 103-114. 
Budget 1997. (1998). 1997/1998 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Budget 2002. (2003). 2002/2003 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Budget 2003. (2004). 2003/2004 Malaysian Tax and Business Booklet. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
Buijink, W. Janssen, B. & Schols, Y. (2001). Corporate tax competition in the 
European Union, MARC, Maastricht University. 
Buijink, W., Janssen, B. & Schols, Y. (2000). Effective tax rates for listed companies 
in the OECD, MARC, Maastricht University. 
Buijink, W., Janssen, B. & Schols, Y. (1999). Corporate effective tax rates in the 
European Union, MARC, Maastricht University. 
Callihan D. S. (1994). Corporate effective tax rates: A synthesis of the literature. 
Journal ofA ccounting Literature, 12,1 - 43. 
Caroll, R. & Wasylenko, M. (1994). Do state business climates still matter? Evidence 
of a structural change. National Tax Journal, 47(1), 19-37. 
251 
References 
Chateau, J. D. (1979). Dividend policy revisited: Within-and without-of-sample tests. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 6(3), 355-372. 
Chatterjee, S. & Scott, J. H. Jr. (1989). Explaining differences in corporate capital 
structure: Theory and new evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 13(2), 
283-309. 
Cheah, K. G. & Chu, E. Y. (2004). The determinants of ownership structure in 
Malaysia. Fourth Asia Pasific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting 
Conference, 4-6 July, Singapore. 
Christie, A. A. (1990). Aggregation of test statistics: An evaluation of the evidence on 
contracting and size hypotheses. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 12(1- 
3), 15-36. 
Chui, A., Strong, N. & Cadle, J. (1992). The empirical significance of tax effects on 
the valuation of dividends: The UK evidence. Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting, 19(4), 515- 532. 
Chung, 0. (2007). `How foreign firms dodge taxes in China' Asia Times, 11 April. 
Citizens For Tax Justice. (2003). More Corporate Tax Shelters on The Way? 
Washington, DC: Citizen for Tax Justice. 
Citizens For Tax Justice. (2004). Congress Passes $210 Billion in New Corporate Tax 
Breaks. Washington, DC: Citizen for Tax Justice. 
Citizens For Tax Justice. (2005). Corporate tax avoidance in the state even worse 
than federal. Washington, DC: Citizen for Tax Justice. 
Clowery, G., Outslay, E. & Wheeler, J. (1986). The debate on computing corporate 
effective tax rates - An accounting view, Tax Notes, 30,991-997. 
Collins, J., Kemsley, D. & Shackelford, D. (1997). Transfer pricing and the persistent 
zero taxable income of foreign-controlled U. S corporations. Journal of the 
American Taxation Association, 19(2), 68 - 83. 
Collins, J. & Shackelford, D. (1999). Writers challenge claim of favorable cross- 
border taxations. Tax Notes, 82(4), 131-134. 
Collins, M. C., Saxena, A. K. & Wansley, J. W. (1996). The role of insiders and 
dividend policy: A comparison of regulated and unregulated firms. Journal of 
Financial and Strategic Decisions, 9(2), 1-9. 
252 
References 
Craig, C. K. & Todd, H. I. (1993). An overview of corporate tax issues involving the 
European community. Journal ofAccountancy, 175(1), 29-32. 
Crutchley, C. E. & Hansen, R. S. (1989). A test of the agency theory of managerial 
ownership, corporate leverage and corporate dividend. Financial 
Management, 18(4), 36-46. 
Daley, L. A. & Vigeland, R. L. (1983). The effects of debt covenants and political 
costs on the choice of accounting methods: The case of accounting for R&D 
costs. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 5(3), 195-211. 
Dashan, X. (2004) `Campaign against tax evasion launched' The China Daily, 7 July. 
DeAngelo, H. & DeAngelo, L. (1985). Managerial ownership of voting rights: A 
study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14(1), 33-69. 
DeAngelo, H. & Masulis, R. (1980). Optimal capital structure under corporate and 
personal taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1), 3-8 1. 
Derashid, C. & Zhang, H. (2003). Effective tax rates and the "industrial policy" 
hypothesis: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 12(1), 45-62. 
Desai, M. & Dharmapala, D. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high powered 
incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 145-179. 
Devereux, M. P., Griffith, R. & Klemm, A. (2004). Why Has the UK Corporation Tax 
Raised So Much Revenue? Fiscal Studies, 25(4), 367-518. 
Dhaliwal, D., Erickson, M. & Trezevant, R. (1999). A test of the theory of tax 
clienteles for dividend policies. National Tax Journal, 52(2), 179-194. 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Salamon, G. L. & Smith, E. D. (1982). The effect of owner versus 
management control on the choice of accounting methods. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 4(1), 41-53. 
D'Souza, J. (1999). Agency cost, market risk, investment opportunities and dividend 
policy-an international perspective. Managerial Finance, 25(6), 35-43. 
Dyl, A. (1988). Corporate control and management compensation: Evidence on the 
agency problem. Managerial and Decision Economics, 9(1), 21-25. 
253 
References 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American 
Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659. 
Economic Report 2006, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. National Printers Berhad. 
Edwards, J. S. S., Mayer, C. P., Pashades, P. & Poterba, J. M. (1987). The effects of 
taxation on corporate dividend policy in the UK. IFS Working Paper, No. 96. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. 
Ender, P. (2006) Multicollinearity. Retrieved 30 October 2006 from the University of 
Notre Dame Web site: http: //www. nd. edu/-rwilliam/stats2/l11. pdf 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(2), 288-307. 
Fleischman, G. M. (1995). The impact of state and local taxation on industry location 
decisions: A review of the literature. Arkansas Business and Economic 
Review, 28(2), 1-12. 
Fletcher, K. (2002). Tax incentives in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. IMF 
Conference on Foreign Direct Investment: Opportunities and Challenges for 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam, August 16-17. 
Fredriksson, T. (2005). R&D: Developing countries - R&D spreads out. Foreign 
Direct Investment. London, Oct. 1,1. 
Friend. I. & Hasbrouck, J. (1988). Determinants of capital structure. Research in 
Finance, 7,1-19. 
Friend, I. & Lang, L. H. P. (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial self- 
interest on corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance, 43(June), 271-281. 
Fullerton, D. (1984). Which effective tax rates? National Tax Journal, 37(1), 23-41. 
Gatward, P. & Sharpe, I. G. (1996). Capital structure dynamics with interrelated 
adjustment: Australian evidence. Australia Journal of Management, 21(2), 89- 
112. 
Global Competitive Report (2002). The United States: Centre for International 
Development (Harvard University). 
254 
References 
Gordon, R. H. & Lee, Y. (2001). Do taxes affect corporate debt policy? Evidence from 
U. S. corporate tax return data. Journal of Public Economics, 82(2), 195-224. 
Grabosky, P. & Braithwaite, J. (1987). Corporate Crime in Australia, Trends and 
Issues No. 5, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra. 
Graham, J. R. (1996). Debt and the marginal tax rate. Journal of Financial Economics, 
4](1), 41-73. 
Graham, J. R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt? Journal of Finance, 55(5), 
1901-1941. 
Graham, J. R. & Tucker, A. L. (2006). Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 81(3), 563-594. 
Gravelle, J. G. (1982). Effects of the 1981 depreciation revisions on the taxation of 
income from business capital. National Tax Journal, 35(1), 1-18. 
Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric Analysis, 4h edition, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
Guenther, D. A. (1994). Earning management in response to corporate tax rate 
changes: Evidence from the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The Accounting Review, 
69(1), 230-243. 
Gujarati, D. (1995). Basic Econometrics. McGraw-Hill, Singapore. 
Gupta, G. S. & Lok, K. S. (1995). Dividend behaviour in Malaysia. Capital Market 
Review, 73-83. 
Gupta, S. & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate 
effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 16(1) 1- 34. 
Haniffa, R. M. & Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations. Abacus, 38(3), 317-349. 
Haniffa, R. & Hudaib, M. (2006) Corporate governance structure and performance of 
Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
33(7-8), 1034-1062. 
Hanlon, M. & Shevlin, T. (2001). Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock 
Options and Implications for Research. Working Paper. University of 
Washington, Seattle, WA. 
255 
References 
Hanson, R. C. & Song, M. H. (2003). Long term performance of divesting firms and 
the effect of managerial ownership. Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(3), 
321-336. 
Harberger, A. C. (1959). The corporate income tax: An empirical appraisal. In 
Proceedings of the Tax Revision Compendium, 1,231-250. House Ways and 
Means Committee. 
Harris, M. & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 
46(1), 297-356. 
Harris, M. & Raviv, A. (1990). Capital structure and the information role of debt. 
Journal of Finance, 45(2), 321-349. 
Harris, M. N. & Feeny, S. (2003). Habit persistence in effective tax rates. Applied 
Economics, 35(8), 951-958. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 
1251-1271. 
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 7(1/2/3), 85-107. 
Higgins, R. C. (1981). Sustainable growth under inflation. Financial Management, 
10(4), 36-40. 
Hines, J. (1999). Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation. 
National Tax Journal, 52(2), 305-322. 
Hodgkinson, L. (2002) Tax costs and signalling benefits: the impact of surplus ACT. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29(3 & 4), 411-428. 
Holland, K. (1998) Accounting policy choice: The relationship between corporate tax 
burden and company size. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25(3 
and 4), 265-288. 
Hulten, C. R. (1984). Tax policy and the investment decision. The American Economic 
Review, 74(2), 236 - 241. 
Hulten, C. R. & Robertson, J. W. (1985). The taxation of high technology industries. 
National Tax Journal, 37(3), 327-345. 
256 
References 
Inland Revenue Annual Report (2000). Retrieved 30 October 2006, from Inland 
Revenue Board web site: 
http: //www. hasilnet. org. my/english/pdf/annualreport2000-bi. pdf 
Inland Revenue Annual Report (2003). Retrieved 30 October 2006, from Inland 
Revenue Board Web site: 
http: //www. hasilnet. org. my/english/pdf/LHDNM-AR2003_English. pdf 
Institute of Taxation and Economic Policy. (2000). Study Finds Resurgence in 
Corporate Tax Avoidance. Washington, DC: Institute of Taxation and 
Economic Policy. 
Inoue, T. (1996). The choice of accounting policy in Japan. Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, 7(1), 1-23. 
Isa, M. (1992). Dividend policies and practices of listed Malaysian companies. 
Securities Industry Review, 18(1), 53-64. 
Ismail, R. & Yussof, I. (2003). Labour market competitiveness and foreign direct 
investment: The case of Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Regional 
Science, 82(3), 389-402. 
Iwamoto, Y. (1992). Effective tax rates and Tobin's q. Journal of Public Economics, 
48(2), 225-237. 
Jacob, J. (1996). Taxes and transfer pricing: Income shifting and the volume of 
intrafirm transfers. Journal ofAccounting Research, 34(2), 301-312. 
Janssen, B. (2005). Corporate effective tax rates in the Netherlands. De Economist, 
153(1), 47-66. 
Janssen, B. & Buijink, W. (2000). Determinants of the variability of corporate 
effective tax rates (ETRs): Evidence for the Netherlands. MARC Working 
Paper, Universiteit Maastricht. 
Jensen, G. R., Solberg, D. P. & Zorn, T. S. (1992). Simultaneous determination of 
insider ownership, debt and dividend policy. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247-263. 
Jensen, M. & Ruback, R. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific 
evidence. Journal ofFinancialEconomics, 11(1-4), 5-50. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeover. 
American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-339. 
257 
References 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 
305 - 360. 
John, K. & Williams, J. (1985). Dividends, dilution, and taxes: A signaling 
equilibrium. Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1053-1070. 
Kalay, A. & Michaely, R. (1993). Dividends and taxes: A reexamination. Working 
Paper, University of Utah. 
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of 
Japan and the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), 510-546. 
Kasipillai, J. (1997). Aspects of The Hidden Economy and Tax Non-Compliance in 
Malaysia. PhD Thesis, The University of New England, Armidale. 
Kay, J. A. (1990). Tax policy: A survey. The Economic Journal, 100(399), 18 - 75. 
Kern, B. & Morris, M. (1992). Taxes and firm size: The effect of tax legislation 
during the 1980s. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 14(1), 80- 
96. 
Kester, G. W. & Isa, M. (1996). Dividend policy in Malaysia: A comparative analysis. 
Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies, 33(1), 33-48. 
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (1990). The organizational fool: Balancing a leader's hubris. 
Human Relations, 43(8), 751-770. 
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (1991). Whatever happened to the philosopher-king? The 
leader's addiction to power. Journal of Management Studies, 28(4), 339-351. 
Kim, K. & Limpaphayom. (1998). Taxes and firm size in Pacific-Basin emerging 
economies. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 7(1), 
47-63. 
KPMG's corporate tax survey (2006). Retrieved 15 September 2006, from KPMG 
International Web site: 
http: //www. kpmg. co. nz/download/ 102964/ 110012/KPMG's%2OCorporatc%2 
OTax%2ORate%20Survey%202006. pdf 
Kroll, M. J., Toombs, L. A. & Wright, P. (2000). Napoleon's tragic march home from 
Moscow: Lessons in hubris. Academy of Management Executive, 14(1), 117- 
128. 
258 
References 
La-Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silances, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership 
around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
La-Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silances, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and 
finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Langli, J. C., & Saudagaran, S. M. (2004). Taxable income differences between foreign 
and domestic controlled corporations in Norway. European Accounting 
Review, 13(4), 713-741. 
Lasfer, M. A. (1995). Agency costs, taxes and debt: The UK evidence. European 
Financial Management, 1(3), 265-285. 
Lasfer, M. A. (1996). Taxes and dividends: The UK evidence. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 20(3), 455-472. 
Leauby, B. A. (1990). Determinants of Corporate Tax Avoidance Strategy: An 
Empirical Analysis. PhD Dissertation, Drexel University. 
Leblang, S. (1998). International double nontaxation. Tax Notes International 
20/7/98,181-183. 
Lee, Y. T., Liu, Y. J. & Roll, R. (2006). Taxes and dividend clientele: Evidence from 
trading and ownership structure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(1), 229- 
246. 
Leithner, S. & Zimmermann, H. (1993). Market value and aggregate dividends: A 
reappraisal of recent tests, and evidence from European Markets. Swiss 
Journal of Economics and Statistics, 129,99-119. 
Lintner, J. (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained 
earnings and taxes. American Economic Review, 46(2), 97-113. 
Litzenberger, R. H., & Ramaswamy, K. (1979). The effects of personal taxes and 
dividends on capital asset prices: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 7(2), 163-195. 
Lloyd, W. P., Jahera, S. J. & Page, D. E. (1985). Agency cost and dividend payout 
ratios. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 24(3), 19-29. 
Lomax, J. W. (1990). A model of ICCs' dividend payments. Bank of England 
Discussion Paper, No. 52. 
259 
References 
Lymer, A. & Oats, L. (2006). Taxation policy and practice. 12th edition. Fiscal 
Publication. 
Mackie, J. (1999). The puzzling comeback of the corporate income tax. In 
Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Conference, 93-102. Washington 
DC: National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America. 
MacKie-Mason, J. K. (1990). Do taxes affect corporate financing decisions? Journal 
of Finance, 45 (5), 1471 - 1493. 
Maloney, M. T., McCormick, R. E. & Mitchell, M. L. (1993). Managerial decision 
making and capital structure. Journal of Business, 66(2), 189-217. 
Malaysian code of corporate governance. (2000). Malaysia Law Journal Sdn. Bhd. 
Malaysia. 
Manzon, G. & Plesko, G. (2002). The relation between financial and tax reporting 
measures of income. Tax Law Review, 55,175-214. 
Manzon, G. B. Jr. & Smith, W. R. (1994). The effect of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the distribution of effective 
tax rates. Journal ofAccounting and Public Policy, 13(4), 349-362. 
Maydew, E. L. (2000). Empirical Tax Research in Accounting: A Discussion. Working 
Paper. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA. 
McConnel, J. J. & Servaes, J. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595-612. 
McDonald, J., Jacquillant, B. & Nussenbaum, M. (1975). Dividend, investment and 
financing decisions: Empirical evidence of French firms. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 10(5), 741-755. 
McIntyre, R. S. & Nguyen, T. D. C. (2000). Corporate income taxes in the 1990s. 
Washington, DC: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. 
Miller, M. & . 
Scholen, M. S. (1982). Dividends and taxes: Some empirical evidence. 
Journal of Political Economy, 90(6), 1118-1141. 
Miller, M. H. (1977). Debt and taxes. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 261-275. 
Miller, M. H. & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend policy under asymmetric information. 
Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1031-1051. 
260 
References 
Mills, L. (1998). Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. 
Journal ofAccounting Research, 36(2), 343-356. 
Mills, L., Erickson, M. & Maydew, E. (1998). Investments in tax planning. Journal of 
the American Taxation Association, 20(1), 1-20. 
Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A 
correction. American Economic Review, 53(3), 433-443. 
Moh'd, M. A., Perry, L. G. & Rimbley, J. N. (1998). The impact of ownership structure 
on corporate debt policy: A time series cross-sectional analysis. Financial 
Review, 33(3), 85-99. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1988) Managerial ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,292- 
315. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-592. 
Myers, S. C. & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
Newman, H. A. (1988). The Influence of Bonus Plans on Resource Allocation 
Decisions. Working Paper, The University of Michigan. 
Nicholls, D. & Ahmed, K. (1995). Disclosure quality in corporate annual reports of 
non-financial companies in Bangladesh. Research in Accounting in Emerging 
Economies, 3,149-171. 
Nissim, D. & Ziv, A. (2001). Dividend changes and future profitability. Journal of 
Finance, 56(6), 2111-2133. 
Omer, T. C., Molloy, K. H. & Ziebart, D. A. (1991). Measurement of effective 
corporate tax rates using financial statement information. The Journal of the 
American Taxation Association, 13(1), 57-72. 
Omer, T. C., Molloy, K. H. & Ziebart, D. A. (1993) An investigation of the firm size - 
effective tax rate relation in the 1980s. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, 8(2), 167-182. 
Palmer, J. (1973). The profit performance effects of the separation of ownership from 
control in large U. S. industrial corporations. The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, 4(1), 293-303. 
261 
References 
Pandey, I. M. (2001). Corporate dividend policy and behavior: the Malaysian 
experience. Working Paper, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 
India. 
Pandey, I. M. (2004). Capital structure, profitability and market structure: Evidence 
from Malaysia. Asia Pacific Journal of Economics and Business, 8(2), 78-91. 
Pandey, I. M. & Bhat, R. (1994). Dividend decision: A study of managers' 
perceptions. Decision, 21(1 &2), 67-86. 
Pattenden, K. (2006). Capital structure decisions under classical and imputation tax 
system: A natural test for tax effects in Australia. Australian Journal of 
Management, 31(1), 67-92. 
Phillips, J. (2003). Corporate tax planning effectiveness: The role of compensation- 
based incentives. The Accounting Review, 78(3), 847-874. 
Pindyck, R. & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1998). Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Porcano, T. (1986). Corporate tax rates: Progressive, proportional, or regressive. The 
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 7(2), 17-31. 
Potas, I. (1993). Thinking about tax avoidance. Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice No. 43, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra. 
Price Waterhouse. (1993-2006). Malaysian Budget. Price Waterhouse. Kuala 
Lumpur: Price Waterhouse. 
Price Waterhouse. (1990). Doing Business in Malaysia: Information Guide. Price 
Waterhouse. Kuala Lumpur: Price Waterhouse. 
Promotion Investment Act. (1986). Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services. 
Pruitt, S. W. & Gitman, L. J. (1991). The interaction between the investment, 
financing, and dividend decisions of major U. S. firms. The Financial Review, 
26(3), 409-430. 
Rego, S. O. (2003). Tax avoidance activities of US multinational corporations. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 1-35. 
Rosenberg, L. G. (1969). Taxation of income from capital, by industry group. In A. C. 
Harberger & M. J. Bailey (Eds), The Taxation of Income from Capital, 
Washington, DC. 
262 
References 
Ross, S. (1985). Debt and taxes and uncertainty. Journal of Finance, 40(3), 337-657. 
Rozeff, M. S. (1982). Growth, beta, and agency costs as determinants of dividend 
payout ratios. The Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249-259. 
Salomon, L. & Siegfried, J. (1977). Economic power and political influences: The 
impact of industry structure on public policy. The American Political Science 
Review, 71(3), 1026-1043. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
Seigfried, J. (1972). The relationship between economic structure and the effect of 
political influence: Empirical evidence from the federal corporation income 
tax program. PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin. 
Seigfried, J. J. (1974). Effective average US corporation income tax rates. National 
Tax Journal, 27(2), 245 - 259. 
Shapiro, S. S., & Wilk, M. B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality 
(complete samples). Biometrika, 52(3/4), 591-611. 
Shevlin, T. (1982). Australian corporate dividend policy: Empirical analysis. 
Accounting and Finance, 22(2), 1-22. 
Shevlin, T., & Porter, S. (1992). The corporate tax comeback in 1987: Some further 
evidence. Journal of American Taxation Association, 14(1), 58 - 79. 
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. 
Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 16(1-3), 167-198. 
Short, H. & Keasey, K. (1999). Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: 
Evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1), 79-101. 
Slemrod, J. (2001). A general model of the behavioral response to taxation. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 8(2), 119-128. 
Slemrod, J. (2004). The economics of corporate tax selfishness. National Tax Journal, 
57(4), 877-899. 
Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E. & Hudson, C. D. (1990). External monitoring and its 
effect on seasoned common stock issues. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 12(4), 397-417. 
263 
References 
Soler, D., Brigham, E. & Evanson, P. (1996). The dividend cut `heard' round the 
world: The case of FPL. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9(1), 4-15. 
Spooner, G. M. (1986). Effective tax rates from financial statements. National Tax 
Journal, 39(3), 293-306. 
STATA Press. (2005). STATA Reference Manual Release 9. College Station, TX: 
STATA Press. 
Stickney, C. & McGee, V. (1982). Effective corporate tax rates: the effect of size, 
capital intensity, leverage and other factors. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 1(2), 125 - 152. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1988). Why financial structure matters. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2(4), 121-126. 
Streuly, C. A. (1994). The primary objective of financial reporting: How are we 
doing? Ohio CPA Journal, December, 15-22. 
Stulz, R. M. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the 
market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,25-54. 
Stulz, R. M. (1990). Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 26(1), 3-28. 
Thillainathan, R. (1999). Corporate Governance and Restructuring in Malaysia: A 
Review of Markets, Mechanisms, Agents and the Legal Infrastructure. Paper 
prepared for the joint World Bank/OECD Survey of Corporate Governance. 
Titman, S. & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. 
Journal of Finance, 43(1), 1-19. 
Tresch, R. (2002). Public Finance, A Normative Theory. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Twite, G. (2001). Capital structure choices and taxes: Evidence from the Australian 
dividend imputation system. International Review of Finance, 2(4), 217-235. 
U. S. Department of Treasury. (1999). The problem of corporate tax shelters. 
Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office. 
U. S. Treasury. (1978). Effective income tax rates paid by United States corporations 
in 1972. Washington DC, United States Government Printing Office. 
264 
References 
Vergossen, R. G. A. (1993). The use and perceived importance of annual reports by 
investment analysts in the Netherland. European Accounting Review, 2(2), 
219-244. 
Watts, R. L. & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the 
determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112 - 
134. 
Watts, R, L. & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: A ten year 
perspective. The Accounting Review, 65(1), 131-156. 
Weir, C. & Laing, D. (2001). Governance structure, director independence and 
corporate performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13(2), 86-94. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), 817-838. 
Wilkie, P. (1988). Corporate average effective tax rates and inferences about relative 
tax preferences. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 10(1), 75 
-88. 
Wilkie, P. & Limberg, S. (1993). Measuring explicit tax (dis)advantage for corporate 
taxpayers: An alternative to average effective tax rates. Journal of the 
American Taxation Association, 15(l), 46-71. 
Wruck, K. P. (1994). Financial policy, internal control and performance: Sealed Air 
Corporation's leverage special dividend. Journal of Financial Economics, 
36(2), 157-192. 
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
5(2), 119 - 149. 
Zmijewski, M. & Hagerman, R. (1981). An income strategy approach to the positive 
theory of accounting standard setting/choice. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 3(2), 129 - 149. 
265 
Appendix 
Appendix A 
Tax Computation of Malaysian Companies 
Profit before taxation as per audited accounts X 
Add: 
Depreciation and amortisation of capital expense x 
Non-allowable items charged in profit and loss (P&L) account x 
Less: 
Allowable expenditure not reflected in P&L account (x) 
Non-taxable items in P&L (x) 
Non-business income to be taxed as a separate source (x) 
Special deduction (e. g., double deduction) (x) 
Adjusted business income X 
Add: 
Balancing charge x 
Less: 
Capital allowance: 
Unabsorbed allowances carried forward (x) 
Current year allowances (x) 
Balancing allowances (x) 
Statutory business income X 
Less: 
Tax incentives (e. g., investment tax allowances, etc. ) (x) 
Business loss b/f (if applicable) (x) 
Add: 
Other statutory income: 
Share of partnership income x 
Dividend (gross), interest, and discounts x 
Rent, royalties and premiums x 
Other gains or profits x 
Aggregate income X 
Less: 
Current year business losses from other sources (x) 
Adjusted loss from partnership (x) 
Prospecting expenditure (for mining companies) (x) 
Non-business deduction (e. g., gifts and donations) x) 
Chargeable income X 
Tax Payable: 
Chargeable income @ tax rate (28%) X 
Less: 
Section 110: Tax on dividend (gross dividend @ 28%) (x) 
Section 132/133: Double taxation relief (x) 
Net tax payable X 
